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ABSTRACT
The Political Economy of Military Spending, Freedom, Conflicts,
and Economic Growth in Developing Countries. (May 2006)
Riad A. Attar, B.S., Yarmouk University;
B.S., Far Eastern University;
M.A., Midwestern State University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Alex Mintz
This study assesses the effect of politics on economic growth in developing
societies. In this study I developed and applied an augmented production function model
to 69 developing countries with several political variables: regime type, institutional
freedom, political freedom, political stability, and ideological base. I investigated how
changes of political contexts affect economic growth by applying non-linear least
squares, and cross national time series techniques to the production function defense-
growth model utilizing time series data from 1960 to 2002. The results show that the
impacts of political variables on economic growth are at least as significant as the
economic variables; the externality of non-military spending has positive and significant
impact on economic growth in the majority of countries; and the impacts of economic
and military variables and their externalities’ effects on economic growth differ with
different political contexts. The main findings of the study provide guidelines to policy
decision makers in evaluating their “guns”-“butter” alternatives.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study assesses the effect of politics on growth in sixty nine developing
societies. Political economists (e.g. Harrod, 1939; Domar,1946; Solow, 1957, 1970;
Denison, 1967, 1985; Feder, 1982; Ram, 1986; Mintz & Huang, 1990, 1991; Ward &
Davis, 1992; Mueller & Atesoglu, 1993a, 1993b; Heo & DeRouen, 1998; Heo, 1998)
have not examined empirically the results of political factors on economic development
and growth (but see Heo & Mintz, 2002). In this study I developed and applied an
augmented production function model to 69 developing countries from 1960 to 2002,
and tested it with several political variables: political freedom, institutional freedom,
regime type, stability, and ideology, using a non-linear least squares (NLS) method, and
cross national time-series (CNTS) analysis. The empirical results show that the
influences of economic and military variables on economic growth while controlling for:
interstate and intra-state conflicts vary across different political contexts. The study
demonstrates empirically that politics matters in the development and growth of nations.
The Production Function Research Program
The study is an extension of the production function model research program
which began after the Great Depression in the early 1930s. The Purpose of this study is
___________________
This dissertation follows the style of the journal Political Psychology.
2to introduce to the production function defense-growth model political dimensions, and
to assess the impact of political and conflict variables on economic growth.
The study theorizes that excluding political factors from the production function
defense-growth model hampers any realistic explanation of the problems of economic
growth; that the influences of economic and military variables and their externalities
effects vary across different political contexts ; that political factors are at least as
important as economic factors in determining the outcome of economic growth; and that
intra-state and interstate conflicts have different impacts on economic growth, and their
impacts differ across regions.
By incorporating political and conflict variables such as political freedom,
institutional freedom, regime type, regime stability, regime ideological base; and intra-
state, interstate, and total conflicts, I augmented the production function to include the
fundamental dimensions of political regimes. Consequently, the production function
model should gain more explanatory power to predict economic growth and
development of nations. I extended the applicability of the production function defense-
growth model to the Third World, which has different level of economic and political
development from the First World. The main findings of the study offer important
contributions to the study of economic growth in developing countries, and provide
guidelines to policy decision makers in evaluating their “guns”-“butter” alternatives.
The study provides preponderance of empirical evidence that the externality of
military spending hinders economic growth, while the externality of non-military
spending promotes economic growth in all political contexts. This finding is huge
3because it resolved a controversial issue, which has been debated for more than three
decades. Also, the results of the study show that the impact of the non-military sector on
economic growth is positive and significant in the majority of countries, while the
impact of military sector on economic growth is positive and significant only in the
minority of countries.
Despite the proliferation of studies on the impact of military spending on
economic growth, it was inconclusive before this study, whether defense spending
hinders or promotes economic growth. In fact, despite many research efforts, no strong
conclusion about the relationship between military spending and economic growth can
be drawn from the literature. The inconsistent results have led Chan (1985, p. 405) to
conclude that a review of the literature in this area is “as likely to bewilder as it is to
enlighten.” (see also Mintz & Stevenson 1995, p. 283). Mintz and Stevenson (1995, p.
85) wrote, “the literature has failed to provide any meaningful consensus on the question
of whether defense spending encourages or hinders economic growth. Indeed, any study
that fails to address these issues is unlikely to contribute to such an answer.” The results
of my dissertation significantly contribute to settling such a question.
The study is the first that added conflict variables to the production function
defense-growth model and test them empirically across countries and regions. The cross
national time-series analysis with external and internal conflicts (2349 observations)
shows unequivocally that internal conflicts have negative and significant impact on
economic growth in all political contexts, while external conflicts have insignificant
negative impact on economic growth in all political contexts. The cross national time-
4series analysis of five regions: the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin
America, Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean region shows that the impact of conflicts on
economic growth differs across regions.
The Middle East and North African region shows preponderance of evidence that
internal and external conflicts have negative and significant impact on economic growth
with all political contexts. This finding strongly supports the theme of my case study in
chapter V, that the Middle East and North African countries have military mode of
production.
The study has very important policy implications since it provides compelling
empirical evidence and guidelines to policy makers on how to allocate the resources of
their states, and to adopt policies that promote economic growth. The main guidelines
that I believe are beneficial to policy decision makers are: first, policy makers should
reform their political system so it will contribute to economic growth. Improving the
levels of freedom, democracy, and openness of the political system are as important as
economic factors to promote economic growth; second, the reallocation of resources to
the civilian sector is the sin-qua-none to improve the performance of the economy in
developing countries. The leaders of the Middle East and North African countries should
pay closer attention to this point due to the enormous amount of resources that they
spend on the military sector; third, Third World leaders should pursue a policy of
national reconciliation between rich and poor, and among ethnic and religious groups
because domestic conflict has damaging effects on the performance of national
economy. In the Middle East and North African countries, in particular, economic
5development is more likely to improve if the leaders pursue policies that advance
domestic and international reconciliation.
In order to illuminate the above mentioned contributions of this study and show
its importance on the evolution of the production function model research program, I
first review the evolution of the neoclassic production function model; second, I review
the logic of the incorporation of defense spending factors into the neoclassic model of
economic growth; and finally, I review the logic of the incorporation of political
variables to the production function defense-growth model.
The Evolution of the Production Function
Solow (1988, p. xi) wrote, “Growth theory did not begin with my articles of
(1956) and (1957), and it certainly did not end there. Maybe it began with The Wealth of
Nations; and probably even Adam Smith had predecessors.” The Physiocratic school
founded by François Quesnay (1694-1774) preceded Adam Smith in developing the
fundamental ideas to achieve economic growth. The Physiocrats articulated the roles of
economic activities that expand the country’s revenue such as industrialization, free
trade, and investment. The Physiocrats believed that a country should concentrate on
manufacturing only to the extent that the local availability of raw materials and of
suitable labor enabled it to have cost advantage over its overseas competitors (see
Muller, 1978; Eltis, 1988). Thus, the complete lifting of all restrictions on local and
foreign sales of agricultural products, and sufficient private investments would only be
forthcoming if they improve the general economic climate. In accordance with the
6Physiocratic doctrine, the economic climate could be improved by desisting from
mercantilist policies, terminate the state’s policy of providing special privileges to
certain manufacturers, abolish excessive dues and tolls along transport routes, and
overhaul the tax system so as to remove the disincentive effect of the existing system. As
far as the private investment is concerned Quesnay foresaw that the problem might arise
through insufficient saving. Therefore it was incumbent upon the proprietors (the major
source of saving) to refrain as far as possible from unnecessary consumption (see
Muller, 1978; Eltis, 1988).
In all accounts, Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations1 embodies a penetrating
analysis of the processes whereby economic wealth is produced and distributed. The
central thesis of The Wealth of Nations is that capital is best employed for the production
and distribution of wealth under conditions of governmental noninterference, or “laissez
passer-laissez-faire” economy, and free trade. In Smith's view, the production and
exchange of goods can be stimulated, and a consequent rise in the general standard of
living attained, only through the efficient operations of private industrial and commercial
entrepreneurs acting with a minimum of regulation and control by governments (see
Smith, 2000).
Although this view of ‘ laissez passer-laissez faire’ economy’ has undergone
considerable modification by economists in the light of historical developments since
Smith's time, many sections of The Wealth of Nations, notably those relating to the
sources of income and the nature of capital, have continued to form the basis for
1 An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776
7theoretical study in the field of political economy. The Wealth of Nations has also
served, perhaps more than any other single work in its field, as a guide to the
formulation of governmental economic policies (see Persky, 1989). The Wealth of
Nations is Smith’s attempt to define the institutional structure which will best harmonize
the individual’s pursuit of his selfish interests with the broader interests of society. The
Smithian model is one of controlled freedom: freedom of behavior and choice exists
only within the socially established norms of conduct. Self love and self interests go
hand in hand with social control and socialization (see Samuels, 1977, p. 196).
After the Great Depression, the main objectives of classical economists was to
regain the stability of the market system and to redefine the steady state conditions of
economic growth within the parameters of industrially advanced societies. Struck by
unstable economic system after the Great Depression, Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946)
attempted to integrate Keynesian analysis with elements of economic growth. Harrod
and Domar used the production function with little substitutability among the inputs to
argue that the capitalist system is inherently unstable (see Barro, 1999, p. 10). In pursuit
of redefining economic stability Harrod and Domar arrived by noticeably different
routes at a classically simple answer: the national saving rate (s) has to be equal to the
product of the capital-output ratio (v) and the rate of growth of the effective labor force
(n), thus, they are compatible if and only if s = vn. Contrary to Harrod and Domar’s
expectations, their formula proved to be explosively unstable as a result of its simplicity
and the rigidity of its assumptions (see Deane, 1978, pp. 190-204; Solow, 1988, pp. x-
xvi).
8The advancement of the technological factor by Robert Solow (1957, 1970)
opened up growth theory to a wider variety of real world facts and to a closer connection
with general economic theory. Solow (1957, 1970) and Denison (1967, 1985) are
credited for having developed the well known neoclassical aggregate production
function, which posits that economic growth is a function of changes in input of capital ,
change in effective labor force, and change in technology. An economy growing at
‘steady state’ according to Solow (1988, p. 4), “its output, employment, and capital
stocks grow exponentially, and its capital/output ratio is constant.” Thus, the growth of
the output can be explained by the variations of capital and labor.
Later, it became a strong tradition to use the neo-classical production function
approach in studying the defense –growth relationship (see Heo, 1999, 2000; Sandler &
Hartley, 1995; Heo & Mintz, 2002). Feder (1982) used this approach by dividing the
aggregate economic output into: export and non-export sector. Following the logic of the
neo-classical production function approach, Ram (1986) developed a two-sector growth
(government and private sectors) model to examine the relationship between government
spending and economic growth. Ram suggested that the public and private sectors differ
with respect to productivity. In several articles, Mintz and Huang (1990, 1991) and
Huang and Mintz (1990, 1991) developed a three equation model employing
neoclassical production function model to test the impact of defense spending including
externalities on economic growth in the United States. Mintz and Huang (1990, 1991)
and Ward and Davis (1992) have tested not only the economic effects of military and
9non-military public expenditures on growth, but also the externality effects of these
expenditures.
The defense-growth production function model prior to Mueller and Atesoglu’s
(1993a, 1993b) did not include the impact of technological change on economic growth.
Mueller and Atesoglu (1993a, 1993b) included technological progress in their model
utilizing the concept of the Hicks neutral technological change which basically means
that changes in technology do not change the share of income going to the factors of
production and the factor ratios. In other words, this concept will allow us to measure the
effects of technological progress separately without affecting the contribution that labor
and capital make to the growth (see also Heo, 1999). Heo and Mintz (2002) noticed that
the defense-growth production function model can be benefited by including technology
progress. The authors concur with Solow (1988, p. 35) who suggested that technological
progress is necessary for steady growth to be possible, and Denison (1985) who
contended that the advancement in technology provides a way to produce at lower cost.
Thus, Heo and Mintz (2002) concluded that technological progress is the cornerstone for
the persistent long-term growth of output per unit of input.
However, Heo and DeRouen (1998) suggest that Mueller and Atesoglu (1993a,
1993b) implicitly assume that technological progress in the non-military public sector,
and technological progress in the non-military private sectors are identical. Thus, Heo
and DeRouen (1998) argue that it is theoretically more reasonable to separate the private
and the non-military government sectors while keeping technological change effects in
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the model. They claim that this division of the sectors allows the economic effects of
defense spending on growth to be measured more accurately.
Despite the vast number of studies on the defense-growth relationship the
political variables were absent from the defense-growth production function model. Heo
and Mintz (2002) extend the production function model of Ram (1986), Mintz and
Huang (1990), and Ward and Davis (1992) to include an important political factor and
test this model with empirical data on the U.S. 1948-1996. The augmented Heo-Mintz
(H-M) defense-growth-political production function model introduced a new research
program, which paved the way to explore the impact of other political factors on the
growth and development of nations.
The Political Economy of Defense
The political economy of defense (PED) is a relatively new field in international
political economy. In setting the boundaries for the PED, Ross (1991, p. 7-10) maintains
that the PED has budded from defense economic and the works of such economists as
Adam Smith, David Ricardo, J.S Mill, and Karl Marx. Ross (1991, p. 32) urges that this
new field remedy past mistakes of defense economies because the growing literature of
PED has moved beyond the unidimensional disarmament/armament development
approach that flourished in the 1970. Prior to the PED, the two main approaches were
arms race approach and incrementalism. The arms race approach centered on the
superpowers’ arms race, particularly, the strategic weapons component. Incrementalism
posited that since defense budgetary process must pass over many desks, budgetary
11
policy makers rely heavily on the record of past expenditures, with only marginal
adjustments of previous appropriations (see Mintz, 1991, p. 6).
The PED approach attempts to fill the gap that exists in the literature by
integrating domestic and international political and economic phenomena. Therefore, the
PED adds explanatory power to the theories that attempt to explain the dynamics of the
Third World’s development and growth. Nevertheless, there is no consensus among
scholars of the impact of defense spending on economic growth. Some scholars such as
Benoit (1978, p. 276) argued that defense programs of most countries help economic
growth, while others such as Ball (1983) suggests that they do not always promote
economic growth. Nevertheless, Mintz and Stevenson (1995, p. 637) observed that, “The
question of how defense spending affects economic growth has been important to both
academicians and the policy community”. While many studies had been conducted, a
dominant theoretical framework has not emerged. Therefore, in his review article, Chan
(1987, p.35) wrote, “even though we understand the processes through which military
spending can affect economic performance much better now than a decade ago, there
remains much that we do not know or that we disagree about.”
Heo’s (1996, pp.4 - 6) dissertation illustrates three different perspectives
concerning the relationship between defense spending and growth. According to Heo
(ibid), one group of scholars has found that defense spending has a positive impact on
economic growth (Atesoglu & Mueller, 1990; Benoit, 1973, 1978; Biswas, 1993;
Kaldor,1976; Kennedy, 1983; Mueller & Atesoglu, 1993a, 1993b; Weed, 1983). The
standard argument of researchers in this group is that defense spending directly
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stimulates economic growth by increasing purchasing power and aggregate demand. A
second group of scholars has found a negative relationship between defense spending
and economic growth (Deger, 1986; Deger & Sen, 1983; Deger & Smith, 1983; Faini,
Annez, & Taylor, 1984; Mintz & Huang, 1990, 1991; Smith, 1980; Ward & Davis,
1992; Heo, 1998). This group of scholars arguing the negative impact of defense
spending and focus on two disadvantages: the allocation effect (gun vs. butter trade-off)
and the growth effect (gun vs. growth trade-off). According to the allocation effect
argument, the government expenditures have a dampening effect on investment, which
in turns slow down economic growth. A third group of scholars have been unable to find
any relationship between defense spending and economic growth (Alexander, 1990;
Biswas & Rati, 1986; De Rouen, 1993).
In order to study how defense spending affects economic growth Benoit (1973,
1978) conducted empirical analysis on 44 developing countries between 1950 and 1965.
The first analysis included the whole period, while the second analysis covered only the
period 1960 to 1965. Benoit failed to find any relationship between defense spending
and economic growth in his first analysis. However Benoit did find that countries with a
heavy defense burden generally had the fastest growth rates, and those with lowest
growth rates spent little on defense. Benoit (1978, p.276) argues that defense programs
in most countries help economic growth by (1) feeding, clothing, and housing a number
of people who would otherwise have to be fed, housed, and clothed by the civilian
economy; (2) providing education and medical care and technical training; (3) engaging
in a variety of public works such as roads, dams, airport, and communication networks
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that may serve civilian uses; (4) engaging in scientific and technical specialties such as
hydrographic studies, mapping, aerial surveys, metrology, soil conservation, and forestry
projects as well as certain quasi-civilian activities such as disaster relief. Ball (1983)
criticized Benoit on the ground that the utility of offering goods and services by the
military should be evaluated based on the comparative prices of the same goods and
services offered by the civilian sector.
Deger and Sen (1983) argue that military expenditures divert resources from
other uses and so have direct opportunity costs in terms of investment and consumption.
Furthermore, there is a balance of payment costs because the weapon systems require a
great amount of import. Nevertheless, when the aggregate demand is shorter than
potential supply, military expenditures will increase employment of labor. In their study
on less developed countries, Deger and Smith (1983) found that military expenditures
have negative effects on growth and thus hinder development.
The apparent contradiction of the impacts of defense spending on economic
growth led Cappelen, Gleditsch, and Pjerkholt (1984) to attempt overcoming this
dilemma by pooling cross-sectional and longitudinal data within the framework of a
model of economic growth. The data are for 17 OECD2 countries for the period 1960-
1980. The authors found that military spending has positive impact on manufacturing
output, but negative effect on investment. These two effects have an opposite impact on
2 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): An international organization
founded in 1961 to coordinate the economic policies of industrialized nations.
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economic growth for the whole sample of countries and for the subgroups, except for the
Mediterranean countries.
Frederiksen and Looney (1983, 1985, and 1986) argue that critical determinant in
the relationship between defense spending and economic growth depends on the
country’s financial resources. According to these authors, a country with limited
financial resources will always face budget reductions. These reductions will often stop
development projects in favor of defense program. Thus, the authors hypothesized that
resources constrained countries will have negative relationship between defense
spending and economic growth, while defense spending will have positive impact on
growth in resources non-constrained countries. They conducted a cluster analysis on 37
developing countries from 1950 to 1965. Their hypotheses were supported in the
analysis.
Lim (1983) examined the relationship between defense and growth for 54
developing countries: 21 African, 13 Western Hemisphere, 11 Asian, and 9 Middle
Eastern and South European for the period 1965-1973. He conducted an ordinary least
squares (OLS) analysis for the 54 countries, and found out that defense spending has a
significantly negative effect on growth. However, when the author conducted an analysis
based on regions, only African and Western Hemisphere countries showed the negative
relationship between defense spending and economic growth.
Faini, Annez, and Taylor (1984) also conducted an empirical test on 69 countries
from 1952 to 1970, and concluded that defense spending has a clear negative effect on
economic growth. They also found out that export expansion is positively associated
15
with economic growth. Likewise, population growth except Africa is positively
associated with economic growth.
Kinsella (1990) investigated the relationship between defense spending and
economic performance in the United States 1943 to 1989 using vector autoregression
analysis (VAR). The evidence indicates that there is not substantial relationship, in
causal direction, between defense spending and the price level, the unemployment rate,
or the interest rate. Nor does there appear to be any substantial lagged relationship
between defense spending and output. Kinsella concludes that those arguments which
link defense spending to economic performance receive little empirical support.
However, Jeording (1986) argues that although many previous studies assumed
that defense spending precede economic performance, the opposite relationship may
exist. Thus, he conducted a Granger causality test on 57 developing countries from 1962
to 1977 from SIPRIT, and from 1967 to 1976 from ACDA. Joerding (ibid) found that
defense spending does not have any statistically significant causal impact on economic
growth. Contrary to Benoit (1978), he found that economic growth causes military
spending. In agreement with Joerding about the possibility that economic growth may
precede defense spending, Chowdhury (1991) conducted a Granger-Causality analysis
between defense spending and economic growth over 55 developing countries. He did
not find a causal relationship between defense spending and economic growth across
countries.
Biswas & Rati (1986) developed a model employing Feder’s growth model to
examine the relationship between defense spending and economic growth in 58
16
developing countries (17 low-income, and 41 middle-income) from 1960 to 1970, and
from 1970 to 1977. The coefficient of the ratio of the military expenditures to GDP for
1960-70 in the total pooled sample shows that defense spending has a positive impact on
economic growth. However, when the total group was divided into low-income and the
middle-income groups, only middle group shows the positive effect. In order to test the
externality effect of defense spending, the authors developed an augmented model,
which is a two sectors model: defense and civilian. The model allows the size of defense
sector to enter the production function for the civilian sector, which indicates the effect
of the former on the latter. The model shows no evidence of statistically significant
impact of defense spending on growth of total output. Alexander (1990, P. 42), criticized
Biswas & Rati on the ground that their model omits relevant variables, which leads to
omission of important economic linkages.
Heo (1998) investigates how the changes in defense burden will affect economic
growth by testing the economic effects of defense spending on growth in 80 countries
using a non-linear defense growth model that includes technological progress. Heo’s
results reveal that two third of the countries under investigation may expect a “peace
dividend” due to the negative relationship between defense spending and economic
growth.
This review of the impact of defense spending on economic growth leads me to
agree with Smith and Georgiou’s observation (1983, p. 15), that “if there can be any
single conclusion about the effects of military expenditures on the economy, it must be
17
that it depends on the nature of the expenditure, the prevailing circumstances, and the
concurrent government policies.”
Combining Politics and Economics
John Maynard Keynes was the most prominent political economist who seriously
expounded a systemic and fundamental change of the free market economy, and openly
adopted an active governmental role in it. Keynes initiated a revolution in the free
market economy by suggesting that national economy should function within political
determinants. The Keynesian proposition of attaching national economy to political
determinants was a retreat from the orthodox traditions of international political
economy. The net outcome of the Keynesian iconoclastic economic doctrine was the
transformation to a new political economy with which to fortify a far reaching program
of sociopolitical reforms. Dillard (1946, p. 123) notes that in Keynes’s later thinking, “he
began to question aspects of the fundamental structure of capitalism, even to the point of
foreseeing as a condition of its survival the disappearance of all rentier capitalism.” In A
Treatise on Money (1930) Keynes sought to explain why an economy operates so
unevenly, with frequent cycles of booms and depressions. Like other treatments of the
subject, his work failed to explain the problem of prolonged depression, a phenomenon
that did not conform to the then generally accepted notion that recessions were self-
correcting. It was then felt that during recessions savings would accumulate, causing
interest rates to fall, and would thereby encourage business to invest and the economy to
expand.
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Later, Keynes closely examined the problem of prolonged depression in his
major work, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1935). Keynes
(ibid) provides a theoretical defense for programs that were already tried in Britain, and
by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the U.S. He proposed that there is no self-
correcting mechanism in the free market system to lift an economy out of a depression.
Keynes argues since investment necessarily fluctuated, it could not be depended on to
maintain a high level of employment and a steady flow of income through the economy.
Keynes proposed that government spending must compensate for insufficient business
investment in times of recession, and collect tax from citizens when the national
economy is booming.
Shortly after Britain entered World War II, Keynes published How to Pay for the
War: A Radical Plan for the Chancellor of the Exchequer (1940), in which he urged that
a portion of every wage earner's pay should automatically be invested in government
bonds. Keynes’s ideas was a pronouncement, that the free motion of economic factors
are not the ultimate determinate of economic growth, instead, the behavior of the
political system and its relationship to the economic process is essential to the proper
functionality of the economy. The Keynesian approach which established the link
between the political system and the economy departed sharply from the orthodox
international political economy, which tended to insulate economic affairs from the
political contexts.
Numerous works exist on the effect of political variables on growth such as the
impact of party control of the polity on defense spending (see Domke, 1992; Stoll, 1992;
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Mintz, 1988), the use of force and military actions (Ostrom & Job, 1986), the impact of
domestic and international conditions on policy performance (see Borrow, 1992), and
the impact of politics on the timing of the use of force (DeRouen, 2000; Fordham,1998).
None of these studies have tested the effects of politics on growth in the context of the
production function. More recently, (Heo & Mintz, 2002) tested the effect of the party
control of the White House (Republican or Democrat) on economic growth. The authors
found that Republican administrations affect growth negatively. However, they admit
that further research is needed to cross-validate their findings. It is worth mentioning that
Hibbs (1977) was the forerunner in reporting systematic effects of party control of the
executive on inflation and unemployment.
The Production Function and Developing Countries
Sen (1999, pp. 3-11) notes that focusing on human freedoms contrasts with
narrower views of development such as identifying development with the growth of
gross national product, or with the rise in personal incomes, or with industrialization, or
with technological advance. Development requires the removal of major sources of
unfreedoms: poverty as well as tyranny. Political and civil freedoms are constitutive
elements of human freedom, and a necessary condition for scientific and technological
creativity. According to Sen (1999, p. 37), “The relevance of the deprivation of basic
political freedoms or civil rights, for an adequate understanding of development, does
not have to be established through their indirect contribution to other features of
development (such as the growth of GNP or the promotion of industrialization). These
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freedoms are part and parcel of enriching the process of development.” Although
freedom is an essential dimension for better understanding of the process of economic
development, other characteristics of the political regime are equally important in
understanding this process. The most relevant characteristics of the political regime are:
political freedom, institutional freedom, regime type, regime stability, and regime
ideological base.
Although many scholars have tested the PF empirically, and found overwhelming
evidence that labor, investment, and technological progress have positive impact on
economic growth, I do not expect to obtain the same results when applying it within the
framework of developing countries because the political contexts of the Third World
countries are different from that of the First World. The impact of political contexts of
states on the performance of economy is the core theoretical construct of this research.
Another important factor is conflict.
The Impact of Conflicts on Economic Growth
Van Raemdonck and Diehl’s (1989), identify and classify the major research
investigations according to their theoretical perspectives on postwar economic growth
and their spatial temporal domain (see also Chan, 1985).
Positive effects: The proponents of the positive impact of war on economic
growth led by Sombart (1913), Borton (1941), Schumpeter (1939), Foch (1918),
Herring (1941) claim that war improves efficiency and protection of industry because it
brings about technological progress. Other scholars such as Dorn’s (1940) and Dulles’s
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(1942) emphasize enhancement of human capital as in the managerial and organizational
improvement in the field of decision making process. Gould (1972) suggests that after
the termination of war redirecting resources to peacetime industries that were ignored
during the war leads to economic growth.
Negative effects: this view is best expressed by Fraser (1926, p. 328): “Destroy
the power of one country to produce, and you immediately destroy one side of the
reciprocal demand, therefore, causing trade to cease.” Waltz (1959, p. 1) notes, “Asking
who won a given war, someone has said, is like asking who won the San Francisco
earthquake. That in wars no victory but only varying degrees of defeat is a proposition
that has gained increasing acceptance in the twentieth century.” Most of the arguments
for the negative economic effects of war are the opposite version of the positive effects’
argument of war on economic growth. Rowthwell (1941) does not see the government
control over the economy which was imposed during war as a transient effect, rather, as
a permanent effect because of the reluctance of institutions to give up power once it is
acquired. Similarly, Ogawa (1926) perceives the negative effects of governments’
mobilization of the credit markets and the distortion of war effort to the consumption
and investment processes. Some scholars expect that states that participate in war,
especially the losers, will experience immediate economic decline: Wheeler (1975) and
Organski & Kugler (1980) referred this impact to the destruction of production facilities
that usually is the result of wars. Mendershausen (1943) and Thorp (1941) posit that
economic stagnation will take place and human capital will squander in the battle field
rather than used properly in economic production. Other scholars argue that the negative
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effects of war may only be apparent indirectly as war causes certain changes in the
government allocations of resources. Both Russett (1970), and Diehl and Goertz (1985)
have found a ‘ratchet effect3’ in allocation to the military as the result of war. A variety
of overlapping perspective emphasize the significant influence of war preparation and
participation on the long-term capital formation of the system’s most powerful states
(Modelski, 1972; Tilly, 1975; Gilpin,1987; Rasler & Thompson, 1985,1988).
Organization of the Study
This dissertation consists of six chapters. In Chapter I, I introduced the problem
and the contribution of my research, and I traced the evolution of the production function
model and theories of economic growth. In Chapter II, I discuss the theoretical
implications of incorporating the political contexts of states in explaining development
and growth across countries. In Chapter III, I introduced my models of economic growth
and their applications to individual states as well as across regions, followed by a
description of the data and methods that I utilize in my empirical analysis. In Chapter IV,
I report the empirical results. Chapter V is a case study of the Middle East and North
Africa which illustrates my theory. In Chapter VI (conclusion), I discuss the findings of
my empirical analysis and the implications of these findings on the economic policies of
developing states.
3 A greater concern is the growing pattern of chronic inflation characterized by much higher price
increases, at annual rates of 10 to 30 percent in some industrial nations and even 100 percent or more in a
few developing countries. Chronic inflation tends to become permanent and ratchets upward to even
higher levels as economic distortions and negative expectations accumulate.
1993-2003 Microsoft Corporation.
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CHAPTER II
THEORY AND MODEL
Standards of living differ among parts of the world by great amounts. Although
precise comparison are difficult, the best available estimate suggest that the average real
incomes in such countries as the United States, Germany and Japan exceeds those in
such countries as Bangladesh and Zaire by a factor of twenty or more. Some countries in
the Third World, such as South Korea, Turkey, and Singapore appear to be making the
transition into the group of relatively wealthy industrialized economies. Others,
including many in the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, have difficulty obtaining
positive growth rates of real income per capita. Understanding the problems of economic
growth and development in the Third World are very important because they
enormously affect the standards of living of human life” (see Romer, 1996, pp 5-7).
This study is applying the defense-growth-political model of Heo and Mintz’s
(the H-M model) (2002) to the Third World countries. However, it is hard to learn the
insights which the H-M model offers without investigating the series of augmentations
that the production function has gone through. As Romer (1996, p.7) notices, “The
Solow model is the starting point for almost all analyses of growth. Even a model that
departs fundamentally from Solow’s are often best understood through comparison with
the Solow model. The Solow model (1970) focuses on four variables: output (Y), capital
(K), labor (L), and “knowledge” or the “effectiveness of labor” (A). At any time, the
economy has inputs of capital, labor, and knowledge, and these are combined to produce
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output. The production function takes the form Y(t) = F[K(t), A(t), L(t)]; where t denotes
time. Two features of the production function should be noted: first, time does not enter
the production function directly, but only through K, L, and A. That is, output changes
overtime only if the inputs into the production function change. In particular the amount
of output to obtain from given quantities of capital, and labor rises over time only if the
amount of knowledge increases. Second, knowledge (A) and Labor (L) enter the
production function multiplicatively. The product (AL) is referred to as effective labor,
and technological progress which enters in this fashion is known as labor-augmenting or
Harrod-neutral (see Romer, 1996, Ch. 1).4
Before the Solow model, growth theories succeeded reasonably well in
comparing equilibrium paths for the economy. In doing so however, they failed to come
to grips adequately with the right way to deal with deviations from equilibrium growth.
Part of this failure as Solow (1988, pp. x-xvi) suggests, comes from the fact that earlier
growth theories were mechanical or physical in the sense that they were almost entirely a
description of flows and stocks of goods. This mechanical configuration of growth
theories was disabling them from detecting and explaining deviations from the
equilibrium paths. The advancement of technology by Solow (1957, 1970) made the PF
amenable in explaining deviations from equilibrium paths, which opened up growth
theory to a wider variety of real world facts and to a closer connection with general
economic theories. Robert Solow (1957, 1970) and Edward Denison (1967, 1985) are
4 A•L is referred to as effective labor, and technological progress which enters the PF indirectly through A
and L is known as labor-augmenting or Harrod-Neutral (see Romer, 1996, Ch. 1).
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credited for having developed an aggregate production function which had became
widely accepted in growth economics. Based on the neo-classical production function
logic, Ram (1986) develops a two-sector growth (government and private sectors) model
to examine the relationship between government spending and economic growth. Ram’s
equation is:
(G/Y)G)C+(+L+(I/Y)=Y G    ………………………………..………...1
Where a dot over the variable indicates its rate of growth, Y is GNP, I is investment, L
represents labor, and G denotes government spending.
Cornes and Sandler (1986) propose that there is likely to be an externality effect
when government activities influence the private sector’s production capacity without
being priced on competitive markets. Following Cornes and Sandler, Ram also develops
a model incorporating the externality effect of the government sector. Ram’s Externality
equation is:
G+L+(I/Y)=Y   ……………………………………………….….. 2
Where a dot over G is the externality effects.
According to Mintz and Huang (1990; 1991), the effects of military expenditures
on growth may not be the same as those of non-military government spending. Thus, it is
theoretically reasonable to separate the military sector from the overall government
sector in order to study how various components of public spending affect economic
performance differently (see also Heo, 1999; Heo & Mintz, 2002). Mintz and Huang’s
equation is:
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/N)(N/Y)]N)[(-(+/M)(M/Y)]M)[(-(+/L)L(+(I/Y)=/YY nnmm   ……….…3
Where a dot over the variable indicates its rate of growth, Y is GNP, I is investment, L
represents labor, and NM denotes non-military government spending.
Huang and Mintz (1991) also examine the externality effects of defense spending
on growth, but separately from that of the non-military government sector. According to
the authors (ibid, p. 1020), “the externality effect generated by the military sector (e.g.
technologic spin-offs) may be different from the one generated by the non-military
government sector (e.g., regulations).” Thus, Huang and Mintz (1991) specify the
separate externality effects of the defense and non-defense government sector. Huang
and Mintz’s externality equation is:
N)/Y)]-/M)((YM[(+/M)(M/Y)]M)[(-(+
M)/Y)]-/N)((YN[(+/N)(N/Y)]N)[(-(+/L)L(+(I/Y)=/YY
mmm
nnn




………….…….4
Where a dot over the variable indicates its rate of growth, Y is GNP, I is investment, L
represents labor, and NM denotes non-military government spending.
Ward and Davis (1992), likewise, divide the state activity into two components:
military spending and non-military state spending, and test the externality effects of
these expenditures. Ward and Davis’ equation is:
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Whereindicates the growth rate, national income is represented by Y, investment by I,
labor by L, defense spending by M, non-military government spending by N, and total
government spending by S (see also Heo & Mintz, 2002).
Solow (1988, p. 35) wrote that, “labor augmenting form of technological
progress is necessary for steady-state growth to be possible.” For this reasons, Mueller
and Atesoglu (1993a, 1993b) include technological progress in their model utilizing the
concept of the Hicks neutral technological change5. In other words, this concept will
allow us to measure the effects of technological progress separately without affecting the
contribution that labor and capital make to the growth (see Heo, 1999). By assuming
that technology progress develops gradually over time period, Mueller and Atesoglu
developed their defense- growth model. Mueller and Atesoglu’s equation is:
(M/Y)+M)(M/Y)](dM/e+(M/Y)[+(I/Y)e+)(L/Y)(dL/Le+=dY/Y mm
t
mk
t
l
t   …….6
Where Y indicates GDP, dM/M represents defense spending growth rate, M/Y is defense
share of GDP, m denotes the externality effects of defense spending andrepresents
technological progress. The technological change factor, et, is always positive even in
cases that is negative because technology do not digress (see Mueller & Atesoglu,
1993a, 1993b; see Heo & Mintz, 2002).
Heo and DeRouen (1998) further augmented Mueller and Atesoglu’s model
(1993a, 1993b). Heo and DeRouen (1998) suggest that, Mueller and Atesoglu (1993a,
1993b) implicitly assume that technological progress, as well as productivity change in
5 Hicks neutral technological change means that changes in technology do not change the share of income
going to the factors of production and the factor ratios (Mueller and Atesoglu 1993a, p. 261)
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the non-military public sector, and those of the private sector are identical. Different
from Mueller and Atesoglu (1993a; 1993b), Ward and Davis (1992) showed that the
U.S. government sector has a lower productivity than the civilian sector. Thus, Heo and
DeRouen (1998) argue that it is theoretically more reasonable to separate the private and
the non-military government sector while keeping technological change effects in the
model (see also Heo, 1999). They assert that this division of the sectors allows the
economic effects of defense spending on growth to be measured more accurately. Heo
and DeRouen’s (1998) equation is:
(N/Y)+(M/Y)+](dN/N)e+(N/Y)[+
](dM/M)e+(M/Y)[+(I/Y)e+(dL/L)e+=dY/Y
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
……….…..7
Where dL/L represents the growth rate of employed labor; I/Y is the investment share of
GDP; dM/M is the growth rate of defense spending; M/Y indicates defense share of
GDP; dN/N is the growth rate of non-defense government spending; and N/Y is non-
defense government spending share of GDP.
According to Heo and Mintz (2002, p.10), “The defense-growth production
function model has thus far been politically neutral. Labor, capital, technology and
defense and non-defense elements govern it. No "political" variable per se has been
included in the model. This structure of the model reflects its historical evolution as a
supply side economic model of growth.” Thus, a political approach to the defense-
growth model may therefore add to our understanding of defense-growth tradeoff (see
Chan, 1995; Mintz, 1991).
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The Heo-Mintz Alternative
Although technology provides more flexibility to the PF, the Solow model failed
in rationalizing deviations from the steady state conditions of economic growth. Ignoring
the political conditions left the production function operating in isolation from its
environment. This dualism of politics and economics hampers any realistic explanation
of the problems of economic growth.
The realization that the political contexts grow and accompany the PF over time
as its shadow, led some contemporary political economists to put an end to overlooking
the impact of political factors on economic growth. The political approach to understand
the deviations from the equilibrium paths emphasizes the impact of internal political
configuration on economic growth. It becomes evident that the apparent similarities of
democratic political systems do not reflect the internal harmony of the domestic forces
nor do they reflect the consensus of these forces on economic policies. Accordingly, it
becomes infeasible to offer serious explanations to the problems of economic growth
without taking into account the configurations of the political forces. The advancement
of a political variable (political party) to the production function by Heo and Mintz
(2002) was a major development in the research program on economic growth since
Solow (1957, 1970) introduced technology to the production function. The value of the
Heo-Mintz study derived from the fact of being the first empirical investigation of the
structural political economic impact on growth in the context of the production function.
Heo and Mintz tested their model within the American political context by considering a
dichotomous variable (1, 0) for the Republican Party, and the Democratic Party
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respectively. The authors deliberately utilize a dummy variable to capture the effect of
politics on economic growth so that they do not destabilize the theoretical construct of
the production function. Incorporating the impact of political party on the economy, the
Heo-Mintz augmented production function model becomes:
DP+(N/Y)+(M/Y)+](dN/N)e+(N/Y)[+
](dM/M)e+(M/Y)[+(I/Y)e+(dL/L)e+=dY/Y
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Where dL/L represents the growth rate of employed labor; I/Y is the investment share of
GDP; dM/M is the growth rate of defense spending; M/Y indicates defense share of
GDP; dN/N is the growth rate of non-defense government spending; and N/Y is non-
defense government spending share of GDP; and P denotes the coefficient of political
party variable and D is the dummy variable for political party.
Incorporating the political context into the production function paved the way to
investigate the impact of other political variables on economic growth. I have augmented
the H-M model by incorporating into it five political regime variables (political freedom,
institutional freedom, regime type, regime stability, and regime ideological base) while
controlling with conflict variables.
By incorporating political and conflict variables, I extended the applicability of
the H-M model to capture most of the fundamental characteristics of the political
regimes. Moreover, I extend the applicability of the H-M model to the Third World,
which has different level of economic and political development from the First World.
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The Models
My models extend the Heo-Mintz (H-M) model, which basically incorporates a
political variable into the Production Function model. I developed and tested the H-M
model in two forms: first, I incorporate separately one of eight political and conflict
variables: political freedom, institutional freedom, regime type, regime stability,
ideological base, external conflicts, internal conflicts, and total conflicts to the
production function. Consequently, I tested eight models as shown in equations 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16.
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Where Y represents GDP;is technological progress;k ,l ,m, , andn are the
externality effects of capital, labor, and defense spending;m, n represent the military
and non-military sectors; dL/L is the growth rate of employed labor; I/Y is the
investment share of GDP; M/Y is defense share of GDP; dM/M is defense spending
growth rate; and N/Y is non-defense government spending share of GDP; dN/N is the
growth rate of non-defense government spending; CONFextR is external conflicts;
intCONFR is the internal conflicts; CONFtotR is total conflicts; POLFRR  is political freedom;
INSFRR  is institutional freedom; TYR is regime type; STR is regime stability; and IBR is
ideological base.
I have developed models 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 226 by adding two conflict
variables: external conflicts and internal conflicts, as control variables to the production
function, and incorporating a single political variable to each model. Therefore the
general form of this model is: economic growth = PF + internal conflicts + external
conflicts + political variable. Below are the models:
6 Simplified forms of equations (17 - 21): economic growth = pf + external conflicts + internal conflicts +
political freedom; economic growth = pf + external conflicts + internal conflicts + institutional freedom;
economic growth = pf + external conflicts + internal conflicts + regime type; economic growth = pf +
external conflicts + internal conflicts + regime stability; economic growth = pf + external conflicts +
internal conflicts + ideological base.
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Where Y represents GDP;is technological progress;k ,l ,m are the externality
effects of capital, labor, and defense spending; m, n represent the military and non-
military sectors; dL/L is the growth rate of employed labor; I/Y is the investment share
of GDP; M/Y is defense share of GDP; dM/M is defense spending growth rate; and N/Y
is non-defense government spending share of GDP; dN/N is the growth rate of non-
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defense government spending; CONFextR is external conflicts; intCONFR is internal conflicts;
POLFRR  is political freedom; INSFRR  is institutional freedom; TYR is regime type; STR is
regime stability; and IBR is ideological base.
Hypotheses
I developed eight hypotheses on the impact of political factors on economic
growth. The hypotheses are valid for the non-linear least squares analysis as well as to
the cross national time-series analysis.
H1. There is a negative effect of interstate conflict on Economic growth in developing
countries.
H2. There is a negative effect of intra-state conflict on economic growth in developing
countries.
H3. The effect of total conflict on economic growth in developing countries is negative
H4. The effect of political freedom on economic growth in developing countries is
positive.
H5. There is a positive effect of institutional freedom on economic growth in developing
countries.
H6. There is a positive effect of democratic political regime on economic growth in
developing countries
H7. There is a positive effect of stable political regime on economic growth in
developing countries.
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H8. There is a positive relationship between liberal ideological base and economic
growth in developing countries.
I tested equations 9 to 167 by using nonlinear least squares (NLS) method for
sixty individual developing countries, with time-series data from 1960 to 2002. I tested
models 17- 22 by using cross national time-series (CNTS) analysis for 69 countries from
1960 to 2002. I conducted the CNTS tests for eight regions plus the entire sample, which
encompasses a total of 69 countries. The subsystems are: Middle East and North Africa
(MENA), oil producing countries, non-oil producing countries, the Arab World, Latin
America, Africa, Asia, the Caribbean region, and the entire sample of the 69 countries.
The followings are the groups of countries included in each region: The Middle
East and North African region consists of Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Algeria,
Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Mauritania, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Pakistan,
Turkey, and Iran; the Asian countries consist of the Philippines, India, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, Nepal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand; the African region consists of
Benin, Burundi, Cameron, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritius, Malawi, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leon, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, and the Sudan; the Latin American countries consist of Argentina, Bolivia,
Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cost Rica, Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras,
7 Simplified forms of equations (9 to 16):economic growth = pf + external conflicts; economic growth =
pf + internal conflicts; economic growth = pf + total conflicts; economic growth = pf + political freedom;
economic growth = pf + institutional freedom; economic growth = pf + regime type; economic growth =
pf + regime stability; economic growth = pf + ideological base.
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Nicaragua, panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, and Uruguay; and the Caribbean region
consists of Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Guatemala, Jamaica, and
Trinidad.
The Total Model (the entire sample) includes Algeria, Argentina, Benin,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Cameron, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, India Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia,
Mauritania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Mali, Morocco, Nepal,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, Philippines, Korea,
Rwanda, Salvador, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leon, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uganda,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Iraq, Syria, and Libya, were excluded from the dataset because of doubts about
the reliability of their data. Syria and Libya were the most favorite clients of the former
Soviet Union among Middle Eastern countries; consequently, this relationship required
them to be secretive, especially, in the field of military spending. Moreover, Iraq and
Libya were under United Nations sanctions since the early 1990s. I also did not include
Lebanon in my dataset because it was a failing state since 1975. The real power in
Lebanon until 1982 belonged to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its
allies of the Lebanese parties. Since the early 1980s, the real power in Lebanon has been
transferred to Syria and its allies of the Lebanese parties: mainly Hezbollah (Party of
God) and the Amal movement (Afwaj al Muqawamah al Lubnaniyyah). Likewise
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Somalia was excluded from my dataset because it has no central government since 1991.
Fighting erupted in Somalia in November 1991 between forces of the Hawiye clan led
by Ali Mahdi Mohamed, and the Abgal subclan led by General Muhammed Farah Aidid,
The two clans continue to contest for power. Eritrea and Djibouti were excluded from
the data analysis because they obtained their independence in 1993 and 1977
respectively—too short of a time frame to produce meaningful statistical results (see
Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1996, pp. 109-582; Microsoft Encarta Reference Library
2004).
I selected the period of my data from 1960 to 2002, because the majority of
countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Africa, and Asia began their state
formation after 1960s: Algeria 1962, Benin 1960, Bahrain 1971, Bangladesh 1971,
Burundi 1962 , Cameron 1960, Gabon 1960, Kenya 1963, Kuwait 1961, Mauritania
1960, Madagascar 1960, Malawi 1964, Mauritius 1968, Mali 1960, Nigeria 1960, Niger
1960, Rwanda 1962, Senegal 1960, Sierra Leon 1961, Singapore 1970, Tanzania 1961,
Togo 1960, United Arab Emirates 1971, Uganda 1962, Zaire 1960 , Zambia 1964,
Zimbabwe 1980 (see Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1996, pp. 109-582).
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CHAPTER III
DATA AND METHODS
This research utilizes time series data on sixty nine developing countries in Asia,
the Middle East and North Africa, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean region
from1960 to 2002. The data of this research consist of four types: economic, military,
political, and conflict data.
Economic Data
Data on economic variables are drawn from the International Financial Statistics
Yearbook (IFS) published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The economic
variables that I obtained from the IFS are Gross Domestic Product (GDP), gross
domestic investment, and government expenditures. The IMF values of the variables are
in current prices. Current values are non-comparable across countries due to the different
amount of inflations across nations over time. I converted all data to constant values with
the year 1985 as a base year using the GDP deflator provided by the IFS. For countries
that do not have GDP deflators for the period (1960 – 2002), I used the Consumer Price
Index (CPI)8 provided by the same source. In addition, values of the variables are
converted from their respective national currencies to the U.S. dollars. Some countries in
Latin America pose problems when I conducted the conversion process because they
8 I used the CPI for the following countries: Jordan, morocco, Turkey, Colombia, Egypt, Ecuador ,
Gabon, Haiti, Kenya, Malaysia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sir Lanka, Tanzania, Trinidad, UAE, Zimbabwe
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arbitrarily changed their national currencies several times from1960 to 2002. These
currencies changes made it very difficult in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and
Mexico to draw reliable conclusions out of their empirical analysis. Several countries:
Chile, Indonesia, Liberia, Mauritius, Madagascar, the Sudan, Tanzania, Zaire, and
Zambia have numerous missing values that made their time-series fall below the
required span for appropriate time-series analysis. These nine countries were dropped
out from the non-linear least squares (NLS) analysis, which reduced the number of
countries involved in the NLS analysis to sixty countries. However, these nine countries
were included in the cross national time series (CNTS) analysis.
For labor data, following (Ram, 1986; Alexander, 1990; DeRouen, 1993; Mintz
& Stevenson, 1995; Ward & Davis, 1992; Lebovic & Ishaq, 1987; and Heo, 1998),
population growth rate data are used as proxy. Ram (1986) points out, that these data are
reliable but are not good proxy in some areas. However, there are two reasons for using
population as a proxy to labor (1) time-series data on labor force are available only for
very few countries and plagued with many missing values (2) the quality of the labor
force variable in developing countries is questionable due to inaccurate reporting for
political reasons. Nevertheless, Lebovic and Ishaq (1987, p. 118) suggest that “because
labor participation rates show little volatility in the short run, the population growth rate
may be used instead.”
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Military Data
The military expenditure values can be found in the SIPRI Yearbook: World
Armament and Disarmament (1969, 1974, 1983, 1992, 1996, and 2004) published
annually by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The SIPRI publishes
long-term annual data of three different types: military expenditures in current prices
(local currencies); military expenditure in constant U.S. dollars; and military
expenditures as a percentage share of GDP. Although for the purpose of this research I
am interested in the constant U.S., Dollar values, it is not possible to use the constant
U.S., dollar values of military expenditures of SIPRIT “as is.” It is possible to convert
data to the same base year since the base year changes several times over the period
(1960 - 2002).
Many scholars have criticized the quality of military expenditures data
suggesting that they may not by comparable across countries (see Brzoska, 1981). All
three major sources of military expenditure data (SIPRI, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency [ACDA], and International Institute of Strategic Studies [IISS])
rely, at least in part, on definition of military expenditure that are different for different
countries or group of countries. Thus the comparability of data from countries using
different definitions is highly questionable (see Mintz & Stevenson, 1995, p. 290,
Lebovic & Ishaq , 1987, p. 683). Therefore I have used SIPRI definitions for values
across countries, and across group of countries.
The SIPRI data have many comparative characteristics that make researchers
prefer using them over other datasets. Deger and Smith (1983, p. 348) prefer using SIPRI
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data over ACDA data because, on one hand, SIPRI reveals its source of data clearly, uses
publicly available information, gives details of military expenditures in national
currencies as well as constant U.S. dollars, and also supplies data on military burden. On
the other hand, according to Deger and Smith (ibid), ACDA data have some major
problems such as the lack of detailed information regarding sources of data collection
and methods of data preparation, thus, it is difficult to have any independent checks on
the accuracy of figures. Consequently, Deger and Smith (ibid) conclude that SIPRI
provides the most consistent data for this type of analysis.
According to SIPRI (1997, p. 241), “[it] has adopted a definition of military
expenditure, based on the NATO definition, as a guideline. Where possible, SIPRI
military expenditure data include: (a) all current and capital expenditure on the armed
forces and on the running of the defense department and other government agencies
engaged in defense projects and space activities; (b) the costs of paramilitary forces
when they are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; (c) military
research and development, testing and evaluation expenditure; and (d) costs of
retirement pensions. Military aid is included in the military expenditure of the donor
country and excluded from that of the recipient country. Excluded are civil defense,
interest on war debts and veterans’ payments.” As Lebovic (1999, p. 695) notes, the data
users should be cautious when drawing even simple conclusions about change and trends
in global military spending: the analyst should not attempt to be too subtle in wringing
out nuances of meaning from data (see also Fei, 1979). The SIPRI data are more useful
for the purpose of this dissertation since it has long-term annual data that is more
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suitable to this empirical analysis due to the dynamic nature of the defense growth
relationship.
Nonmilitary government expenditures are obtained by subtracting defense
spending from the total government expenditures of each year. Since the data for
government and military expenditures are obtained from different sources (from IFS and
SIPRI) respectively, the comparability of the data may not be perfect (see Alexander,
1990).
Political Data
The political variables: political freedom, institutional freedom, regime type,
regime stability, and regime ideological base are drawn from the Polity IV: Political
Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002. The Polity data are originally
developed by Ted Gurr9, and recently investigated and updated by Marshall., Jaggers &
Gurr (2002)10. They contain coded annual information on regime and authority
characteristics for all independent states (with greater than 500,000 total populations) in
the global state system and covers the years 1800-2002.
Institutional and Political Freedoms
Sen (1999, p. 3) admits that the Growth of GNP or of individual incomes can be
very important as means to expanding the freedoms enjoyed by the members of the
9 http://data.library.ubc.ca/datalib/survey/icpsr/6695/codebook.html (accessed on July 30, 2004).
10 http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/#data (accessed on July 30, 2004).
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society. However, Sen (ibid) emphasizes that freedoms depend also on other
determinants, such as social and economic arrangements (for example, facilities for
education and health care) as well as political and civil rights (for example, the liberty to
participate in public discussion and scrutiny).” In other words, Development requires
institutional freedom as well as political freedom. According to Sen (ibid),
“Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as
tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of
public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity of repressive states.”
Two distinctive types of freedoms are investigated in this empirical study:
political freedom, and institutional freedom. The operational indicators of these two
types of freedoms as derived from Polity IV dataset are:
1. Institutional freedom: the variable PARREG (regulation of participation) means the
development of institutional structures for political expression
2. Political freedom is a composite of institutional freedom (PARREG) and
competitiveness of participation PARCOMP. The variable PARCOMP is an indicator of
the extent to which non-elite are able to access institutional structures for political
expression.
Regime Type
In an attempt to make the polity data more compatible with other measure of
democracy, it is useful to establish a single summary measure of the institutional
characteristics of the political regimes by subtracting a state’s autocracy score from its
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democracy score (DEMOC- AUTOC) (see Jaggers & Gurr, 1995, p. 473). Jaggers &
Gurr’s (1995) approach has three empirical advantages over treating democracy and
autocracy as separate indicators. First it makes the polity data more easily compatible
with other measures of democracy which conceptualize regime type along a single
analytic continuum in which democratic and autocratic systems are assumed to occupy
its two extreme ends. Second, DEMOC-AUTO is easily interpretable, ranging from
positive ten from states that are purely democratic to negative ten for those which are
purely autocratic. The zero to ten scores for both DEMOC and AUTOC are not so easily
interpretable, especially in situations with ‘mixed’ authority characteristics. Third, this
summary measure of regime type helps lessen the bimodal nature of the democracy and
autocracy indicators found in the policy datasets.
The operational indicator of institutionalized democracy (DEMOC) is conceived
as three essential elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through
which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders.
Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by
executive. Third, is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and
in acts of political participation. The democracy indicator is an additive eleven point
scale (0-10).
In contrast, authoritarian regime in Western political discourse is a pejorative
term whose common properties are a lack of regularized political competition and
concern of political freedoms. In polity IV dataset the authors use the term “autocracy”
as a more neutral term and define it operationally in terms of the presence of a
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distinctive set of political participation: The chief executives are chosen in a regularized
process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with
few institutional constraints.
What distinguished the Polity Dataset from other datasets are the scholarly
efforts to update it, the longer period of time it covers, and the consistency of measuring
the variables. Furthermore, Polity Data’ measurement for democracy are more dynamic
and more applicable than other data to different levels of political development. Other
datasets such as Vanhanen’s11 Democratization and Power Resources 1850-2000
measure of democracy is constructed exclusively from electoral data which make them
difficult to measure political development in the Third World. Bollen dataset12 Cross-
National Indicators of Liberal Democracy 1950-1990 rely on a combination of objective
and subjective data in the construction of his indices, which make the measurement
inconsistent (see also Bollen, 1980; 1991; 1993; Jaggers & Gurr, 1995; Vanhanen,
2000).
Regime Stability
A stable political system, in this premise, is one whose authority patterns
remains similar over a long period of time, and demonstrates a capacity to adapt more or
less gradually in response to internal and environmental stress. Durability is the term
used here for the distinguished property of systems which both persist and adapt (see
Gurr, 1974, p. 1484). Indicator of stability in Polity Dataset is the variable DURABLE
11 http://www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD1216/meF1216e.html (accessed on October, 8, 2005)
12 http://www.nd.edu/~mcoppedg/QPA/BollenCodebook.pdf (accessed on October 8, 2005)
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which is coded from the year of the first regime transition or the first year of
independence for all years since 1949.
Ideological Base
Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996, p. 23) notes, “Identifying the ideology on
which a political system is based, or influenced by, will help us penetrate the façade of
institutions and slogans, but we must first clarify what we mean by ideology.” The
meaning depends on how we construct ideology since the word ‘ideology’ “is a much
abused, and overused, word”. In order to lessen the tautological confusion of the word
ideology, I check Derbyshire & Derbyshire’s (1996, p. 21) definition against the Polity
variables that I think meet the requirements of Derbyshire and Derbyshire definition of
liberal ideology.
Derbyshire & Derbyshire (1996) compile a list of markers of liberal ideology as
the one which has evidence of constitutionally elected government for assemblies and
executives, the active presence of more than one political party and protection of
personal liberties, and evidence of an independent judiciary and checks and balances
between three elements of government. Parallel to these elements I found that the
variable Executive Recruitment (EXREC) in polity IV dataset is the closest to
Derbyshire & Derbyshire’s definition. EXREC is a concept variable which combines
information presented in three component variables: XRREG (Regulation of Executive
Recruitment) indicates institutionalized procedures regarding the transfer of executive
power; XCOMP (Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment) indicates the extent to
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which executive are chosen through competitive elections; and XROPEN (Openness of
Executive Recruitment) indicates opportunity for non-elites to attain executive office. A
political system that exhibits opposing characteristics to these elements such as
communism, national socialism, authoritarian socialism, military authoritarianism,
religious nationalism, and absolutism have conservative ideologies (see Derbyshire &
Derbyshire 1996, pp. 23-38)
Conflict Variables
External conflicts, internal conflicts, and total conflicts are drawn from Singer and
Small’s the Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992 (COW)13.
The COW provides the most thorough and influential quantitative dataset on international
conflicts. The COW dataset were developed by Singer and Small in their effort to understand
the root causes of war. These data collection describes international and civil wars for the year
1816 – 1992 and they are divided into two parts: International and extra-systemic wars, and
civil wars (see also Singer, Bremmer & Stuckey, 1972; Singer & Small, 1992; Small & Singer,
1982).
International and Extra-Systemic Wars
This part contains 1278 logical records for 426 cases. Each case contains the values for
40 variables that describe the experience of one participant in an international war. The
participants are nation-states with at least 500,000 total populations, and either diplomatic
13 http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/09905.xml
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recognition by at least two major powers or membership in the United Nations. This part of the
dataset describes two types of international wars: interstate wars, in which a nation-sate
engages in a war with another member of the interstate system. Extra-systemic wars, in which
a nation-state engages in a war with a political entity that is not an interstate system member.
The extra-systemic wars are further divided into two sub-types. First, the imperial wars involve
an independent political entity, but do not qualify it as a member of the interstate system.
Second, the colonial wars include international wars in which the adversary was a colony.
Civil Wars
Describes when and where fighting took place, whether war fought within the
boundaries of a major power, or central system member, whether there was outside
intervention and if so, whether the intervening state was a major power, on what side
they intervene, who won the war, number of battle deaths, total population, and total
number of pre-war armed forces.
According to Meredith and Schafer (2000, p. 124), “In 1994 the COW began the
process of slightly modifying its classification of wars as they originally appear in the
Wages of War 1816-1965: A statistical Handbook, and Resort to Arms: International
and Civil War, 1816-1980. A continuation of this process by Meredith and Schafer
added a new expanded wars typology which resulted to updating the COW to 1997. The
period 1998-2002 is covered by the International Crisis Behavior Project (ICB)14. I
included conflict based on the ICB that meet the criteria of the COW. The conflicts of
14 See online:http://www.icbnet.org
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Algeria, Ethiopia, Rwanda, the Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, and Zaire/Congo for only few
events were coded based on ICB.
Methods
This study is a continuation of the research program which aims at testing the
impact of politics on economic growth. Since the production function model is
theoretically derived, I used dummy variables to capture the effects of politics on
economic growth without affecting the theoretical logic of the production function
approach (see Heo & Mintz, 2002, p. 11). I tested the impacts of dichotomous political
and conflict variables with the production function in order to avoid any deformation of
its theoretical structure. This dissertation involves Non-linear least squares analysis,
cross national time series analysis, and an in depth case study of the Middle East and
North Africa based on the empirical results with particular focus on Egypt and Algeria.
Each analytical method has relative advantages and disadvantages. There is no
singular method that can explain all social phenomena and illuminate all their sides due
to the complexity of the political economic world. A method which might be appropriate
at a certain level of analysis is not necessarily appropriate at another level of analysis. In
order to illuminate different sides of the phenomenon it is necessary to look from
different directions, or at different levels of analysis. As Przeworski and Teune (1970, p.
36) note, “comparative research is an inquiry in which more than one level of analysis is
possible…”
50
Along these lines, I employed different methods to investigate economic growth
in developing countries. The longitudinal design “comparison of the same unit at
different times” is employed. Lijphart (1971, p. 689) argues that the longitudinal analysis
offers a solution to the control problem. Dogan and Pelassy (1984, p. 19) suggest that
only by examining multiple cases can we locate, rank and build a hierarchy.
The in-depth analysis of the MENA does not intend to form a theory by its own,
rather, to serve the general research question of this dissertation. As Eckstein (1963,
p.15) points out, “case studies never ‘prove’ anything; their purpose is to illustrate
generalizations which are established elsewhere, or to direct attention toward
generalizations.”
After Solow (1957; 1970) had incorporated the technological progress to the PF,
the economic growth model became more reflective of the dynamic of industrial
capitalism. Consequently, it was natural to think of the aggregate model from long-run
time series for a real economy. Sartori (1970, p. 103) criticizes the cross-sectional
design as being the province of “overconscious thinkers”, and he argues that cross
sectional units are not comparable—the apple and orange argument. Macridis & Brown
(1986) argues that cross-sectional design represents an oversimplified and arbitrary
approach. Likewise, Rostow (1960) argues that this type of research makes it impossible
to formulate causal inferences.
On the same vein, Ball (1983) and Chan (1985) have argued, statistical analysis
of a cross-sectional sample is not equipped to deal with the diversity existing in different
countries in terms of structural variation of economic and political system. Moreover,
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many scholars (see Brzoska 1981) have suggested that military expenditure data may not
be comparable across countries. Therefore, I will use time-series data for individual
countries and cross national time series for regionally based analysis. Following Heo
(1998), Heo and Mintz (2002), Heo and DeRouen (1998) I will employ the NLS
regression method to test for individual countries.
The estimation of nonlinear models requires the use of a numerical optimization
algorithm by using a quasi-Newton method also known as a variable metric method (see
Judge., Hill., Griffiths., Lutkepohl., & Lee, 1988, pp. 985-960). Each Updating step of
the algorithm requires a gradient (first derivative) estimate for exact evaluation of the
gradient. If exact derivatives cannot be computed then a numerical approximation is
used to obtain the gradient. Each updating step also requires an approximation of the
Hessian (second derivatives). The quasi-Newton family of algorithms obtains a Hessian
inverse approximation in each repetition by an updating scheme that involves adding a
correction matrix. At model convergence this approximation is then used as the
covariance matrix estimate of the estimated parameters.
Since there is no guarantee that the model will converge, it should always be re-
estimated with different starting values to verify that the global maximum has probably
been achieved. Since the computational time required for nonlinear estimation can be
extremely high it is often useful to attempt to get good starting values by first estimation
a linear simplification of the model such as ordinary least squares (OLS). The NLS
method has two benefits that make it preferred to other methods: firs, it allows model
restrictions to be used. The model restriction is that Lambda (), and Pi () have the
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same value in each term in the model. Since the Production Function has been pre-
specified (mathematically derived based on the restrictions mentioned above), thus
meeting the pre-imposed restrictions is crucial in estimating the parameters. Second, the
NLS method allows for the estimation of the values of Lambda (), Pi (), and PSI ()
Where: I = l, k, m, n separately.
Since the NLS method provides with separate estimation, It becomes possible to
obtain the externality effects of both military and non-military government spending as
well as the combined effects of technological progress and productivity changes on
economic growth. The time series properties of the data were investigated using Dickey-
Fuller tests accounting for both drift and deterministic time trends. All variables that
exhibit non-stationary behaviors were differenced and rendered stationary before using
them in the analysis. The t-ratio level of significance at (0.01) and (0.05) levels are
calculated.
The values of Durbin Watson calculated by NLS analysis are not reliable
indicators for the presence or absence of autocorrelation. According to White (1992, p.
370), “Durbin-Watson distribution theory assumes a linear model so the exact F(d) test
can not be used with a nonlinear model.” Thus, White (ibid) suggests the method of
Approximate Nonlinear Durbin-Watson (A.N.D) test in order to deal with this problem.
White (ibid) claims that, “many researchers who continue to compute the d statistic in
nonlinear models would like to use this test.” Because the proposed (A.N.D) test has
good size and power when compared to other alternatives (see White, 1992). White
(1992) theorizes that the general form of the linear regression model is Y= X+; where
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Y is an (n x 1) vector of observation on the dependent variable, X is an (n x k) matrix of
independent variable, is a (k x 1) parameter vector, andis an (n x 1) normally
distributed disturbance vector. Based on this formulation It is common to use Durbin-
Watson (1950, 1951, 1971) test statistics (d) which is equal to:
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Following the method in White (1992) it is easy to approximate the exact
distribution of the Durbin-Watson statistics using White’s (1992) article. The White
method is shown in the contest of estimation of a CES (constant elasticity substitution)
by developing a Z matrix which is described in Judge., Griffiths., Hill., Lutkepohl, &
Lee, [1985, Equation 6.2.3]. The Z-matrix is used to store the derivatives of the
nonlinear function with respect to each parameter. The nonlinear equation with additive
errors has the general form:
yt = f ( xt) +; for t = 1,…, N
The residual sum of squares is: S() = 
N
t
Yt
1
[ 2)],( x tf
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Witht ~ N(0, I N2 ) the maximum likelihood estimator for2 is approximately
equal to S()/N and the maximum likelihood estimator is the value ofthat maximizes
the concentrated log-likelihood function (see Judge., Griffiths., Hill., Lutkepohl, & Lee,
[1985, Equation 12.2.85]): L() = - N/2 ln (2) – N/2ln {(S()/N} – N/2
When the errors are normally distributed the maximum likelihood estimator is identical
to the nonlinear least squares estimator which globally minimizes S(). The estimates
have an interpretation as estimated from a linearized model that is constructed from a
Taylor series approximation. Define the matrix of the first derivatives evaluated the
converged estimates as Z( ~ ) =   /),( Xf
~

This equation can be transformed into a linear pseudo model (see Judge., Griffiths.,
Hill., Lutkepohl, & Lee, [1985equation 12.2.14] ):
(b) = Z( ~ )+ ; where( ~ ) = Y - f(x, ~ ) + Z ( ~ )
~

An OLS regression of( ~) on Z ( ~ ) will reproduce the parameter estimate of
. Following Heo (1998) and Heo and Mintz (2002), I Utilize the A.N.D test in verifying
the presence, or absence of autocorrelation. I found autocorrelation in Eleven countries:
Iran with external conflicts; Gabon with political freedom; Haiti with external conflicts,
internal conflicts, total conflicts, and political freedom variables; Jordan, Trinidad, and
Benin with all political and conflict variables; Algeria with external and internal
conflicts; and Uganda with external conflicts. For these countries, the generalized non-
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linear least squares (GNLS) method suggested by Pagan (1974) is utilized to correct the
problem of autocorrelation.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The results of the empirical analysis contain estimation of eleven regression
models. Models 9 - 16 consist of the production function (PF) in addition to a political or
conflict variable, while models 17 - 22 contain the PF, internal and external conflicts as
control variables, and an individual political variable. I tested models 9 - 16 using two
methods: first, non-linear least squares (NLS) method on 60 individual countries using
time-series data from 1960 to 2002. Second, cross national time-series (CNTS) analysis
of nine regions: Middle East and North Africa (MENA), MENA Non-oil producing
countries, MENA Oil producing countries, the Arab World, Latin America, Africa, Asia,
the Caribbean region, and all states (full model) with a single political or conflict
variable.
Models 17-22 were tested by using CNTS analysis with external and internal
conflicts as control variables on all states (full model) using pooled data with 2349
observations, and on five regions: the MENA, Latin America, Asia, Africa, the
Caribbean region. The number of observations across regions ranges from 178 to 718
observations. The six models were tested with external and internal conflicts as control
variables.
Appendix A contains the NLS estimation of models 9 - 16 for 60 countries. Each
page of appendix A has the estimates of the production function along one of the
political and conflict variables: political freedom, institutional freedom, regime type,
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regime stability, ideological base, external conflicts, internal conflicts, and total
conflicts. The coefficients of the production function variables:l (PSIL),k (PSIK),
m (PSIM), andn (PSIN) represent the externality effects of labor, capital, military
expenditures, and non-military expenditures respectively;m (PIEM), and n (PIEN)
are the coefficients of military and non-military sectors respectively; and (Lambda) is
a constant representing technological progress. Appendix B contains the empirical
results of the CNTS analysis with a single political or conflict variable of the full model
(all states), the MENA, Non-Oil producing countries in the MENA (Non-Oil), oil
producing countries in the MENA (Oil), the Arab World, Latin America, Africa, Asia,
and the Caribbean. Appendix C contains the estimates of equations 17 -22 of the CNTS
models with external and internal conflicts as control variables.
In the appendices A, B, and C, I reported the number of cases (N), Durbin-
Watson statistics (DW), and the goodness of fit (R-Square). I reported a summary of the
NLS empirical results of appendix A in table 1. In this table, I reported information on
the impact of economic and military variables, and their externality effects on economic
growth along political and conflict variables. In each group of table 1, I reported the
numbers of countries that have significant and positive impact on economic growth
(+Sig), and their percentages (%+Sig). Likewise, I reported the numbers of countries
that have significant and negative impact (- Sig) and their percentages (%-Sig). Also, I
included in table 1 the numbers of countries that do not show positive, nor negative
significant impact on economic growth (NonSIG) and their percentages (%NonSIG).
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Each group in table 1 represents a summary of the production function estimates with
the influence of one of the political or conflict variables as elaborated below.
The PF with Political Freedom
Political freedom shows positive and significant impact in 11 countries (25
percent), while they have negative and significant impact in 4 countries (6.67 percent).
The estimates of the production function with political freedom are below: technological
progress has positive and significant impact on economic growth (EG) in 15 out of 60
countries (25 percent), while it hinders EG in 24 out of 60 countries (40 percent);
changes in the labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG in 19 countries
(31.67 percent), while they significantly hinder EG in 5 countries ( 8.33percent);
investment has positive and significant impact on EG in 5 countries (8.33 percent), while
it has negative and significant impact in15 countries (25 percent); the combined effects
of technological progress and productivity of the military sectors have positive and
significant impact on EG in 8 countries (13.33 percent), while they have negative and
significant impact in 12 countries (20 percent); the externality effects of defense
spending have positive and significant impact in 12 countries (20 percent), while they
have negative and significant impact in 4 countries (6.67 percent); the combined effects
of technological progress and productivity of the non-military sectors have positive and
significant impact in 11 countries (18.33 percent), while they show negative and
significant impact in 20 countries (33.33 percent); and the externality effects of non-
military government spending show overwhelming positive and significant impact in 32
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TABLE 1. Summary of the Non-linear Least Squares Empirical Analysis Results
+Sig % +Sig -Sig % -Sig NonSIG %NonSIG
Technology13.00 21.00 24.00 40.00 23.00 38.33
Labor 13.00 21.00 11.00 18.00 36.00 60.00
Investment 11.00 18.33 9.00 15.00 40.00 66.00
Mil sector 19.00 31.00 10.00 16.67 31.00 51.67
Miitary ext 13.00 21.00 6.00 10.00 41.00 68.33
Nmil-sector21.00 35.00 16.00 21.00 23.00 38.33
Nmil ext 30.00 50.00 5.00 8.33 25.00 41.67
Ext Conf 6.00 10.00 2.00 3.33 52.00 66.00
+Sig % +Sig -Sig % -Sig NonSIG %NonSIG
Technology15.00 25.00 16.00 26.67 29.00 48.33
Labor 13.00 21.00 8.00 13.33 39.00 65.00
Investment 10.00 16.67 9.00 15.00 41.00 68.33
Mil sector 9.00 15.00 10 16.67 41.00 68.33
Mil ext 12.00 20.00 5.00 8.33 43.00 71.67
Nmil-sector18.00 30.00 20.00 33.33 22.00 36.67
NMil ext 41.00 68.33 1.00 1.67 18.00 30.00
Int conf 15.00 25.00 6.00 10.00 39.00 65.00
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TABLE 1. (Continued)
+Sig % +Sig -Sig % -Sig NonSIG %NonSIG
Technology17.00 28.00 17.00 28.00 26.00 43.00
Labor 11.00 18.33 11.00 18.33 38.00 63.33
Investment 11.00 18.33 8.00 13.33 41.00 68.33
Mil sector 7.00 11.67 13.00 21.67 40.00 66.67
Mil ext 19.00 31.67 3.00 5.00 38.00 63.33
Nmil-sector16.00 26.67 19.00 31.67 25.00 41.67
NMil ext 25.00 41.67 2.00 3.33 33.00 55.00
Tot Conf 19.00 31.67 7.00 11.67 34.00 56.00
+Sig % +Sig -Sig % -Sig NonSIG %NonSIG
Technology15.00 25.00 24.00 40.00 21.00 35.00
Labor 19.00 31.67 5.00 8.33 36.00 60.00
Investment 5.00 8.33 15.00 25.00 40.00 66.67
Mil sector 8.00 13.33 12.00 20.00 40.00 66.67
Mil ext 12.00 20.00 4.00 6.67 44.00 73.33
Nmil-sector11.00 18.33 20.00 33.33 29.00 48.33
NMil ext 32.00 53.00 3.00 5.00 25.00 41.67
Pol Free 11.00 18.33 4.00 6.67 45.00 75.00
61
TABLE 1. (Continued)
+Sig % +Sig -Sig % -Sig NonSIG %NonSIG
Technology14.00 23.00 29.00 48.33 17.00 28.33
Labor 10.00 16.67 7.00 11.67 43.00 71.67
Investment 5.00 8.33 8.00 13.67 47.00 78.33
Mil sector 12.00 20.00 8.00 13.33 39.00 65.00
Mil ext 11.00 18.33 3.00 5.00 46.00 76.00
Nmil-sector8.00 13.33 25.00 41.67 27.00 45.00
Nmil ext 29.00 48.33 2.00 3.33 29.00 48.33
Inst Free 13.00 21.33 10.00 16.67 37 61.67
+Sig % +Sig -Sig % -Sig NonSIG %NonSIG
Technology15.00 25.00 20.00 33.00 25.00 33.00
Labor 19.00 31.67 6.00 10.00 35.00 38.00
Investment 8.00 13.67 12.00 20.00 40.00 38.33
Mil sector 8.00 13.33 13.00 21.67 39.00 38.33
Mil ext 13.00 21.67 6.00 10.00 41.00 38.33
Nmil-sector13.00 21.67 14.00 23.33 33.00 38.33
Nmil ext 32.00 53.33 2.00 3.33 53.33 38.33
Reg type 9.00 15.00 10.00 16.67 38.33 38.33
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TABLE 1. (Continued)
+Sig % +Sig -Sig % -Sig NonSIG %NonSIG
Technology19.00 31.67 18.00 30.00 23.00 38.33
Labor 16.00 26.67 5.00 8.33 39.00 65.00
Investment 9.00 15.00 9.00 15.00 42.00 70.00
Mil sector 11.00 18.33 9.00 15.00 40.00 66.67
Mil ext 13.00 21.67 2.00 3.33 45.00 75.00
Nmil-sector18.00 30.00 17.00 28.33 25.00 41.67
Nmil ext 30.00 50.00 5.00 8.33 25.00 41.67
Stability 12.00 20.00 12.00 20.00 36.00 60.00
+Sig % +Sig -Sig % -Sig NonSIG %NonSIG
Technology17.00 28.33 19.00 31.67 24.00 40.00
Labor 15.00 25.00 5.00 8.33 40.00 66.67
Investment 11.00 18.33 12.00 20.00 37.00 61.67
Mil sector 7.00 11.67 12.00 20.00 41.00 68.33
Mil ext 8.00 13.33 6.00 10.00 46.00 76.00
Nmil-sector15.00 25.00 17.00 28.33 28.00 46.67
Nmil ext 32.00 53.33 2.00 3.33 26.00 43.33
Ideology 16.00 26.67 8.00 13.33 36.00 60.00
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countries (53.33 percent), while they significantly hinders EG in 3 countries (5 percent).
Figure 1 demonstrates the number of countries that economic or military variables show
significant impacts (positive or negative) on their economic growth along political
freedom.
The PF with Institutional Freedom
Institutional freedom has positive and significant impact on economic growth
(EG) in 13 countries (21.67 percent); while they have negative and significant impact on
EG in 10 countries (16.67 percent). The estimates of the production function with
institutional freedom are below: technological progress has positive and significant
impact on (EG) in 14 out of 60 countries (23.33 percent), while it significantly hinders
EG in 29 out of 60 countries (48.33 percent); changes in the labor growth have positive
and significant impact on EG in 10 countries (16.67 percent), while they hinder EG in 7
countries (11.67 percent); investment has positive and significant impact on EG in five
countries (8.33 percent), while it has negative and significant impact in 8 countries
(13.33 percent); the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the
military sectors have positive impact on EG in 12 countries (20 percent), while they have
negative and significant impact in 9 countries (15 percent); the externality effects of
defense spending have positive and significant impact in 11 countries (18.33 percent),
while they have negative and significant impact in 3 countries (5 percent); The combined
effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military sectors have
positive and significant impact in 8 countries (13.33 percent), while they show negative
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Figure 1. The Impact of Political Freedom, Economic, Military, and Non-
military Factors, and Their Externalities on Economic Growth.
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Figure 2.The Impact of Institutional Freedom, Economic, Military, and
Non-military Factors, and Their Externalities on Economic Growth.
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and significant impact in 25 countries (41.67 percent); and the externality effects of non-
military government spending show positive and significant impact in 29 countries
(48.33 percent), while they significantly hinders EG in 2 countries (3.33 percent). Figure
2 demonstrates the number of countries that economic or military variables show
significant impacts (positive or negative) on their economic growth with institutional
freedom.
The PF with Regime Type
Regime type has positive and significant impact on economic growth (EG) in
nine countries (15 percent); while they have negative and significant impact on EG in
ten countries (16.33 percent). The estimates of the production function with political
freedom are below: technological progress has positive and significant impact on EG in
15 out of 60 countries (25 percent), while it significantly hinders EG in 20 out of 60
countries (38.33 percent); changes in labor growth have positive and significant impact
on EG in 19 countries (31.67 percent), while they significantly hinder EG in 6 countries
(10 percent); investment has positive impact on EG in 8 countries (13.33 percent), while
it has negative impact in 12 countries (20 percent); the combined effects of technological
progress and productivity of the military sectors have positive and significant impact on
EG in eight countries (13.33 percent), while they have negative and significant impact in
13 countries (21.67 percent); the externality effects of defense spending have positive
and significant impact in 13 countries (21.67 percent), while they have negative and
significant impact in 6 countries (10 percent); the combined effects of technological
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progress and productivity of the non-military sectors have positive and significant
impact in 13 countries (21.67 percent), while they show negative and significant impact
in 14 countries (23.33 percent); and the externality effects of non-military government
spending show positive and significant impact in 32 countries (53.33 percent), while
they significantly hinders EG in two countries (3.33 percent). Figure 3 on p.68
represents countries of which economic and military variables show significant impacts
(positive or negative) on economic growth with regime type.
The PF with Political Stability
Political stability has positive and significant impact in 12 countries (20
percent), while they have negative and significant impact in 5 countries (8.33 percent).
The estimates of the production function with political stability are below: technological
progress has positive and significant impact on economic growth (EG) in 19 out of 60
countries (31.67 percent), while it significantly hinders EG in 18 out of 60 countries (30
percent); changes in the labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG in 16
countries (26.67 percent), while they significantly hinder EG in 5 countries (8.33
percent); investment has positive and significant impact on EG in 9 countries (15
percent), while it has negative and significant impact in nine countries (15 percent); the
combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the military sectors have
positive and significant impact on EG in 11 countries (18.33 percent), while they have
negative and significant impact in nine countries (15 percent); the externality effects of
defense spending have positive and significant impact in 13 countries (21.67 percent),
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while they have negative and significant impact in two countries (3.33 percent); The
combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military sectors
have positive and significant impact in 18 countries (30 percent), while they show
negative and significant impact in 17 countries (28.33 percent); The externality effects
of non-military government spending show positive and significant impact in 30
countries (50 percent), while they significantly hinders EG in five countries (8.33
percent). Figure 4 represents countries of which economic and military variables show
significant impacts (positive or negative) on economic growth with political stability.
The PF with Ideological Base
Regime ideological base has positive and significant impact on economic growth
(EG) in 16 countries (26.67 percent); while they have negative and significant impact in
eight countries (13.33 percent). The estimates of the production function with
ideological base are below: technological progress has positive and significant impact on
EG in 17 out of 60 countries (28.33 percent), while it significantly hinders EG in 19 out
of 60 countries (31.67 percent); changes in labor growth have positive and significant
impact on EG in 15 countries (25 percent), while they significantly hinder EG in five
countries (8.33 percent); investment has positive and significant impact on EG in 11
countries (18.33 percent), while it has negative and significant impact in 12 countries (20
percent); the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the military
sectors have positive and significant impact on EG in 7 countries (11.67 percent), while
they have negative and significant impact in 12 countries (20 percent); the externality
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Figure 3. The Impact of Regime Type, Economic, Military, and Non-military Factors,
and Their Externalities on Economic Growth.
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effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact in 8 countries (13.33
percent), while they have negative and significant impact in 6 countries (10 percent); the
combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military sectors
have positive and significant impact in 15 countries (25 percent), while they show
negative and significant impact in 17 countries (28.33 percent); and the externality
effects of non-military government spending show positive and significant impact in 32
countries (53.33 percent), while they significantly hinder EG in two countries (3.33
percent). Figure 5 on p.71 represents countries of which economic and military variables
show significant impacts on economic growth with regime ideological base.
The PF with Internal Conflicts
Internal conflicts have positive and significant impact in 15 countries (25
percent); while they have negative and significant impact in 6 countries (10 percent).
The estimates of the production function with internal conflicts are below: technological
progress has positive and significant impact on economic growth (EG) in 15 out of 60
countries (25 percent), while it significantly hinders EG in 16 out of 60 countries (26.67
percent); changes in labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG in 13
countries (21 percent), while they significantly hinder EG in 8 countries (13.33 percent);
investment has positive and significant impact on EG in 10 countries (16.67 percent),
while it has negative and significant impact in 9 countries (15 percent); the combined
effects of technological progress and productivity of the military sectors have positive
and significant impact on EG in 9 countries (11.67 percent), while they have negative
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and significant impact in 10 countries (16.67 percent); the externality effects of defense
spending have positive and significant impact in 12 countries (20 percent), while they
have negative and significant impact in 5 countries (8.33 percent). technological
progress and productivity of the non-military sectors have positive impact in 18
countries (30 percent), while they show negative and significant impact in 20 countries
(33.33 percent); the externality effects of non-military government spending show
overwhelming positive and significant impact in 41 countries (68.33 percent), while they
hinders EG in a single country (1.67 percent). Figure 6 represents countries of which
economic and military variables show significant impacts (positive or negative) on
economic growth with internal conflicts.
The PF with External Conflicts
External conflicts have positive and significant impact on EG in only 6 countries
(10 percent), while only two countries (3.33 percent) show negative and significant
impact on EG. The estimates of the production function with internal conflicts are
below: there are 13 out of 60 countries (21.67 percent) that have positive and significant
impact of technological progress on economic growth (EG), while 24 out of 60 countries
(40 percent) have negative and significant impact on EG; changes in labor growth show
positive and significant impact in 13 countries (21.67 percent) while they show negative
and significant impact in 11 countries (18.33 percent); investment shows that 11
countries (18.33 percent) have positive and significant impact on EG, while 9 countries
(15 percent) show negative and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of
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technological progress and productivity of the military sector has positive and significant
impact on EG in 19 countries (31.67 percent), while it hampers EG in 10 countries
(16.67 percent); the externality effects of defense spending (EEDS) show positive and
significant impact on EG of 13 countries (21.67 percent), while they show negative and
significant impact on EG in six countries (10 percent); the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the non-military sectors show positive and
significant impact of 21 countries (35 percent), while 16 countries (26.67 percent) incur
negative and significant impact on EG; the externality effects of non-military
government spending show overwhelming positive and significant impact of 30
countries (50 percent) on EG, while only five countries (8.33 percent) incur negative and
significant impact on EG. Figure 7 represents countries of which economic and military
variables show significant impacts, positive or negative, on economic growth along
external conflicts.
The PF with Total Conflicts
Total conflicts have positive and significant impact in 19 countries (31.67
percent); while they have negative and significant impact in seven countries (56.67
percent). The estimates of the production function with total conflicts are below:
technological progress has positive and significant impact on (EG) in 17 countries out of
60 countries (28 percent), while it significantly hinders EG in 17 countries out of 60
countries (28 percent); changes in the labor growth have positive and significant impact
on EG in 11 countries (18.33 percent), while they significantly hinder EG in11 countries
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(18.33 percent); investment has positive and significant impact on EG in 11 countries
(18.33 percent), while it has negative and significant impact in 11 countries (13.33
percent); the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the military
sectors have positive and significant impact on EG in 7 countries (11.67 percent), while
they have negative impact in 13 countries (21.67 percent); the externality effects of
defense spending have positive and significant impact in 19 countries (31.67 percent),
while they have negative impact in three countries (5 percent); The combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the non-military sectors have positive and
significant impact in 16 countries (26.67 percent), while they show negative and
significant impact in 19 countries (31.67 percent); The externality effects of non-
military government spending show positive and significant impact in 25 countries
(41.67 percent), while they significantly hinders EG in 2 countries (3.33 percent). Figure
8 represents countries of which economic and military variables show significant
impacts (positive or negative) on economic growth with total conflicts.
Results of the Cross National Time Series Analysis
I reported a summary of the CNTS empirical results of appendix B in table 2 on
p. 76, which demonstrates the direction and significance of the relationships of economic
and military variables on economic growth with political variables for nine regions:
MENA Non-oil producing countries, MENA Oil producing countries, the Arab World,
MENA, Latin America, Africa, Asia, the Caribbean region, and all states (full model).
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Figure 7. The Impact of External Conflicts, Economic, Military, and Non-
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I also reported a summary of the CNTS empirical results of appendix C in Table
3 on p. 81, which demonstrates the direction and significance of the relationships of
economic and military variables on economic growth with internal and external conflicts
as control variables plus a political variable for six regions: the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA), Latin America, Asia, Africa, the Caribbean region, and all states (full
model).
The CNTS Analysis with a Single Political Variable
Political freedom in the full model (entire sample) shows insignificant positive
impact on EG. The estimates of the production function with political freedom are
below: changes in labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; the
combined effects of technological progress
and productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG; and
the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military
sectors have negative and significant impact on EG.
Institutional freedom shows insignificant positive impact on EG. The estimates
of the production function with institutional freedom are below: changes in labor growth
have positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological
progress and productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on
EG; the externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on
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TABLE 2. Summary of the Cross National Time Series Results with Political Variables
Labor Invest Mil Mil ext Nmil Nmil ext
All St (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* (-)* (-)
Non-Oil (+)* (-) (-)* (+)* (-) (-)
Oil (+)* (-)* (-)* (+)* (-)* (-)*
Arabia (+)* (-)* (+)* (+)* (+) (-)
MENA (+)* (-) (+) (+)* (+) (-)
Latinos (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* (+) (+)
Africa (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* (-)* (+)
Asia (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA)
Caribbean (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA)
Ext conf (-) (-) (+) (+) (-)*
(+) (+) (NA) (NA)
Labor Invest Mil Mil ext Nmil Nmil ext
All St (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* (-)* (-)
Non-OIL (+)* (-) (-)* (+)* (+) (-)
Oil (+)* (-)* (-)* (+)* (-)* (-)
Arabia (+)* (-)* (+)* (+)* (+) (-)
MENA (+)* (-) (+) (+)* (+) (-)
Latinos (+)* (+) (+) (+)* (+) (-)
Africa (+)* (+) (+) (+)* (-)* (-)
Asia (+)* (-) (-)* (+)* (-) (-)
Caribbean (+)* (-)* (-)* (+)* (+) (-)
Int conf (-)* (-)* (+) (-) (-)*
(-) (+) (+) (-)
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TABLE 2. (Continued)
Labor Invest Mil Mil ext Nmil Nmil ext
All St (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* (-)* (-)
Non-Oil (+)* (-) (-)* (+)* (+) (+)
Oil (+) (-)* (-)* (+)* (-)* (-)*
Arabia (+)* (-)* (+) (+)* (+) (-)
MENA (+)* (-) (+) (+)* (+) (-)
Latinos (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* (+) (+)
Africa (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* (-)* (+)
Asia (+)* (+) (+) (+) (-) (+)
Caribbean (+)* (-) (+)* (+)* (+) (+)
Tot Conf (-)* (-)* (+) (-) (-)
(-) (+)* (+) (+)
Labor Invest Mil Mil ext Nmil Nmil ext
All St (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* (-)* (-)
Non-Oil (+)* (-) (-)* (+)* (+) (-)
Oil (+)* (-)* (-)* (+)* (-)* (-)*
Arabia (+)* (-)* (+)* (+)* (+) (-)
MENA (+)* (-) (-) (+)* (+) (-)
Latinos (+) (+) (+)* (+)* (+) (+)
Africa (+)* (+) (+) (+) (-*) (+)
Asia (+)* (-)* (+)* (+)* (-) (-)*
Caribbean (+)* (-)* (+)* (+)* (+) (+)
Pol free (+) (-) (+) (-) (-)
(+) (-) (-) (-)
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TABLE 2. (Continued)
Labor Invest Mil Mil ext Nmil Nmil ext
All St (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* (-)* (-)
Non-Oil (+)* (-) (-)* (+)* (+) (-)
Oil (+)* (-) (-)* (+)* (-)* (-)
Arabia (+)* (-) (+)* (+)* (+) (-)
MENA (+)* (-) (+) (+)* (+) (-)
Latinos (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* (+) (+)
Africa (+)* (+) (+)* (+) (-)* (+)
Asia (+)* (-) (+) (+)* (-) (-)
Caribbean (+)* (-) (+)* (+)* (+) (+)
Ins free (+)* (+) (-) (+) (+)
(+) (+) (-) (-)
Labor Invest Mil Mil ext Nmil Nmil ext
All St (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* () ()
Non-Oil (+)* (-) (-)* (+)* () ()
Oil (+)* (-)* (-)* (+)* () ()
Arabia (+)* (-)* (+)* (+)* () ()
MENA (+)* (-)* (+) (+)* () ()
Latinos (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* () ()
Africa (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* () ()
Asia (+)* (-) (+) (+) () ()
Caribbean (+)* (-)* (+) (+)* () ()
Type (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
(-) (-) (-) (-)
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TABLE 2. (Continued)
Labor Invest Mil Mil ext Nmil Nmil ext
All St (+) (+) (+)* (+)* (-)* (-)
Non-Oil (+)* (-) (-)* (+)* (+) (-)
Oil (+)* (-)* (-)* (+)* (-)* (-)
Arabia (+)* (-)* (+)* (+)* (+) (-)
MENA (+)* (-) (+)* (+)* (+) (-)
Latinos (+) (+) (+)* (+)* (+) (+)
Africa (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* (-)* (+)
Asia (+)* (-) (+) (+)* (-) (-)
Caribbean (+)* (-)* (+)* (+)* (+) (+)
Stability (-) (+) (-) (+) (+)
(-) (+) (+) (-)
Labor Invest Mil Mil ext Nmil Nmil ext
All St (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* (-)* (-)
Non-Oil (+)* (-) (-)* (+)* (+) (-)
Oil (+)* (-)* (-)* (+)* (-)* (-)*
Arabia (+)* (-)* (+)* (+)* (+) (-)*
MENA (+*) (-) (+) (+)* (+) (-)*
Latinos (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* (+) (+)
Africa (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* (-)* (+)
Asia (+)* (-)* (+) (+)* (-) (-)*
Caribbean (+)* (-)* (+)* (+)* (-) (+)
Ideology (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
(-) (-) (-) (-)
* Significant at 0.05 level
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EG; and the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-
military sectors have negative and significant impact on EG.
Regime type shows insignificant negative impact on EG. The estimates of the
production function with regime type are below: changes in labor growth have positive
and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; and the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
Regime stability shows insignificant negative impact on EG. The estimates of the
production function with regime stability are below: the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the military sectors show positive and
significant impact on EG; the externality effects of defense spending have positive and
significant impact on EG; and the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the non-military sectors have negative and significant impact on EG.
Ideological base shows insignificant negative impact on EG. The estimates of the
production function with ideological base are below: changes in labor growth have
positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress
and productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG; and
the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military
sectors have negative and significant impact on EG.
Internal conflicts show negative and significant impact on EG. The estimates of
the production function with internal conflicts are below: changes in labor growth have
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TABLE 3. Summary of the CNTS Results with Conflicts as Control Variables
Pol free Ins free Type Stability Ideology
All States
Labor (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)*
Investment (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
Mil sector (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)*
Mil ext (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (-)*
Nmil sect (-)* (-)* (-)* (-)* (-)*
NMil ext (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Pol var (+) (+) (-) (-) (-)
Ext conf (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Int conf (-)* (-)* (-)* (-)* (-)*
Pol free Ins free Type Stability Ideology
Africa
Labor (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)*
Investment (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
Mil sector (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)*
Mil ext (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)*
NMil sect (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)*
NMil ext (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
Pol var (-) (+) (-) (+) (-)
Ext conf (-) (-) (+) (-) (-)
Int conf (-) (+) (-) (+) (-)
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TABLE 3. (Continued)
Pol free Ins free Type Stability Ideology
Asia
Labor (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)*
Investment (-)* (-)* (-)* (-)* (-)*
Mil sector (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
Mil ext (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)*
NMil sect (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
NMil ext (-)* (-)* (-)* (-)* (-)*
Pol var (-) (+) (-) (+) (-)
Ext conf (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Int conf (-) (+) (-) (+) (-)
Pol free Ins free Type Stability Ideology
MENA
Labor (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)*
Investment (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Mil sector (-) (+) (+) (+) (+)
Mil ext (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)*
NMil sect (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
NMil ext (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Pol var (-) (+) (-) (+) (-)
Ext conf (-)* (-)* (-)* (-)* (-)*
Int conf (-)* (-)* (-)* (-)* (-)*
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TABLE 3(Continued)
Pol free Ins free Type Stability Ideology
Latin America
Labor (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)*
Investment (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)*
Mil sector (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
Mil ext (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)*
NMil sect (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
NMil ext (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
Pol var (+) (+) (-) (-) (-)
Ext conf (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
int conf (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Pol free Ins free Type Stability Ideology
The Caribbean
Labor (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)*
Investment (-)* (-)* (-)* (-)* (-)*
Mil sector (-)* (-)* (-)* (-)* (-)*
Mil ext (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)*
NMil sect (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
NMil ext (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)* (+)*
Pol var (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Ext conf (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
int conf (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
* Significant at 0.05 level
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positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress
and productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG; and
the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military
sectors have negative and significant impact on EG.
External conflicts show insignificant negative impact on economic growth EG.
The estimates of the production function with external conflicts are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the military sectors show positive and
significant impact on EG; the externality effects of defense spending have positive and
significant impact on EG; and the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the non-military sectors have negative and significant impact on EG.
Total conflicts show negative and significant impact on EG. The estimates of the
production function with total conflicts are below: changes in labor growth have positive
and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG; and
the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military
sectors have negative and significant impact on EG.
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MENA Non-Oil Producing Countries
Political freedom shows insignificant positive impact on EG. The estimates of
the production function with political freedom are below: changes in labor growth have
positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress
and productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; and
the externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
Institutional freedom shows insignificant positive impact on EG. The estimates
of the production function with institutional freedom are below: changes in labor growth
have positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological
progress and productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on
EG; the externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on
EG.
Regime type shows insignificant positive impact on EG. The estimates of the
production function with regime type are below: changes in labor growth have positive
and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
Regime stability shows insignificant positive impact on EG. The estimates of the
production function with regime type are below: changes in labor growth have positive
and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
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Ideological base shows insignificant negative impact on economic growth (EG).
The estimates of the production function with ideological base are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the military sectors show positive and
significant impact on EG; the externality effects of defense spending have positive and
significant impact on EG.
Internal conflicts show negative and significant impact on EG. The estimates of
the production function with internal conflicts are below: changes in labor growth have
positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress
and productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG; and
the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military
sectors have negative and significant impact on EG.
External conflicts show insignificant negative impact on economic growth EG.
The estimates of the production function with external conflicts are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the military sectors show positive and
significant impact on EG; the externality effects of defense spending have positive and
significant impact on EG.
Total conflicts show negative and significant impact on EG. The estimates of the
production function with total conflicts are below: changes in labor growth have positive
and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
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productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG; and
the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military
sectors have positive and significant impact on EG.
MENA Oil Producing Countries
Political freedom show insignificant positive impact on economic growth (EG).
The estimates of the production function with political freedom are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment shows negative and
significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show negative and significant impact on EG; the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG; the
combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military sectors
have negative and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of non-military
government spending have negative and significant impact on EG.
Institutional freedom shows insignificant positive impact on economic growth
EG. The estimates of the production function with institutional freedom are below:
changes in labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment shows
negative and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress
and productivity of the military sectors show negative and significant impact on EG; the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG; the
combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military sectors
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have negative and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of non-military
government spending have negative and significant impact on EG.
Regime type shows insignificant negative impact on economic growth EG. The
estimates of the production function with regime type are below: changes in labor
growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment shows negative and
significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show negative and significant impact on EG; and the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
Regime stability shows insignificant positive impact on economic growth EG.
The estimates of the production function with political stability are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment shows negative and
significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show negative and significant impact on EG; and the
externality effects of defense spending have negative and significant impact on EG.
Ideological base shows insignificant negative impact on economic growth EG.
The estimates of the production function with ideological base are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment shows negative and
significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show negative and significant impact on EG; the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG; the
combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military sectors
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have negative and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of non-military
government spending have negative and significant impact on EG.
Internal conflicts show insignificant positive impact on economic growth EG.
The estimates of the production function with internal conflicts are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment shows negative and
significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show negative and significant impact on EG; the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG; the
combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military sectors
have negative and significant impact on EG.
External conflicts show insignificant positive impact on economic growth EG.
The estimates of the production function with external conflicts are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment shows negative and
significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show negative and significant impact on EG; the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG; the
combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military sectors
have negative and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of non-military
government spending have negative and significant impact on EG.
Total conflicts show insignificant positive impact on economic growth (EG). The
estimates of the production function with total conflicts are below: investment shows
negative and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress
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and productivity of the military sectors show negative and significant impact on EG; the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG; the
combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military sectors
have negative and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of non-military
government spending have negative and significant impact on EG.
The Arab World
Political freedom shows insignificant negative impact on economic growth EG.
The estimates of the production function with political freedom are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment shows negative and
significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; and the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG; and
the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military
sectors have negative and significant impact on EG.
Institutional freedom shows insignificant positive impact on economic growth
EG. The estimates of the production function with institutional freedom are below:
changes in labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; the combined
effects of technological progress and productivity of the military sectors show positive
and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of defense spending have
positive and significant impact on EG.
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Regime type shows insignificant negative impact on economic growth EG. The
estimates of the production function with regime type are below: changes in labor
growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment shows negative and
significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; and the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
Regime stability shows insignificant positive impact on economic growth EG.
The estimates of the production function with political stability are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment shows negative and
significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; and the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
Ideological base shows insignificant negative impact on economic growth (EG).
The estimates of the production function with ideological base are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment shows negative and
significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG; and
the externality effects of non-military government spending have negative and
significant impact on EG.
Internal conflicts show insignificant negative impact on economic growth EG.
The estimates of the production function with internal conflicts are below: changes in
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labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment shows negative and
significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; and the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
External conflicts show insignificant positive impact on economic growth EG.
The estimates of the production function with external conflicts are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment shows negative and
significant impact on EG; and the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG.
Total conflicts show insignificant negative impact on economic growth EG. The
estimates of the production function with total conflicts are below: changes in labor
growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment shows negative and
significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of defense spending have positive
and significant impact on EG.
The Middle East and North Africa
Political freedom shows insignificant negative impact on economic growth EG.
The estimates of the production function with political freedom are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of
defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
Institutional freedom shows insignificant positive impact on economic growth
EG. The estimates of the production function with total conflicts are below: changes in
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labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of
defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
Regime type shows insignificant negative impact on economic growth EG. The
estimates of the production function with regime type are below: changes in labor
growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment shows negative and
significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of defense spending have positive
and significant impact on EG.
Regime stability shows insignificant positive impact on economic growth (EG).
The estimates of the production function with political stability are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the military sectors show positive and
significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of defense spending have positive
and significant impact on EG.
Ideological base shows insignificant negative impact on economic growth EG.
The estimates of the production function with ideological base are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of
non-military government spending have negative and significant impact on EG.
Internal conflicts show negative and significant impact on economic growth EG.
The estimates of the production function with internal conflicts are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of
defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
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External conflicts show negative and significant impact on economic growth EG.
The estimates of the production function with external conflicts are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of
defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
Total conflicts show insignificant negative impact on economic growth (EG).
The estimates of the production function with total conflicts are below: changes in labor
growth have positive and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of defense
spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
Latin America
Political freedom shows positive impact on economic growth EG. The estimates
of the production function with political freedom are below: the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the military sectors show positive and
significant impact on EG and the externality effects of defense spending have positive
and significant impact on EG.
Institutional freedom shows insignificant positive impact on economic growth
EG. The estimates of the production function with institutional freedom are below:
changes in labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; the combined
effects of technological progress and productivity of the military sectors show positive
and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of defense spending have
positive and significant impact on EG.
95
Regime type shows insignificant negative impact on economic growth EG. The
estimates of the production function with regime type are below: changes in labor
growth have positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the military sector show positive and
significant impact on EG and the externality effects of defense spending have positive
and significant impact on EG.
Regime stability shows positive impact on economic growth (EG). The estimates
of the production function with political stability are below: the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the military sector show positive and
significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of defense spending have positive
and significant impact on EG.
Ideological base shows insignificant negative impact on economic growth (EG).
The estimates of the production function with ideological base are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the military sector show positive and
significant impact on EG and the externality effects of non-military government
spending have negative and significant impact on EG.
Internal conflicts show negative and significant impact on economic growth
(EG). The estimates of the production function with internal conflicts are below: changes
in labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of
defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
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External conflicts show insignificant negative impact on economic growth (EG).
The estimates of the production function with external conflicts are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the military sector show positive and
significant impact on EG and the externality effects of defense spending have positive
and significant impact on EG.
Total conflicts show insignificant negative impact on economic growth (EG).
The estimates of the production function with total conflicts are below: changes in labor
growth have positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the military sectors show positive and
significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of defense spending have positive
and significant impact on EG.
Africa
Political freedom shows insignificant negative impact on EG. The estimates of
the production function with political freedom are below: changes in labor growth have
positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress
and productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; and
the externality effects of non-military spending have negative and significant impact on
EG.
Institutional freedom shows insignificant positive impact on (EG). The estimates
of the production function with institutional freedom are below: changes in labor growth
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have positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological
progress and productivity of the military sector shows positive and significant impact on
EG; and the externality effects of non-military spending have positive and significant
impact on EG.
Regime type shows insignificant negative impact on EG. The estimates of the
production function with regime type are below: changes in labor growth have positive
and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; and the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
Regime stability shows insignificant positive impact on economic growth (EG).
The estimates of the production function with regime stability are below: the combined
effects of technological progress and productivity of the military sector shows positive
and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG; and
the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military
sectors have positive and significant impact on EG.
Ideological base shows insignificant negative impact on EG. The estimates of the
production function with ideological base are below: changes in labor growth have
positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress
and productivity of the military sector shows positive and significant impact on EG; the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG; the
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combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military sectors
have positive and significant impact on EG; the externality effects of non-military
spending have negative and significant impact on EG.
Internal conflicts show positive and significant impact on EG. The estimates of
the production function with internal conflicts are below: changes in labor growth have
positive and significant impact on EG; the externality effects of defense spending have
positive and significant impact on EG; and the combined effects of technological
progress and productivity of the non-military sectors have negative and significant
impact on EG. There are no results for External conflicts.
Total conflicts show positive and significant impact on economic growth (EG).
The estimates of the production function with total conflicts are below: changes in labor
growth have positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the military sectors show positive and
significant impact on EG; the externality effects of defense spending have positive and
significant impact on EG; and the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the non-military sectors have negative and significant impact on EG.
Asia
Political freedom shows insignificant negative impact on EG. The estimates of
the production function with political freedom are below: changes in labor growth have
positive and significant impact on EG; investment has negative and significant impact on
EG; the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the military
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sector shows positive and significant impact on EG; the externality effects of defense
spending have positive and significant impact on EG; and the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the non-military sectors have negative and
significant impact on EG.
Institutional freedom shows insignificant negative impact on economic growth
(EG). The estimates of the production function with institutional freedom are below:
changes in labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; and the combined
effects of technological progress and productivity of the military sectors have positive
and significant impact on EG.
Regime type shows insignificant negative impact on economic growth (EG).
Labor growth is the only significant variable among the estimates of the production
function. Changes in labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG.
Regime stability shows insignificant positive impact on economic growth (EG).
The estimates of the production function with regime stability are below: the combined
effects of technological progress and productivity of the military sectors show positive
and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of defense spending have
positive and significant impact on EG.
Ideological base shows insignificant negative impact on economic growth (EG).
The estimates of the production function with ideological base are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment has negative and
significant impact on EG; and the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG.
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Internal conflicts show positive and significant impact on EG. The estimates of
the production function with internal conflicts are below: changes in labor growth have
positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress
and productivity of the military sectors show negative and significant impact on EG; and
the externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
There are no results for External conflicts.
Total conflicts show insignificant positive impact on economic growth (EG).
Labor growth is the only significant variable among the estimates of the production
function with total conflicts. Changes in labor growth have positive and significant
impact on EG.
The Caribbean Region
Political freedom shows insignificant negative impact on EG. The estimates of
the production function with political freedom are below: changes in labor growth have
positive and significant impact on EG; investment has negative and significant impact on
EG; the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the military
sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of
defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
Institutional freedom shows insignificant negative impact on EG. The estimates
of the production function with institutional freedom are below: changes in labor growth
have positive and significant impact on EG; and the combined effects of technological
progress and productivity of the military sectors have positive and significant impact on
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EG; and the externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact
on EG.
Regime type shows insignificant negative impact on EG. Changes in labor
growth have positive and significant impact on EG; and the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the military sectors have negative and
significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of defense spending have positive
and significant impact on EG.
Regime stability shows insignificant negative impact on EG. The estimates of the
production function with political freedom are below: changes in labor growth have
positive and significant impact on EG; investment has negative and significant impact on
EG; the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the military
sector shows positive and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of
defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
Ideological base shows insignificant negative impact on economic growth (EG).
The estimates of the production function with political freedom are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment has negative and
significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show positive and significant impact on EG; and the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
Internal conflicts show insignificant negative impact on economic growth (EG).
The estimates of the production function with internal conflicts are below: changes in
labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; investment has negative and
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significant impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sectors show negative and significant impact on EG; and the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
There are no results for External conflicts.
Total conflicts show insignificant negative impact on economic growth (EG).
The estimates of the production function with total conflicts are below: changes in labor
growth have positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the military sector shows positive and
significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of defense spending have positive
and significant impact on EG.
The CNTS Analysis with Conflicts as Control Variables
All political variables in the full model (entire sample) show insignificant
(positive or negative) impact on economic growth (EG); internal conflicts show
significant negative impact on EG; external conflicts show insignificant negative impact
on EG. The estimates of the production function with political freedom, and conflicts as
control variables, show the same impact with all political contexts: changes in labor
growth have positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the military sectors show positive and
significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of defense spending have positive
and significant impact on EG.
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Africa
Political as well as conflict variables show insignificant impact on economic
growth. The estimates of the production function with the political variables, and
conflicts as control variables, show the same impact with all political contexts: changes
in labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the military sector shows positive and
significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of defense spending have positive
and significant impact on EG.
Asia
Political as well as conflict variables show insignificant impact on economic
growth (EG). The estimates of the production function with conflicts as control variables
show the same impact with all political contexts: changes in labor growth have positive
and significant impact on EG; investment shows negative and significant impact on EG;
the externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG;
and the externality effects of non-military spending have negative and significant impact
on EG.
MENA
Political variable show insignificant impact on economic growth (EG); internal
conflicts show negative and significant impact on EG; and internal conflict show
negative and significant impact on EG. The estimates of the production function with
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conflicts as control variables show the same impact with all political contexts: changes
in labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of
defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
Latin America
Both political and conflict variables show insignificant impact on EG. The
estimates of the production function with conflicts as control variables show the same
impacts with all political contexts: changes in labor growth have positive and significant
impact on EG; investment show positive and significant impact on EG; and the
externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG.
The Caribbean Region
Both political and conflict variables show insignificant impact on economic
growth (EG). The estimates of the production function with conflicts as control variables
show the same impact with all political contexts: changes in labor growth have positive
and significant impact on EG; investment show negative and significant impact on EG;
the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the military sector
shows negative and significant impact on EG; the externality effects of defense spending
have positive and significant impact on EG; and the externality effects of non-military
spending have positive and significant impact on EG. The Main findings of this study
are: first, the externality of non-military spending is positive and significant in majority
of countries. Second, political variables: political freedom, institutional freedom, regime
105
type, political stability, and ideological base are at least as significant as the economic
variables. Third, defense sector has more significant impact than the private sector on
economic growth. Finally, the positive and significant impact of labor on EG reaches its
peak with institutionalized and stable political regimes.
106
CHAPTER V
THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
In Man Makes Himself (1936) and What Happened in History (1942), Gordon
Childe developed his theories about the rise and fall of ancient civilizations in the
Middle East. Childe argued that these civilizations were shaped by conflicts between
progressive groups, which endorsed flexible social structures and embraced
technological change, and conservative groups, which favored a rigid social hierarchy
and opposed any developments that might undermine the power of the elite. Childe
suggested that the increasing dominance of conservative forces ultimately undermined
the civilizations of the ancient Middle East.
One wonders whether Childe had ever read Ibn Khaldoun (1967) who considered
the conflict between badu (nomads) and hadar (urbanites) a major category in his
sociological analysis. Ibn Khaldoun15 (1322-1406) analyzes the conflict between the
nomads and urbanites in his Muqaddimah, and explains the evolution of societies in the
Middle East and North Africa (see Ibn Khaldoun1967, p. 91-123; see also Ayoubi, 1999,
pp. 38-86). Ibn Khaldoun, theorizes that the nomads despise agriculture and crafts and
15
Born in Tunisia. He went into seclusion near modern Frenda, Algeria, taking four years to compose his
monumental Muqaddamah , the introductory volume to his Kitab al-Ibar (Universal History). In the Muquadamah, Ibn
Khaldun outlined a philosophy of history and theory of society that are unprecedented in ancient and medieval writing
and that are closely reflected in modern sociology. He argued that social change and the rise and fall of societies
follow laws that can be empirically discovered.
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are disinclined to engage in them (the Arabic word for a ‘craft’ or profession is derived
from the same root of ‘humiliation’, imtihan), but they are at the same time tempered by
the riches of the settled people lands and inclined to take them over and control their
producers. A cyclical pattern is then often set in motion: nomadic fighters relying on
their strength and their group solidarity (asabia) take over power, but over time those
nomads were softened by the luxury of settled urban life, leading to its weakening and
decay. As a result another wave of nomads whose group solidarity still strong attacked
and take over power again and the cycle continues (see Ayoubi 1999, pp. 49-50). Ali Al-
Wardi (1981) holds that conflict between badawa (nomadism) and hadara (civilization)
characterizes the entire social history of the Arab World.
The most prominent Moroccan thinker Abid Al-Jabiri (1982, pp. 404-31) finds
Ibn Khaldoun’s theory interestingly indicative of a certain mode of production that he
calls a ‘conquestal mode of production’ or a ‘military mode of production.’ Al-jabiri
(1982) usage of the term ‘production’ has obviously different meaning from its general
economic usage, for this is basically a consumerist or circulationist not producing type
of economy. In such political economy, the ‘booty’ (al-ghanima) takes pride of place: it
is the source of income reflects itself on distribution (which is based on donation), and it
promotes a certain ‘rentier mentality’ which is averse to production and to work ethics.
According to Nazih Ayoubi (1999, p. 41), the idea of the existence of distinct ‘orient
mode of production’ is not entirely new. Adam Smith classed China with Ancient Egypt,
and ‘Indostan’, making the point that the government in these societies paid much
attention to the canal system. The idea of ‘Oriental society’ was put forward some years
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later, by James Mill and also by John Stuart Mill. Furthermore, Karl Marx who was
familiar with such writers developed a theory about ‘an Asiatic mode of production.’
According to Ayoubi (1999, p. 42), “Oriental society as Marx understood was
nevertheless something more complex than a system of canals. It had to do on the one
hand, with centralized—i.e., despotic—regulation of the basic economic functions and,
on the other, with a self sufficient village economy.” Ayoubi (ibid, pp. 49, 51) suggests
that the ‘Asiatic mode of production’—inasmuch applies to the Middle East cannot be
understood without taking into account another mode of production that was never very
far away from any Middle Eastern society: the nomadic kin-ordered mode of
production. A nomadic community has not only to be sensitively tuned to nature and its
changes, but has also to be critically alert to the movement of other nomadic
communities that are trying to use the same limited resources. Thus, the vital rule of
social organization is absolute internal solidarity and absolute external antagonism.
The tribal society of the Arabia about a century before Islam was by no means a
simple one of autonomous and egalitarian tribes. It has known poverty, wealth, injustice,
and tribal warfare. It had also witnessed chiefly authority based on some degree of
ownership and elements of control over the means of production. Markets existed both
for the interchange of goods and ideas (through poetry in particular), and in Hijaz,
especially around Mecca, a commercial semi-aristocracy (mainly Quraishi) was involved
in local and distance trade, and was capable of possessing herds, large area of pasture
land, slaves, and long trade rout extended to Iraq, the Gulf, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Syria
(see Ayoubi, 1999, pp. 54-56; Clevland, 2000, pp. 4-8). This level of economic
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development in Arabia was accompanied by high level of injustice, deep social
antagonism, and ultimately deep threat to the internal social cohesion. Islam then came
in the seventh century as a unifying force forging most of Arabia into a more integrated
society subject to one law, the new Islamic shari’a. However, the unifying process was
not comprehensive and fixed as evidenced by the ridda16 (apostasy) wars that followed
the death of Prophet Muhammad. The ridda wars (632-634) cost the newly established
Islamic state enormous amount of resources, and weakened the internal social cohesion.
Thus, through conquest the Islamic state achieved higher level of social integration, and
vast economic resources vital to the life of the newly established state.
The origin of the Islamic state as Waddah Sharara (1981, pp. 125-42) points out,
can be traced to a process of the traditional conquest (ghazw) practice, and more
specifically to the traditional rules of ‘distribution’ following war. Ayoubi (1999, p. 57)
notes, “Distribution of the spoils of war was at first equitable among Arabs regardless of
differences; it then became increasingly based on a system of degradation. Abu Baker,
the first caliph, related the distribution directly to internal consideration of Arabian
society by adopting the (nomadic) principle of equal share of the booty. With Umar, the
16 Shortly after the news of Prophet Muhammad’s death, many Arab tribes renounced their allegiance to Islam in favor
of new, local leaders. This was less a religious choice than a political and economic one, since the tribes used this as
an excuse to govern themselves and stop paying the zakãt, or alms tax. Though most Arab tribes did not challenge the
prophecy of Muhammad, others, apostatized and returned to their pre-Islamic religion and traditions, classified by
Muslims as idolatry. The tribes claimed that they had submitted to Prophet Muhammad and that with the Prophet’s
death, they were again free. Abu Baker insisted that they had not just submitted to a leader but joined the Muslim
religious community, of which he was the new head, and Abu Baker declared war on the rebels. The severest struggle
was the war with Ibn Habib al-Hanefi, known as Musailimah Al-Khadab (Musailimah the Liar), who claimed to be a
prophet and Muhammad’s true successor. The Muslim undefeatable general Khalid bin Walid finally defeated al-
Hanefi at the Battle of Akraba (see Cleveland 2000, p. 13; Mircosoft Encarta Reference Library 2004;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Bakr#The_Ridda_Wars)
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second caliph, however, gradation in compensation was introduced according to Islamic
‘seniority’ (how long in Islam and whether the crucial battle of Bader17 had been
attended or not).” Furthermore, according to (ibid) Umar made the grant to the fighters
annual, after accumulating the money, and not occasional with each conquest collection.
Umar was assassinated in 644 and he was succeeded by Uthman who faced opposition
from the military from the beginning of his reign. In 656 a group of soldiers broke into
Uthman’s home and murdered him. They then prevailed upon Ali to accept the caliphate,
which was contested by the Umyyad clan. Two major civil wars were erupted between
Ali’s partisans (shaia) and the Umyyads: the ‘great strife’ (al-fitna al-kubra18) lasted
from 656 to 661 and Siffin19 in 657. Ali was assassinated by the Kharijites in 661 which
marked the end of the first phase of the Islamic community (see Cleveland 2000, pp. 13-
16).
Al-Jabiri (1982, pp. 404-31) believes that Ibn Khaldoun’s observation can be
generalized to most phases of the history of the Islamic state: monies are collected to be
distributed among fighters and the officials for consumption but not for investment. The
‘consquestal’ economy as Al-Jabiri (1982, p. 404-31) suggests is based on wealth
accruing to the state, via statist method, to be spent by the statesmen. The main feature
17 In March 624 Prophet Muhammad and about 300 of his men battled a Meccan force three times their size at the
oasis of Badr. It was a great victory for the Muslims, and later generations of Muslims considered it a mark of nobility
to have fought at Badr.
18Ali went north to Al Başrah-Iraq with his loyal troops where, in December 656, he defeated an army of Aisha’s (the
wife of Prophet Muhammed) supporters in what is considered the first round of the first Islamic civil war. This war,
which lasted from 656 to 661, later became known as the first fitnah because it tested the unity of the Islamic
community.
19 Ali moved from Medina to Al Kūfah-Iraq where he had more support. There he was challenged by Muawiyah, the
Umayyad governor of Syria. Muawiyah refused to recognize Ali as caliph and engaged Ali’s forces in a battle at
Siffin, in northern Syria, in 657.
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of the conquestal economy is the absence of the base of production accompanying by a
heavy role of state power exercised through the military. Although the role of the state in
the modern MENA had been changed to a different one, the essence of the mode of
production remains the same. If conquest is replaced by external aid or oil revenues, we
end up with unproductive economy where the state eliminates social economic activities
and propose itself as the sole ‘entrepreneur’. Ayoubi (1999, p. 3) suggests, “The Arab
state is not a natural growth of its own socio-economic history or its own cultural and
intellectual tradition. It is a ‘fierce’ state that has frequently to resort to raw coercion in
order to preserve itself.” Consequently, the divergence between the people and the state
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) became a fact of life, and it was increasing
as more privileges offered to the military and other state’s coercive apparatus. Therefore,
it is less likely to understand the problems of development in the MENA without taking
into account their political contexts.
Structural Approach to Political Systems
I believe that the structure of the political system approach20 as developed by
David Easton is the most appropriate level of analysis to examine the problems of
political and economic development in the MENA. I would like to elaborate on some of
Eaton’s concepts. In this respect it is essential to distinguish between a political regime
and a political system: specifically, to what might we refer when speaking of the regime
20 I am more inclined to utilize the system level of analysis as developed by David Easton (1965) because
system analysis of political life enables the investigator to look at the whole picture, and understand the
interactions among the units of the system and the reasons that make some system ineffective.
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of political system? A political system is more comprehensive than a political regime
such that within a political system we have political authorities, a political community,
and a political regime. A regime refers to the goals or values of a political system, the
norms or rules of the game, and the structure of authority” (see Easton, 1965, P. 26;
1990, pp. 12).
Easton (1990, pp. 12 ; 1967, pp. 190-212) theorizes that each of these elements
of political regime has its own structure, which typically, draws our attention to the
relationships among the political authorities and, in turn, their relationship as political
authorities, to other members of the political system. In Easton’s (ibid) words, “it points
to the distribution of that kind of power we call authority and the informal political
power relationships associated with such authority.” Easton (1990, p. 13) reminds us to
bear in mind that the structure of the political regime is narrower than that of the
political system as a whole or of the regime itself. Easton (ibid) wrote, “The structure of
the political system, for example, would include the structure of nonauthoritative power
in a system (elite-mass relationships or class-based power, for example); the patterns of
nonauthoritative relationships among interests groups and political parties; various roles
such as those of opinion leaders, political bosses, and voters; electoral and other political
cleavages; and all those other groups and roles that wield political power (except the
kind we call political authority), which is characteristics of the influence exercised
through regime.”
The regime as sets of constraints on political interaction in all systems may be
broken down into three components: values (goals and principles), norms, and structure
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of authority. The values serve as broad limits with regard to what can be taken for
granted in the guidance of day-to-day policy without violating deep feelings of an
important segment of the community. The norms specify the kind of procedures that are
expected and acceptable in the processing and implementation of demands [as well as
support and conversion processes]. The structure of authority designates the formal and
informal patterns in which power is distributed and organized with regard to the
authoritative making and implementing of decisions—the roles and their relationships
through which authority is distributed and exercised. The goals, norms, and structure of
authority both limit and validate political actions and in this way provide what tends to
become a context for political interactions. This context changes more slowly than other
kinds of political relationships” (see Easton 1990, pp. 12-3; 1967, pp 259-66).
Easton (1965, p. 138) notes, “if we select political systems for special study, we
do so because we believe that they have characteristically important consequences for
society, namely, authoritative decisions. These consequences I shall call the outputs. If
we judged that political systems did not have important outputs for society, we would
probably not be interested in them.” According to Easton(ibid), “unless a system is
approaching a state of entropy—and we can assume that this is not true for most political
systems—it must have continuing inputs to keep it going. Without inputs the system can
do no work; without outputs we cannot identify the work done by the system. The
typical demands that will find their way into political process will concern the matters in
conflict that are labeled important by the culture. Easton (ibid) suggests, “We cannot
hope to understand the nature of the demands presenting themselves for political
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settlement unless we are ready to explore systematically and intensively their connection
to the culture.”
Support is fed into the political system in relation to three objects:
1. The political community: no political system can continue to operate unless its
members are willing to support the existence of a group that seeks to settle differences or
promote decisions through peaceful action in common.
2. The regime: support for the regime helps to keep the system running. This kind of
support related to all those arrangements that regulate the way in which demands put
into the system are settled and the way in which decisions are put into effects.
3. Converting mechanism: if a political system is going to be able to handle the
conflicting demands put into it, the political community must support the government.
Supporting the government is essential because it is the mechanism which converts
inputs to outputs, making and interpreting the rules, and representing social interests
(See Easton, 1967, pp. 25-33, 155-170, 171-72). The government also provides feedback
to various agencies in order to enhance proficiency. Feedback helps the system to persist
in the face of stress due information and other influences that return to its actors and
decision makers and assist them in rectifying past mistakes (see Easton 1965, p. 25).
Economic Growth Based on Easton Model
Considering Eaton’s (1965, p. 112) model as an analytical framework of
economic growth in the Middle East and North Africa bring forth a system of economic
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growth as in figure 9. The system of economic growth consists of inputs, converting
mechanism, and output.
The Input Variables: the system of economic growth as shown in figure.9
receives three different types of inputs:
1. Political input: political freedom, institutional freedom, regime type, regime stability,
and ideological base.
2. Conflict input: external conflicts, internal conflicts, and total conflicts
3. Economic input: investment, labor, military spending, non-military spending, and the
externality effects of capital, labor, and defense spending.
Converting Mechanism: The production function represents the converting
mechanism through which the inputs are transformed to outputs.
Output: the production function transforms the impacts of political, economic
and military variables, the externality effects (labor, capital, and defense spending), and
the impact of conflict variables to output (economic growth). The output increases if
there is a positive impact from the input variables; on the contrary, it decreases if the
impacts of the input variables on EG are negative. Utilizing Eaton’s (1965, pp. 111-117)
terminologies, the positive impact on economic growth provides “support” to the system
of economic growth, conversely, the negative impact on economic growth imposes
“demand” on the it.
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Figure 9. Model of the Production Function Based on Easton (1965, p. 32).
Apply Easton Framework on the MENA
I tested fifteen countries in the Middle East and North Africa: Jordan, Morocco,
Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Mauritania, Tunisia, United Arab
Econ
Grow
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Emirates, Sudan, Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran by using cross national time-series (CNTS)
analysis in two settings:
I. The standard production function, in addition to, external and internal conflict
as control variables plus one political variable in each test. The countries’ time series
ranges from 15 to 42 annual observations, and the total number of observations is (451).
The results in table 4 show the impact of the input variables on economic growth
(output). In all tables on pp. 118, 120, 124, and 128, I reported the number of cases (N),
Durbin Watson Statistics (DW), and the goodness of fit (R-Square).
Political input variables: political freedom has insignificant negative impact on
economic growth (EG); institutional freedom has insignificant positive impact on EG;
regime type has insignificant negative impact on economic on EG; regime stability has
insignificant positive impact on EG; and ideological base has insignificant negative
impact on EG.
Conflict input variables: the external conflicts variable has negative and
significant impact on economic growth under all political contexts. Likewise, the
internal conflict variable has negative and significant impact on economic growth under
all political contexts. However, the internal conflict variable shows more significant
negative impact on economic growth than the external conflict variable under the
contexts of political freedom, institutional freedom, and regime stability. In contrast, the
external conflicts variable shows more negative significant impact on economic growth
than the internal conflicts variable under the contexts of regime type, and ideological
base.
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TABLE 4. Cross National Time Series Analysis Results with External and Internal
Conflicts as Control Variables –MENA
Parameter Pol free Inst free Type Stability Ideology
Labor est. 1.422 1.437 1.422 1.424 1.422
t-stat 4.61** 24.58** 24.62** 24.57** 24.64**
Investment -1.924 -0.748 -0.797 -0.748 -0.857
-1.335 -1.093 -1.168 -1.096 -1.254
Mil sector -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.225 0.004
-0.050 0.064 0.086 0.047 0.093
Mil ext 0.14E-3 0.14E-3 0.14E-3 0.13E-3 0.14E-3
20.38** 20.14** 20.27** 20.19** 20.28**
Nmil-sector0.394 0.675 1.471 0.655 1.081
0.097 0.166 0.361 0.162 0.268
Nmil ext -0.899 -0.757 -0.816 -0.743 -0.785
-0.927 -0.783 -0.845 -0.776 -0.815
Ext conf -0.44E-5 -0.41E-5 -0.433E-5 -0.40E-5 -0.45E-5
-2.251* -2.083* -2.219* -2.058* -2.289*
Int conf -0.382 -0.396 -0.373 -0.391 -0.358
-2.625** -2.341* -2.206* -2.293* -2.111*
Pol vars -0.163 0.410 -0.319 0.038 -0.383
-1.474 0.022 -1.440 0.0204 -1.839*
N=451 N=451 N=451 N=451 N=451
R-Sq=0.72 R-Sq=0.72 R-Sq=0.72 R-Sq=0.72 R-Sq=0.72
DW =1.16 DW =1.15 DW =1.16 DW =1.14 DW =1.16
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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The PF input variables: the changes in the labor growth have positive and
significant impact on economic growth (EG) under all political contexts of the MENA;
investment shows insignificant negative impact on EG under all political contexts of the
MENA; the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the military
sector show insignificant negative impact on EG under the context of political freedom,
and insignificant positive impact under institutional freedom, regime type, stability, and
ideological base; the externality effects of defense spending have unequivocal positive
and significant impact on EG under all political contexts of the MENA; the combined
effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military spending have
insignificant positive impact on EG under all the political contexts; the externality
effects of non-military government spending show insignificant negative impact on EG
under all political contexts.
The results in table 4 show, that the system of economic growth in the Middle
East and North Africa receives significant “supports” from the change in labor and the
externality effects of military spending. On the contrary, the internal and external
conflicts variables impose “demands” on EG, i.e., hamper economic growth.
II. The standard production function plus a single political or conflict variable.
The countries’ time series ranges from 15 to 42 annual observations, and the total
number of observations is (451). The results in table 5 show the impact of the input
variables (political, conflict, and the PF’s independent variables) on economic growth
(output).
Political input variables: political freedom has insignificant negative impact on
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TABLE 5. Cross National Time Series Analysis Results with a Single Political
Variable– MENA
Parameter Ext conf int conf tot conf pol free
Labor est. 1.427 1.425 1.439 1.426
t-stat 24.55** 24.55** 24.69** 24.45**
Investment -0.677 -0.778 -0.940 -0.876
-0.989 -1.137 -1.358 -1.255
Mil sector 0.004 0.269 0.037 -0.166
0.077 0.056 0.077 -0.035
Mil ext 0.14E-3 0.135 0.136 0.136
20.28** 20.24** 20.34** 20.22**
Nmil-sector 0.390 3.812 3.836 3.506
0.096 1.010 1.015 0.925
Nmil ext -1.078 -0.834 -0.760 -1.279
-1.122 -0.861 -0.779 -1.322
Pol vars -0.409 -0.396 -0.313 -0.149
-2.091* -2.337** -2.219* 1.35
N= 451
R-Sq=0.72
DW=1.12
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TABLE 5. (Continued)
Parameter Inst free Type Stability Ideology
Labor est. 1.427 1.426 1.426 1.425
t-stat 24.42** 4.47** 24.40 24.49**
Investment -0.693 -0.766 -0.72 -0.830
-1.010 -1.114 -1.043 -1.205
Mil sector 0.003 0.433 0.38E-3 0.464
0.062 0.906 0.008 0.097
Mil ext 0.13E-3 0.135 0.13E-3 0.13E-3
20.03** 20.10 20.08** 20.09
Nmil-sector 3.397 4.541 3.344 4.265
0.891 0.879 1.122
Nmil ext -1.160 -1.199 -1.082 -1.158
-1.202 -1.245 -1.116 -1.205
Pol vars 0.070 -0.323 0.143 0.386
0.369 -1.452 0.766 -1.862
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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economic growth (EG); institutional freedom has insignificant negative impact on EG;
regime type has insignificant negative impact on economic EG; regime stability has
insignificant positive impact on EG; and ideological base has insignificant negative
impact on EG.
Conflict input variables: the external conflict variable has negative and
significant impact on economic growth. Likewise, the internal conflict variable has
negative and significant impact on EG. However, the internal conflict variable shows
more significant negative impact on economic growth than the external conflict. The
total conflict variable shows significant negative impact on EG.
The PF input variables: the changes in the labor growth have positive and
significant impact on economic growth (EG) with each political or conflict variable;
investment shows insignificant negative impact on EG with each political or conflict
variable; The combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the military
sector show insignificant positive impact on EG with each political or conflict variable;
The externality effects of defense spending have unequivocal positive and significant
impact on EG under all political or conflict contexts; The combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the non-military spending show insignificant
positive impact on EG under all the political contexts; The externality effects of non-
military government spending show insignificant negative impact on EG under all
political contexts.
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Egypt and Algeria
I consider Egypt and Algeria as the focus of my case study because the two
countries are important in terms of their levels of economic growth and developments
among the countries of the MENA. Hudson (1977, p. 234) wrote, “Despite its present
weaknesses, Egypt is the preeminent country of the Arab World…its history of
modernization is the longest, its industrial sector is the most extensive, its educational
and cultural institutions are the most prolific its military machine is the biggest.”
Similarly, Algeria is one of the most important countries in North Africa due to its
natural resources, size of population, and considerable military machine. Algeria and
Egypt share similar experiences of economic and political developments such as
“economic opening” (infitah), and regime type and stability from the early 1960s to the
early 1970s (see Allen & Waterbury 1999, pp. 238, 240, 251-52; Hudson 1977, pp. 238-
251, 364-368). I am going to show the impact of political, conflict, and the standard
production function variables on economic growth of both cases (Egypt and Algeria)
based on the non-linear least squares results.
Egypt
The data on Egypt contains 43 annual observations from 1960 to 2002. I tested
Egypt’s model using the NLS method. The Egyptian model constitutes the standard
production function plus a single political, or conflict variable. The general format of the
equation: Economic growth = PF + political variable; PF + conflict variable. The impact
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TABLE 6. NLS Results of Egypt
Parameter Ext conf int conf tot conf pol free
Technology 0.01 0.009 0.009 0.009
t-stat 4.458** 3.441** 4.458* 3.612**
Labor -0.326 -0.313 0.326 -0.302
-5.369** -4.152** -5.369** -4.079**
Investment 0.506 0.007 0.005 0.006
0.479 0.765 0.476 0.656
Mil sector 0.618 0.763E-3 0.006 0.103
1.256 0.178 1.256 0.249
Mil ext 0.001 -0.001 0.112 -0.002
0.545 -0.801 0.545 -0.947
Nmil-sector -0.402 -0.412 -0.402 -0.413
-2.651** -2.564** -2.651** -2.759**
Nmil ext 0.021 0.023 0.021 0.023
7.770** 8.233** 7.770 8.544**
Pol vars 0.003 1.000 0.003 -0.307
-1.945* 1.000 -1.945 -0.417
N= 43
R-Sq=0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
DW=1.89 1.72 1.89 1.77
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TABLE 6. (Continued)
Parameter Inst free Type Stability Ideology
Technology 0.021 0.009 0.011 0.009
t-stat 3.049** 3.441** 2.879** 3.441
Labor -1.331 -0.313 2.638 -0.313
-1.076 -4.152** 3.024** -4.151**
Investment 0.013 0.773 0.104 0.007
0.082 0.765 0.417 0.765
Mil sector 0.028 0.763 0.055 0.763
0.384 0.178 0.582 0.178
Mil ext -0.016 -0.134 -0.263 -0.001
-0.589 -0.801 -0.062 -0.801
Nmil-sector -10.084 -0.412 -7.449 -0.412
-3.099** -2.564** -2.341* -2.564
Nmil ext 0.411 0.023 0.552 0.232
4.521** 8.233** 6.426** 8.233
Pol vars 0.485 1.000 0.070 1.000
1.067 1.000 -2.607** 1.000
N= 43
R-Sq=0.94 0.92 0.99 0.92
DW=1.73 1.72 1.63 1.72
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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of the political, conflict, and the production function variables are shown in table 6. The
Impact of Political variables: political freedom has insignificant negative impact on
economic growth (EG) ; institutional freedom has insignificant positive impact on EG;
regime type has insignificant positive impact on economic on EG; regime stability has
significant negative impact on EG; and the ideological base has insignificant positive
impact on EG.
Conflict input variables: the external conflicts variable has negative and
significant impact on economic growth; the internal conflict variable has insignificant
positive impact on EG; however, the total conflict variable shows negative and
significant impact on EG.
The PF input variables: the changes in the labor growth have positive and
significant impact on economic growth (EG) under political freedom, institutional
freedom, regime type, and regime stability. However, the changes in the labor growth
show insignificant positive impact on EG; investment shows significant positive impacts
on EG under total conflicts and regime stability,while it shows negative impacts under
external conflicts, internal conflicts, political freedom, institutional freedom, and
ideological base; the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the
military sector show insignificant positive impact on EG with each political or conflict
variable; the externality effects of defense spending have insignificant positive impact on
EG under external and internal conflict variables, while they show insignificant negative
impact on economic growth under internal conflicts and all political variables; the
combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military
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spending show negative and significant impact on EG under all political and conflict
contexts; and the externality effects of non-military government spending show positive
and significant impact on EG under all political and conflict’s contexts.
Algeria
The data on Algeria contains 41 annual observations from 1962 to 2002. I tested
Algeria’s model using NLS method. The Algerian model constitutes the standard
production function plus a single political, or conflict variable. The general format of the
equation: EG = PF + political variable; EG= PF + conflict variable. The impact of the
political, conflict, and the production function variables are shown in table 7.
The Impact of Political variables: political freedom has insignificant positive
impact on economic growth (EG); institutional freedom has insignificant positive impact
on EG; regime type has insignificant positive impact on EG; regime stability has
significant positive impact on EG; and ideological base has negative and significant
impact on EG.
Conflict input variables: The external and internal conflict variables have
positive and significant impact on economic growth; however, the total conflict variable
has negative and significant impact on EG.
The PF input variables: the changes in the labor growth have insignificant
positive impact on EG under the political freedom and ideological base variables, while
they have positive and significant impact under institutional freedom, regime type, and
regime stability variables; the changes in labor growth show positive and significant
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TABLE 7. NLS Results of Algeria
Parameter Ext conf int conf tot conf pol free
Technology 0.34E-13 0.34E-13 -0.485E-4 -1.398
t-stat 3.41** 3.471** -0.838 -21.841**
Labor -0.21E-20 -0.21E-20 0.821E-11 1.001
-4.417** -4.417** 0.352 1.001
Investment 0.14E-13 0.14E-13 0.003 1.010
1.499 1.499 1.087 1.010
Mil sector -0.15E-12 -0.15E-12 0.317 0.998
-7.478** -0.17E-6 0.955 1.212
Mil ext 1.00 1.00 0.002 0.969
0.29E+15 0.29E15 2.575** 0.969
Nmil-sector 0.2E-18 2E-17 0.029 0.923E-3
2.99** 2.99** 1.610 -0.001
Nmil ext -1.00 -1.000 0.017 0.928
-0.15E14 1.000 4.447** 0.928
Pol vars 0.250 0.25E13 -0.003 1.000
3.357** 3.471** 2.293* 1.000
N= 41
R-Sq=1.00 1.00 0.82 0.02
DW=1.89 1.89 1.23 1.02
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TABLE 7. (Continued)
Parameter Inst free Type Stability Ideology
Technology -0.033 0.004 -0.033 -0.032
t-sta -25.767** 4.286** -24.890** -25.216
Labor 0.326E-8 -0.196E-9 0.308E-8 0.317E-8
11.723** -5.185** 11.322** 1.571
Investment 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.001
0.992 2.043* 0.976 0.284
Mil sector 0.472E-6 -0.301E-5 0.524E-6 0.493E-6
2.014* -2.126* 2.084* 2.126*
Mil ext 0.186 0.483 0.019 0.025
2.492** 2.153* 2.938** 3.745**
Nmil-sector 0.243 0.270 0.021 0.002
0.972 1.519 0.980 0.097
Nmil ext 0.353 0.017 0.333 0.022
4.158** 5.371** 3.834** 2.770**
Pol vars 0.400E-3 1.000 0.002 0.006
0.230 1.000 1.301 -3.589**
N= 41
R-Sq=0.75 0.85 0.76 0.82
DW=1.27 1.36 1.36 1.68
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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positive impact on EG under external and internal conflict variables, while they show
negative and significant impact under total conflicts; investment shows significant
positive impacts on EG under regime type; while it shows insignificant negative impact
under all other political or conflict contexts; the combined effects of technological
progress and productivity of the military sector show insignificant positive impact on
EG under political freedom, negative and significant impact under regime type, and
significant and positive impact under institutional freedom, stability, and ideological
base variables; the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the
military sector show negative and significant impact under external conflict,
insignificant negative impact under internal conflict, and insignificant positive impact
under total conflicts; the externality effects of defense spending have insignificant
positive effect on EG under political freedom, and significant positive effect on EG
under the remaining political variables; the externality effects of defense spending show
insignificant effects under external and internal conflicts on EG, while they show
significant effect under total conflicts; the combined effects of technological progress
and productivity of the non-military spending show insignificant negative effect on EG
under political freedom, while they show insignificant positive impact on EG under the
remaining political variables: institutional freedom, regime type, stability, and
ideological base; under the conflict variables, the externality effects of defense spending
show insignificant positive impact on economic growth; the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the non-military spending show insignificant
negative impact under political freedom, and insignificant impact under the remaining
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political variables; the externality effects of non-military spending show positive and
significant impact on EG under all political variables but political freedom. Under
political freedom the externality effects of. the non-military spending show insignificant
positive impact on EG; under external and internal conflict variables, the externality
effects of non-military defense spending show positive impact, while it show negative
and significant effect under the context of total conflict variable.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Singer’s (1961) argument that both levels of analysis (system and nation-state)
are useful to investigate problems of international relations has a great validity. The
system level of analysis provides the most comprehensive level at which to study
international relations, while the nation-state level of analysis allows more detailed
investigation of the conditions and processes within states than does the system level
approach.
Accordingly, I conducted the following empirical analysis: first, non-linear least
squares (NLS) analysis of sixty individual-states using time series data from 1960 to
2002 with a single political or conflict variable. Second, cross national time-series
(CNTS) analysis of five regions: the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin
America, Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean region using pool data with annual number of
observations ranges from 178 to 718, and with interstate and intra-state conflicts as
control variables plus one political variable. Third, I tested the entire sample (all state)
model using CNTS analysis and pool data with 2349 observations, and with interstate
and intra-state conflicts as control variables plus one political variable. And Finally, I
tested nine regions: MENA Non-oil producing countries, MENA oil producing
countries, the Arab World, MENA, Latin America, Africa, Asia, the Caribbean region,
and the full model with a single political or conflict variable using CNTS analysis and
annual number of observations ranges from 178 to 718.
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The state level of analysis approach provides me with meticulous information
about each state and how economic, conflict, and political variables interplay, and
influence economic growth. In contrast, the regional and the full model analysis provide
me with comparative empirical information of different regions as well as of the system
of the Third World.
The results of the statistical analysis at the state and regional levels offer
empirical evidence that the problems of economic growth cannot be understood without
bringing in the political contexts to the production function. Therefore, treating
economics and politics as two separate realms is not scientifically sound. It is simply
infeasible to understand the dynamic of any state without understanding the
interrelationship between economic variables and their political contexts. For this
reason, it is not surprising that attempts to apply models of economic growth, without
taking into account the political contexts failed to predict long-term solutions to the
problems of economic growth of nation-states.
Moreover, it is fundamentally infeasible to study the growth of individual states,
as well as, regions, and the system of the Third World without taking into account the
impact of conflicts on them. Conflicts in its two forms (internal and external) affect
economic growth. It is less likely to understand the political economy of the Middle East
and North Africa without understanding the development of their conflicts, and their
impacts on the national economies of the region.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, not all conflicts are harmful to the economic
development of the state. The NLS analysis shows that conflicts are favorable to
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economic growth in some countries. It seems that some developing countries follow the
‘wisdom’ of the Duchy of Grand Fenwick in Wimberley’s (2003) satire, The Mouse that
Roared, who utilizes conflicts as a source of economic utility. However, the impacts of
conflicts (intra-state, and Interstates) show negative impact on the model of all states
with all political contexts using the CNTS analysis: intra-state conflicts show negative
and significant impact on economic growth with all political contexts; while interstate
conflicts show insignificant negative effects with all political contexts. The CNTS
analysis of the Middle East and North Africa show unequivocally that the impacts of
conflicts (intra-state and interstates) are negative and significant with all political
contexts.
The dialectic between internal and external conflicts seems to be the engine of
economic progression in the Third World. The results of this research lend support to the
dialectic of conflicts by showing that a state can maintain economic growth by
maintaining internal unity, while external conflicts can be managed to bolster economic
growth, or at least minimize its damaging effects on the national economy. It is obvious
that this dialectical balance has been lost in the majority of developing countries because
theirs societies have become internally divided into two hostile camps: the ‘haves” and
the ‘haves not,” which shatters their internal cohesions. Likewise, conflicts protract to
the extent that their damaging effects are hard to manage, and much lesser to benefit
from them.
The results of this dissertation show that politics does matter in economic
growth and development of nations. The results also show that the impacts of economic
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and military variables and their externalities’ effects on economic growth differ with
different political contexts. Furthermore, the empirical evidence indicates damaging
effects of conflicts on economic growth.
The PF with Political Freedom
Political freedom has positive and significant impact on economic growth (EG)
in 13 countries (21.67 percent), while they have negative and significant on impact on
EG in 10 countries (16.67 percent); technological progress has positive and significant
impact on EG in 14 out of 60 countries (23.33 percent), while it hinders EG in 29 out of
60 countries (48.33 percent); changes in the labor growth have positive impact on EG in
10 countries (16.67 percent), while they hinder EG in 7 countries (11.67 percent);
investment has positive and significant impact on EG in 5 countries (8.33 percent),
while it has negative significant and impact in 8 countries (13.33 percent); the combined
effects of technological progress and productivity of the military sector have positive
impact on EG in 12 countries (20 percent), while they have negative and significant
impact in 9 countries (15 percent); the externality effects of defense spending have
positive and significant impact in 11 countries (18.33 percent), while they have negative
and significant impact in 3 countries (5 percent); the combined effects of technological
progress and productivity of the non-military sectors have positive and significant
impact in 8 countries (13.33 percent), while they show negative and significant impact
in 25 countries (41.67 percent); and the externality effects of non-military government
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spending show positive and significant impact in 29 countries (48.33 percent), while
they hinders EG in 2 countries (3.33 percent).
The PF with Institutional Freedom
Institutional freedom shows positive and significant impact on economic growth
in 11 countries (25 percent), while they have negative and significant impact on EG in 4
countries (6.67 percent); technological progress has positive and significant impact on
EG in 15 out of 60 countries (25 percent), while it hinders EG in 24 out of 60 countries
(40 percent); changes in labor growth have positive and significant impact on EG in 19
countries (31.67 percent), while they hinder EG in 5 countries ( 8.33 percent);
investment has positive and significant impact on EG in 5 countries (8.33 percent), while
it has negative and significant impact in15 countries (25 percent); the combined effects
of technological progress and productivity of the military sector have positive and
significant impact on EG in 8 countries (13.33 percent), while they have negative and
significant impact in 12 countries (20 percent); the externality effects of defense
spending have positive and significant impact in 12 countries (20 percent), while they
have negative and significant impact on EG in 4 countries (6.67 percent); the combined
effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military sectors have
positive and significant impact in 11 countries (18.33 percent), while they show negative
and significant impact in 20 countries (33.33 percent); and the externality effects of
non-military government spending show overwhelming positive and significant impact
in 32 countries (53.33 percent), while they hinders EG in 3 countries (5 percent).
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The PF with Regime Type
Technological progress has positive and significant impact on economic growth
(EG) in 15 out of 60 countries (25 percent), while it hinders EG in 20 out of 60
countries (38.33 percent); changes in the labor growth have positive and significant
impact on EG in 19 countries (31.67 percent), while they significantly hinder EG in 6
countries (10 percent); investment has positive impact on EG in 8 countries (13.33
percent), while it has negative impact in 12 countries (20 percent); the combined effects
of technological progress and productivity of the military sector have positive and
significant impact on EG in 8 countries (13.33 percent), while they have negative and
significant impact on EG in 13 countries (21.67 percent); the externality effects of
defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG in 13 countries (21.67
percent), while they have negative and significant impact in 6 countries (10 percent);
The combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military
sectors have positive and significant impact in 13 countries (21.67 percent), while they
show negative and significant impact on EG in 14 countries (23.33 percent); and the
externality effects of non-military government spending show positive and significant
impact in 32 countries (53.33 percent), while they significantly hinder EG in 2 countries
(3.33 percent).
The PF with Regime Stability
Political freedom has positive and significant impact on economic growth (EG)
in 9 countries (15 percent), while they have negative and significant impact on EG in 10
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countries (16.33 percent); technological progress has positive and significant impact on
economic growth (EG) in 19 out of 60 countries (31.67 percent), while it significantly
hinders EG in 18 out of 60 countries (30 percent); changes in the labor growth have
positive and significant impact on EG in 16 countries (26.67 percent), while they
significantly hinder EG in 5 countries (8.33 percent); investment has positive and
significant impact on EG in 9 countries (15 percent), while it has negative and
significant impact in 9 countries (15 percent); the combined effects of technological
progress and productivity of the military sector have positive and significant impact on
EG in 11 countries (18.33 percent), while they have negative and significant impact on
EG in 9 countries (15 percent); the externality effects of defense spending have positive
and significant impact in 13 countries (21.67 percent), while they have negative and
significant impact in 2 countries (3.33 percent); the combined effects of technological
progress and productivity of the non-military sectors have positive and significant
impact on EG in 18 countries (30 percent), while they show negative and significant
impact in 17 countries (28.33 percent); The externality effects of non-military
government spending show positive and significant impact on EG in 30 countries (50
percent), while they hinder EG in 5 countries (8.33 percent); finally, the political regime
stability has positive and significant impact on EG in 12 countries (20 percent) ; while
they have negative and significant impact on EG in 5 countries (8.33 percent).
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The PF with Ideological Base
Ideological base has positive and significant impact on economic growth in 16
countries (26.67 percent), while it has negative and significant impact on EG in 8
countries (13.33 percent); technological progress has positive and significant impact on
economic growth EG in 17 out of 60 countries (28.33 percent), while it significantly
hinders EG in 19 out of 60 countries (31.67 percent); changes in the labor growth have
positive and significant impact on EG in 15 countries (25 percent), while they hinder
EG in 5 countries (8.33 percent); investment has positive and significant impact on EG
in 11 countries (18.33 percent), while it has negative impact in 12 countries (20 percent);
the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the military sector
have positive and significant impact on EG in 7 countries (11.67 percent), while they
have negative and significant impact on EG in 12 countries (20 percent); the externality
effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact on EG in 8 countries
(13.33 percent), while they have negative impact in 6 countries (10 percent); the
combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the non-military sectors
have positive and significant impact in 15 countries (25 percent), while they show
negative and significant impact on EG in 17 countries (28.33 percent); and the
externality effects of non-military government spending show positive and significant
impact on EG in 32 countries (53.33 percent), while they significantly hinders EG in 2
countries (3.33 percent).
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The PF with External Conflicts
External conflicts have positive and significant impact on economic growth (EG)
in 6 countries (10 percent), while only two countries show negative and significant
impact on EG; technological progress has positive and significant impact on EG in 13
out of 60 countries (21.67 percent), while it significantly hampers EG in 24 out of 60
countries (40 percent; changes in labor show positive and significant impact in 13
countries (21.67 percent), while they show negative and positive impact in 11 countries
(18.33 percent; investment show that 11 countries (18.33 percent) have positive and
significant impact on EG, while 9 countries (15 percent) show negative and significant
impact on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and productivity of the
military sector has positive and significant impact on EG in 19 countries (31.67 percent),
while it significantly hampers EG in 10 countries (16.67 percent); the externality effects
of defense spending (EEDS) show positive and significant impact on EG of 13 countries
(21.67 percent), while only 6 countries (10 percent) incur negative and significant
impact of the EEDS on EG; the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the non-military sectors show positive and significant impact of 21
countries (35 percent), while 16 countries (26.67 percent) incur negative and significant
impact on EG; and the externality effects of non-military government spending show
overwhelming positive and significant impact of 30 countries (50 percent) on EG, while
only 5 countries (8.33 percent) incur negative and significant impact on EG.
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The PF with Internal Conflicts
Internal conflicts have positive and significant impact on EG in 15 (25 percent)
countries, while they have negative and significant impact on EG in 6 countries (10
percent); technological progress and productivity of the non-military sectors have
positive and significant impact on EG in 18 countries (30 percent), while they show
negative and significant impact on EG in 20 countries (33.33 percent); and the
externality effects of non-military government spending show overwhelming positive
and significant impact in 41 countries (68.33 percent), while they significantly hinders
EG in one country (1.67 percent).
The PF with Total Conflicts
Internal conflicts have positive and significant impact on economic growth (EG)
in 19 countries (31.67 percent), while they have negative and significant impact in 7
countries (56.67 percent); technological progress has positive and significant impact on
EG in 17 countries out of 60 countries (28.33 percent), while it hinders EG in 17
countries out of 60 countries (28.33 percent); changes in labor growth have positive and
significant impact on EG in 11 countries (18.33 percent), while they hinder EG in11
countries (18.33 percent); investment has positive and significant impact on EG in 11
countries (18.33 percent), while it has negative and significant impact on EG in 11
countries (13.33 percent); the combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the military sector has positive and significant impact on EG in 7
countries (11.67 percent), while they have negative impact in 13 countries (21.67
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percent); the externality effects of defense spending have positive and significant impact
on EG in 19 countries (31.67 percent), while they have negative and significant impact
on EG in 3 countries (5 percent); The combined effects of technological progress and
productivity of the non-military sectors have positive and significant impact on EG in 16
countries (26.67 percent), while they show negative and significant impact on EG in 19
countries (31.67 percent); and the externality effects of non-military spending show
positive and significant impact in 25 countries (41.67 percent), while they significantly
hinder EG in 2 countries (3.33 percent).
The CNTS Analysis with Conflicts as Control Variables
In the full model political freedom shows insignificant positive impact on
economic growth (EG); institutional freedom has positive and significant impact on EG;
regime type shows negative and significant impact on EG; regime stability has
insignificant negative impact on EG; and ideological base has insignificant negative
impact on EG.
In Africa political freedom shows insignificant negative impact on EG;
institutional freedom has insignificant positive impact on EG; regime type has
insignificant negative impact on EG; regime stability has insignificant positive impact on
EG; and ideological base has insignificant negative impact on EG.
In Asia, political freedom has significant and negative impact on EG;
institutional freedom has insignificant positive impact on EG; regime type has
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insignificant negative impact on EG; regime stability has insignificant positive impact on
EG; and ideological base has insignificant negative impact on EG.
In the MENA political freedom has significant and negative impact on EG;
institutional freedom has insignificant positive impact on EG; regime type has
insignificant negative impact on EG; regime stability has insignificant positive impact on
EG; and ideological base has insignificant negative impact on EG.
In Latin America, political freedom has insignificant positive impact on EG;
institutional freedom has insignificant positive impact on EG; regime type has
insignificant negative impact on EG; regime stability has insignificant negative impact
on EG; and ideological base has insignificant negative impact on EG.
In the Caribbean region, political freedom has insignificant negative impact on
EG; institutional freedom has insignificant negative impact on EG; regime type has
insignificant negative impact on EG; regime stability has insignificant negative impact
on EG; and ideological base has insignificant negative impact on EG.
In the full model, external conflicts have insignificant negative impact on EG
with all political contexts; while internal conflicts have negative and significant impact
on EG with all political contexts. In Africa, external conflicts have insignificant negative
impact with all political contexts but regime type, which has insignificant positive
impact; internal conflict has insignificant positive impact on EG with all political
contexts. In Asia, external conflicts have insignificant negative impact with political
freedom and regime type, while they have insignificant impact on EG under the
remaining political variables: institutional freedom, political stability, and ideological
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based. In the MENA, external as well as internal conflicts have negative and significant
impact on EG. In Latin America, internal as well as external conflicts have insignificant
negative impact on EG. Also in the Caribbean region, internal as well as external
conflicts have insignificant negative impact on EG.
The CNTS Analysis with a Single Political or Conflict Variables
Political freedom shows insignificant positive effect on EG in all states (full
model), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the MENA oil producing
countries, while political freedom shows insignificant negative impact in the MENA
non-oil producing countries, Arab countries, Latin American, African, Asian, and the
Caribbean countries.
Institutional freedom shows positive and significant impact on EG in all states
(full model), insignificant positive impact on EG in the MENA Non-oil producing
countries, the Arab World, the MENA, and Latin America, while institutional freedom
shows insignificant negative impact in Asian and the Caribbean countries.
Regime type shows insignificant negative effects on EG in all the nine regions.
Regime stability shows insignificant negative effect on EG in all states (full model), the
MENA (oil producing countries), Latin American, and the Caribbean countries, while it
shows insignificant positive effect in the MENA (non-oil producing countries), the Arab
World, the MENA, Asia, and Africa. Ideology shows negative impact on EG in all the
nine regions.
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External conflicts show positive and significant effect on EG in the MENA;
insignificant positive effect on EG in the MENA (oil producing countries), the Arab
countries, and African and Asian regions, while external conflicts show insignificant
negative effect on EG in all states (full model) and the MENA.
Internal conflicts show negative and significant effect on EG in all states (full
model) and the MENA (non-oil producing countries); insignificant positive impact in the
MENA (oil producing countries), African, and Asian regions; while internal conflicts
show significant negative impact on EG in the MENA, while they show insignificant
negative impact in the Arab countries, Latin America, and the Caribbean countries.
Total conflicts show negative and significant effect in all states (full model), the
MENA, and Africa; insignificant positive impact on EG in the MENA oil producing
countries, Asia, and the Caribbean countries; while internal conflicts show significant
negative impact in the MENA non-oil producing countries, and insignificant negative
effect in MENA, Latin America, and Africa.
My results lend empirical evidence to the argument that the non-military sector
has more powerful impact than the military sector on economic growth. The empirical
results of the NLS analysis offer strong evidence that the combined effects of
technological progress and productivity of the non-military sector have positive and
significant impacts on EG in the majority of countries. Similarly, there is preponderance
of evidence on the positive impact of externality effects of the non-military spending
with all political contexts but institutional freedom. On the contrary, the externality
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effects of the military spending show positive and significant impact on economic
growth in the minority of countries with all political contexts.
The NLS results show that the positive impact of labor on EG reaches its peak
under institutionalized, stable, liberal, democratic regimes. However, the change of
political context from internal conflicts to external conflict does not affect the positive
impact of labor on EG; rather it minimizes its negative effects on EG. In CNTS analysis,
the labor shows positive impact on EG regardless the changing of context across five
different regions, as well as, the full model.
Compared to the non-military sectors, the empirical results reveal the weaknesses
of the private sectors in developing countries. The NLS results show that the impact of
investment on EG is not encouraging. The most conspicuous negative impact can be
seen with institutional freedom, where investment has negative and significant impact in
the majority of countries (13.33 percents), while it shows positive and significant impact
on low percentage of countries (8.33 percent). Moreover, investment does not show any
significant impact in 78.33 percent of the countries.
The CNTS results show insignificant positive impact of investment on EG in all
states (full model), Africa, and Latin America. On the contrary, investment shows
negative and significant impact on economic growth with all political contexts in Asia
and the Caribbean. The relationship between investment and economic growth remains
negative under all political contexts in the MENA, but shows no significance.
The results of investment in Asia are troubling because there were tons of talk
about the “Asian Tiger,” and the rise of investment in Asia. In spite of the brouhahas of
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the ‘Asian Tiger,’ the economic reality looks differently. It seems that the plummeting of
the Asian currencies in the late 1980s led to capital flight from the Asian countries to
other safe havens for capital investment. As a result, investments in Asia suffer a full
blow that is still pervading the Asian economies until the present day.
The impact of investment on economic growth with ideological base shows
negative and significant impact on economic growth in Asia and the Caribbean regions
using the CNTS analysis. Also investment with ideological base shows negative and
significant impact on economic growth in oil-producing countries, the Arab world, Asia,
and the Caribbean region.
Problems and Issues Concerning the Empirical Analysis
There are several problems concerning my empirical analysis that might be
potential sources of estimation bias first, the impact of technological progress on EG
within the parameters of developing countries is different from its impact on developed
countries. In the developed countries, the advancement of technology made the PF
amenable in explaining deviations from equilibrium paths because technology is an
intrinsic factor in the advanced societies. However, technology may have different
effects in developing countries from that in developed countries. Technology did not
accompany the evolution of developing countries and yield its effects on their modes of
production over time; rather it was added to developing countries as pulses. Thus, the
replication of technological effects on economic growth of the advanced industrialized
societies might not be accurate in developing societies.
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Second, the identification of the most productive sector in the economy might be
a source of estimation bias. The most productive sector in the economy differs in the
Third World from that in the First World: the industrial sector is less important in
increasing wealth than the agriculture sector in numerous developing countries
Finally, the high level of sub-economies and shadow economies in the Middle East and
North Africa may hinder the accuracy of measuring economic growth. These two types
of economies bypass the converting mechanism (the production function) and create
dislocation in the outputs of national economies.
Sub-economies: the Islamic investment companies illustrate this type of
economies, especially, in Egypt and Pakistan. Zubaida (1992, p. 9) observes that “These
companies only functioned freely because they recruit influential high-ranking officials,
both retired and in post, to their board of directors and consultancies at high fees.”
According to Zubaida (ibid), “these companies were involved in all kinds of
irregularities and doubtful practices.” What Zubaida alludes to are the infamous
investment companies (sharikat tawzif al-amwal) that came to prominence in Egypt
from1985 to 1988. They were ‘investment companies’ in the sense of inviting deposits
from the public on which they paid very high rates of return, but in form which did not
offend against the Islamic interdiction on interest dealing. According to Zubaida’s (1990,
p. 154), “The volume of investment attracted by these companies was enormous.
Estimates vary between 4.5 and eight billions Egyptian pounds by 1988, deposited by an
estimated half a million customers. This represented a movement of capital out of the
149
banks and saving investments, which caused considerable dislocation in the financial
markets.”
The shadow economies: a recent article by Schneider (2005, pp. 114-115)
suggests that a shadow economy includes unreported income from the production of
legal goods and services from either monetary or barter transactions and, thus, includes
all economic activities that would generally be taxable were they reported to state
authorities. The Middle East and North African countries reflect a very high degree of
shadow economies compared to any region in the world. The average of regional
shadow economies of (145 nations) is 33.6 percent of the GDP in 1999/2000: Five
MENA countries top the regional average: Tunisia (38.4), Pakistan (36.8 percent),
Morocco (36.4 percent), Egypt (35.1 percent), and Algeria have (38.4 percent). The
regional average of shadow economies in 2001/2002 of 145 nations is 34.5 percent of
GDP: three countries in the MENA top the regional average: Tunisia (39.1 percent),
Pakistan (37.9 percent), and Morocco (37.1 percent) (see Schneider 2005, pp. 118-127).
In summary, the empirical results of this dissertation reveal important findings
that have practical and theoretical impact on the field of economic growth of developing
nations: First, political factors are the key to enhancing economic performance in
developing countries. Political variables such as political freedom, institutional freedom,
regime type, political stability, and ideological base are at least as significant as
economic variables in explaining growth. Second, the externality effects of non-military
spending are positive and significant, dominant, and consistent in the majority of
countries with all political variables, while the externality effects of military spending
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are positive and significant only in the minority of countries with all political variables.
This finding is huge because it resolved a long standing debate on the impact of defense
spending on economic growth. Third, there is stronger evidence of the damaging effects
of conflicts in all developing countries (the entire sample). However, these damaging
effects of conflicts on economic growth are more significant in the Middle East and
North Africa than in any other region in the Third World. Fourth, the sub-economy and
shadow economies in developing countries, in the MENA in particular, might be a
source of dislocation to the outputs of national economies. Fifth, the empirical results
reveal the weaknesses of the private sector in developing countries, and their inability to
stand the challenges of economic development. Sixth, it is not scientifically sound to
separate economic factors from politics in studying the process of economic growth and
development of Third World nations. Seventh, a qualitative change of the inputs of
political regime may enhance economic growth in developing countries; and finally, the
defense sector has more significant impact than the private sector on economic growth.
The overwhelming evidence of the positive and significant impact of the
externality effects of the non-military spending on economic growth should warn
decision makers to reallocate their resources to civilian development programs instead of
military programs in order to enhance the economic performance of their countries.
Also, pursuing domestic reconciliation as well as international peace is essential to the
improvement of the economies of developing nations.
The results of the current study show that political factors are as significant to
economic growth as economic factors. Therefore, it is infeasible to achieve economic
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progress in the Third World without reforming their political systems. Freedom,
democracy, stability, and openness of political system are fundamental factors to the
process of economic development in the Third World.
Deger (1986, p. 260) recognized that, “in principle, economic theory should
dictate what variable should we include in, for example, the growth equation.” However,
“in practice theory is rarely that precise…therefore, relatively ad hoc specifications are
necessary.” The results of this dissertation show that incorporating political and conflict
variables in the production function model are essential to the theory of economic
growth. Furthermore, the fact that this dissertation provides an unequivocal answer that
the externalities of military spending hinders economic growth, and non-military
spending promotes economic growth with all political contexts provides a theoretical
direction in the study of the political economy of defense.
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APPENDIX A
NON-LINEAR LEAST SQUARES RESULTS
Parameter Kenya Jamaica Iran Paraguay Panama
 est. 0.187 -1.228 -34E-16 0.008 0.004
t-stat 1.634 -23.943** -1.90 0.599 0.518
l -0.808 1.606 84E-15 0.530 1.382
-3.582** 1.578 11.46** 0.103 2.047*
k -0.0570 -44.108 74E-16 -0.018 -0.082
-0.7335 -3.976** 4.44** -0.136 -2.472*
m 0.240 -0.112 0.878 -0.206 -0.573E-7
1.783* -0.981 25** -0.272 0.271
m -0.573 1.289 -0.12 0.198 -0.70E-8
-1.223 0.0753 34E+9** 1.161 0.106
n 0.148 -0.677 -0.878 2.781 -1.429
0.160 -59.080** -25E+8** 2.296* -2.181*
n 0.559 -0.039 -22E-16 0.552 0.275
3.111** -25.371** -3.432** 1.896* 3.679**
LR1 1.000 33.820 -22E-16 1.000 1.000
1.000 56.482** -3.431** 1.000 1.000
N = 39 N=37 N=39 N=41 N=38
R-Sq = 0.90 R-Sq= 0.81 R-Sq=0.98 R-Sq=0.73 R-Sq=0.61
DW = 2.08 DW= 2.11 DW=1.96 DW=1.39 DW=1.41
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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Parameter Kenya Jamaica Iran Paraguay Panama
 est 0.018 -1020 0.98E-3 0.008 0.004
t-stat 1.634 -14.696** 0.58 0.599 0.518
l -0.808 1.560 -0.053 0.530 1.382
-3.582** 1.560 -0.975 0.103 2.047*
k -0.057 -39.788 0.002 -0.189 -0.082
0.735 -23.319** 0.86 -0.136 -2.472*
m 0.240 0.002 0.125E-6 -0.206 -0.573E-7
1.783* 0.025 1.826* -0.277 -0.271
m -0.057 0.831 -0.378E-9 0.198 -0870E-8
-1.223 0.427 -0.041 1.161 -0106
n 0.148 -0.770 0.018 2.781 -0.1429
0.161 -44.002** 1.782* 2.296* -2.185*
n 0.559 0.036 0.026 0.552 0.275
3.111** -21.239** 8.063** 1.896* 3.679**
LR2 1.000 38.342 0.003 1.000 1.000
1.000 43.796** 2.142* 1.000 1.000
N = 39 N=37 N=39 N=41 N=38
R-Sq= 0.90 R-Sq=0.83 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=1.39 R-Sq=0.61
DW =2.08 DW=2.11 DW=1.99 DW=1.39 DW=1.41
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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Parameter Kenya Jamaica Iran Paraguay Panama
 est 0.018 -1020 0.002 0.008 0.004
t-stat 1.634 -14.696** 0.935 0.599 0.518
l -0.808 1.560 -0.099 0.530 1.382
-3.582** 1.560 -1.212 0.103 2.047*
k -0.057 -39.788 0.001 -0.189 -0.082
0.735 -23.319** 0.569 -0.136 -2.472*
m 0.240 0.002 0.464E-7 -0.206 -0.573E-7
1.783* 0.025 0.688 -0.277 -0.271
m -0.057 0.831 -0.405E-8 0.198 -0.870E-8
-1.223 0.427 -0.449 1.161 -0.106
n 0.148 -0.770 0.014 2.781 -1.429
0.161 -44.002** 1.086 2.296* -2.181*
n 0.559 0.036 0.027 0.552 0.275
3.111** -21.239** 7.8894** 1.896* 3.679**
LR3 1.000 38.342 0.003 1.000 1.000
1.000 43.796** 1.516 1.000 1.000
N = 39 N=37 N=39 N=41 N=38
R-Sq= 0.90R-Sq=0.83 R-Sq=0.96 R-Sq=0.73 R-Sq=0.61
DW =2.08 DW=2.11 DW=1.90 DW=1.39 DW=1.413
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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Parameter Kenya Jamaica Iran Paraguay Panama
 est 0.019 -4.449 0.028 0.009 0.832E-3
t-stat 1.773* -36.233** 3.266** 0.667 0.100
l --0.706 1.514 -0.343 -1.572 1.262
-2.976** 1.514 -0.957 -0.297 1.871*
k -0.649 -55.671 0.042 0.024 -0.773
-34.816** 1.009 -0.296 0.179 -2.275*
m 0.246 -0.074 0.508E-6 -0.220 -0.202E-7
1.903* -1.339 0.287 -0.296 -0.097
m 0.060 90.481 0.100E-6 0.191 -0.129E-7
-1.536 40.932** 0.762 1.171 -0.149
n 0.1609 -0.860 -0.151 2.490 -1.377
0.174 -22.41** -0.341 1.938* -2.099*
n 0.558 -0.108 0.471 0.514 0.308
3.311** -6.363** 4.147** 1.747* 3.789**
LR4 -0.169 4.483 0.046 0.030 0.015
-1.068 24.009** 1.521 0.819 1.365
N = 39 N= 37 N=39 N=41 N=38
R-Sq = 0.90 R-Sq=0.92 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.74 R-Sq=0.63
DW = 2.22 DW=2.09 DW=2.17 DW=1.38 DW=1.37
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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Parameter Kenya Jamaica Iran Paraguay Panama
 est 0.009 -0.971 0.028 0.009 0.071
t-stat 1.177 -14.999** 3.554** 0.703 3.106**
l 0.962 1.554 0.710 -2.072 -0.195
0.662 1.554 0.838 -0.422 -2.322*
k -0.090 -39.090 0.026 0.022 -0.110
-1.085 -24.794** 0.638 0.168 -1.095
m 0.237 0.066 0.756E-6 -0.323 0.804
1.768* 0.679 0.410 -0.438 0.003
m -0.628 0.266 0.110E-6 0.153 -0.195E-7
-1.2660 0.276 0.839 1.013 -1.344
n 0.108 -0.783 -0.179 2.466 -0.543
0.106 -48.060** -0.407 2.040* -1.095
n 0.718 -.0356 0.455 0.527 0.739
4.521** -22.347** 4.194** 1.947* 1.806*
LR5 -0.068 38.719 -0.038 0.055 -0.018
-1.391 47.461** -0.901 1.519 -0.911
N = 39 N=37 N=39 N=41 N=38
R-Sq = 0.91 R-Sq=0.82 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.74 R-Sq=0.57
DW = 2.18 DW=2.11 DW=2.20 DW=1.44 DW=1.60
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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Parameter Kenya Jamaica Iran Paraguay Panama
 est 0.022 -4.835 0.034 -0.006 0.832E-3
t-stat 1.836* -27.674** 4.252** 0.459 0.100
l -0.855 1.550 0.087 -1.982 1.262
-3.889** 1.550 0.418 -0.361 1.871*
k -0.041 -59.834 0.025 0.068 -0.077
-0.645 -28.683** 0.746 0.442 -2.275*
m 0.324 --0.090 0.547E-6 -0.266 -0.202E-7
2.211* -1.189* 0.304 -0.366 -0.097
m -0.553 97.061 0.115E-6 0.172 -0.129E-7
-1.428 31.707** 1.068 1.135 -0.149
n 0.066 -0.094 -0.290 2.473 -1.377
0.069 -20.786** -0.688 2.155* -2.099*
n .497 -0.186 0.392 0.567 0.308
2.878** -4.33** 4.203** 1.830* 3.789**
LR6 -0.094 4.857 -0.146 -0.610 0.015
-1.65 21.545** -2.075* -1.388 1.365
N = 39 N=37 N=39 N=41 N=38
R-Sq = 0.91R-Sq=0.91 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.74 R-Sq=0.63
DW =1.86 DW=2.01 DW=2.13 DW=1.43 DW=1.37
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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Parameter Kenya Jamaica Iran Paraguay Panama
 est 0.017 -4.574 0.027 0.017 0.007
t-stat 1.628 -53.711** 3.420** 1.940* 1.348
l -0.579 1.526 0.564 -0.777 2.151
-0.817 1.526 1.095 -0.193 2.516*
k -0.536 -57.017 0.023 -0.071 -0.750
-0.722 -44.468** 0.595 -0.542 -2.901*
m 0.242 -0.085 0.149E-5 -0.717 -0.703E-7
1.80* -1.256 0.791 -0.963 0.336
m -0.056 92.609 0.109E-6 0.135 -0.509
-1.16 57.364** 0.782 1.092 -0.661
n 0.121 -0.089 -0.2590 2.374 -1.399
0.127 -33.072** -0.603 1.915* -2.343*
n 0.570 -0.136 0.486 0.360 0.283
3.303** -11.018** 4.365** 2.299* 4.404**
LR7 -0.112 4.608 -0.035 0.137 -0.030
-0.348 38.089** -1.280 1.988* -1.245
N = 39 N=37 N=39 N=41 N=38
R-Sq = 0.90 R-Sq=0.91 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.75 R-Sq=0.62
DW = 2.09 DW=2.09 DW=2.13 DW=1.42 DW=1.53
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
170
Parameter Kenya Jamaica Iran Paraguay Panama
 est 0.017 -4.527 0.034 0.006 0.004
t-stat 1.536 -36.986** 4.252** 0.459 0.492
l -0.825 1.522 0.087 -1.985 1.327
-3.621** 1.521 0.418 -0.361 1.732*
k -0.063 -56.509 0.0257 0.068 -0.812
-0823 -35.422** 0.746 0.442 -2.370*
m 0.238 -0.089 0.547E-6 -0.266 -0.584E-7
1.788* -1.683 0.304 -0.366 0.261
m -.059 91.806 0.115E-6 0.172 -0.895E-8
-1.283 41.658** 1.086 1.135 -0.107
n 0.089 0.088 -0.290 2.473 -1.427
0.912 -22.155** -0.688 2.155* -2.106*
n 0.572 -0.129 0.392 0.567 0.276
3.078** -6.732** 4.203** 1.830* 3.370**
LR8 0.012 4.549 -0.146 -0.061 0.0019
0.508 23.308* -2.075* -1.38 0.167
N= 39 N=37 N=39 N=41 N=38
R-SQ= 0.90 R-Sq=0.92 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.75 R-Sq=0.61
DW =2.06 DW=2.09 DW=2.13 DW=1.42 DW=1.40
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
171
Parameter Sri Lanka Singapore Sierra Leon Senegal Rwanda
 est -0.025 0.088 0.034 -0.359 -.002
t-stat -1.563 11.746** 3.633** -0.399 -0.134
l 3.228 -0.308 -6.277 0.486 1.656
2.354* 0.917 -4.393** 0.387 1.834**
k -0.074 0.004 0.039 0.304 -0.426
-0.340 0.162 0.814 0.094 -0.254
m -0.397 0.268 1.219 -0.883 -0.243
-3.864** 0.398 3.610** -2.741** -1.351
m 0.102 0.027 0.276 0.462 0.146
1.357 1.278 3.584** 2.837** 1.069
n 1.955 -0.616 0.119E-4 -0.334 -0.267
3.368** -3.390** 3.379** -3.99 -1.661
n 0.825 0.431 0.270E-6 0.406 0.258
2.340** 2.184* 0.879 4.184 2.258*
LR1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.130
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -1.884*
N=43 N=36 N=36 N=40 N=32
R-Sq=0.72 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.76 R=0.87 R-Sq=0.71
DW = 2.44 DW=1.40 DW=1.63 DW=2.02 DW=2.12
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
172
Parameter Sri Lanka Singapore Sierra Leon Senegal Rwanda
 est -0.025 0.088 0.034 -0.003 0.055
t-stat -1.515 11.746** 4.038** -0.399 2.032*
l 3.192 -0.308 -6.359 0.486 -0.085
2.094* -0.917 -4.948** 0.387 0.860
k -0.068 0.004 0.419 0.304 -0.602
-0.285 0.162 0.946 0.936 -0.982
m -0.396 0.268 1.218 -0.884 0.167
-3.799** 0.398 3.647** -2.741** 0.810
m 0.103 0.027 0.254 0.462 -0.002
1.388 1.278 3.891** 2.83** 0.034
n 1.952 -0.616 0.127E-4 -0.334 -0.177
3.56** -3.390** 3.687** -3.99** -1.510
n 0.825 0.043 0.249E-6 0.406 0.152
2.366* 2.184* 0.817 4.184** 2.300*
LR2 -0.001 1.00 -0.157 1.00 -0.195
-0.053 1.00 -2.068* 1.00 -2.892**
N= 43 N=36 N=36 N=40 N=32
R-Sq=0.73 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.80 R-Sq=0.87 R-Sq=0.72
DW = 2.44 DW=1.40 DW=1.74 DW=2.02 DW=2.04
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
173
Parameter Sri Lanka Singapore Sierra Leon Senegal Rwanda
 est 0.025 0.088 0.034 -0.359 0.018
t-stat -1.515 11.746** 4.037** 0.399 0.542
l 3.192 -0.308 -6.359 0.486 0.561
2.093* -0.917 -4.948** 0.387 0.754
k 0.089 0.004 0.042 0.030 -0.033
-0.285 0.162 0.946 0.0934 -0.266
m -0.396 0.026 1.218 -0.883 -0.003
-3.799** 0.398 3.647** -2.741** -0.011
m 0.103 0.027 0.254 0.462 0.063
1.388 1.278 3.89** 2.83** 0.455
n 1.952 -0.616 0.127E-4 -0.334 -0.222
3.557** -3.390** 3.687** -3.99** -1.593
n 0.825 0.043 0.2499 0.406 0.210
2.367* 2.184* 0.817 4.184** 2.379*
LR3 -0.001 1.00 -0.157 1.00 -0.110
0.053 1.00 -2.069* 1.00 -2.265*
N= 43 N=36 N=36 N=40 N=32
R-Sq=0.73 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.98 R-Sq=0.87 R-Sq=0.73
DW = 2.44 DW=1.40 DW=1.74 DW=2.02 DW=1.97
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
174
Parameter Sri Lanka Singapore Sierra Leon Senegal Rwanda
 est -.028 -0.630 -0.442 0.006 -0.009
t-stat -2.089* -19.301** -6.406** 0.580 -0.585
l 1.242 45.127 288.18 -0.136 1.248
0.594 1.304 1.650 -0.131 1.402
k 0.255 14.704 15.081 0.241 -0.097
0.721 1.300 1.139 0.752 -0.472
m -0.383 0.382 0.449 -0.635 -0.328
-3.823** 3.477** 1.748* -2.172* -1.78*
m 0.774 -0.053 69.584 0.332 0.272
0.931 -0.045 0.891 2.278* 1.697*
n 2.116 0.837 0.100E-4 -0.328 -0.196
3.648** 4.255** -0.120E-4 -4.283** -1.062
n 0.959 -26.440** -1.120E-4 0.370 0.261
2.760** -0.997 -0.198 4.252** 1.937*
LR4 -0.030 0.706 0.212 -0.025 0.078
-1.437* 20.873** 1.695* -0.774 0.973
N= 43 N=36 N=36 N=40 N=32
R-Sq=0.74 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.39 R-Sq=0.88 R-Sq=0.69
DW = 2.48 DW=1.34 DW=1.79 DW=2.13 DW=1.97
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
175
Parameter Sri Lanka Singapore Sierra Leon Senegal Rwanda
 est -0.028 -0.630 -0.613 -0.913E-3 -0.003
t-stat -2.089* -19.301** -3.785** 0.980E-1 1.196
l 1.242 45.727 824.78 1.946 1.435
0.594 1.304 0.908 1.378 1.196
k 0.255 14.704 54.273 -0.148 -0.083
0.721 1.130 0.782 -0.531 -0.471
m -0.383 0.382 0.473 -0.761 -0.220
-3.823** 3.477** 2.146** -2.583** -1.129
m 0.077 -0.053 440.15 0.449 0.196
0.931 -0.045 0.706 2.889** 1.345
n 2.116 0.837 0.121 -0.317 -0.167
3.648** 4.255** 2.204* -4.169** -0.948
n 0.959 -26.440 -0.249E-3 0.400 0.251
2.760** -0.997 -0.602 4.494** 2.002*
LR5 -0.030 0.706 0.254 -0.048 -0.030
-1.437 20.873** 1.445 -2.046* -1.125
N= 43 N=36 N=36 N=40 N=32
Sq=0.74 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.37 R-Sq=0.89 R-Sq=0.68
DW = 2.48 DW=1.34 DW=1.21 DW=2.28 DW=2.06
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
176
Parameter Sri Lanka Singapore Sierra Leon Senegal Rwanda
 est -0.022 0.088 0.011 -0.0013 -0.009
t-stat -1.191 11.746** 1.102 0.142 -0.508
l 3.030 -0.308 -3.642** 0.281 1.353
1.848* -0.917 -3.283** 0.239 1.284
k -0.252 0.004 0.052 0.072 -0.118
-0.651 0.162 0.879 0.247 -0.599
m -0.416 0.026 1.322 -0.804 -0.297
-3.739** 0.398 6.87** -2.636 -1.538
m 0.101 0.276 0.696 0.416 0.233
1.430 1.278 3.922** 2.633** 1.529
n 1.853 -0.616 -0.155 -0.340 -0.214
3.226** -3.390** -0.493 -4.051** -1.174
n 0.771 0.431 0.602E-4 0.408 0.294
2.251* 2.184* 0.214 4.281** 2.174*
LR6 0.227 1.00 0.791 -0.040 1.00
0.433 1.00 1.506 0.837 1.00
N=43 N=36 N=36 N=40 N=32
R-Sq=0.7 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.92 R-Sq=0.87 R-Sq=0.67
DW=2.47 DW=1.40 DW=1.62 DW=2.09 DW=2.06
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
177
Parameter Sri Lanka Singapore Sierra Leon Senegal Rwanda
 est -0.022 0.630 0.051 -0.002 -0.225
t-stat -1.191 -19.301** 5.968** -0.261 -25.795**
l 3.030 45.727 -4.432 0.721 -15.969
1.85* 1.304 -4.577** 0.530 -5.102**
k -0.252 14.704 0.630 0.641 -5.592
-0.651 1.130 0.229 0.195 -7.042**
m -0.416 0.382 1.428 -0.888 -0.077
-3.739** 3.477** 4.318** -2.893** -0.196
m 0.101 -0.055 0.187 0.452 -0.217
1.430 -0.450 4.219** 2.883** -0.348
n 1.853 0.837 -0.190 -0.322 0.564E-4
3.226** 4.255** -0.401 -3.614** 222.880**
n 0.771 -26.44 0.155 0.390 7.080**
2.251** -0.997 0.739 3.65** 234.900**
LR7 0.0227 0.706 0.924 -0.122E-1 0.237
0.433 20.873** 0.591 -0.348 5.268**
N= 43 N=36 N=36 N=40 N=32
R-Sq=0.73 R-Sq=0.99 R=0.84 R=0.87 R-Sq=0.99
DW = 2.47 DW=1.34 DW=1.30 DW=1.99 DW=1.72
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
178
Parameter Sri Lanka Singapore Sierra Leon Senegal Rwanda
 est -0.217 -0.630 -0.398 -0.327E-3 0.052
t-stat -1.192 -19.301** -5.923** -0.035 1.855*
l 3.030 45.727 294.68 0.495 -0.073
1.848* 1.304 1.313 0.438 -0.602
k -0.252 14.704 17.046 0.034 -0.040
-0.651 1.130 0.958 0.123 -0.608
m -0.416 0.382 0.508 -0.667 0.074
-3.739** 3.477** 1.784* -1.989** 0.367
m 0.101 -0.053 70.762 0.377 0.016
1.430 -0.045 1.032 2.368* 0.233
n 1.853 0.837 0.161E-4 -0.374 0.224
3.226** 4.255** 1.715* -4.307** -1.641
n 0.771 -26.440 -0.122E-4 0.442 0.167
2.251* -0.997 -0.239 4.427** 2.412*
LR8 0.022 0.706 -0.208 -0.389 -0.176
0.433 20.873** -0.470 -1.105 -2.629**
N=43 N=36 N=36 N=40 N=32
R-Sq=0.73 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.33 R-Sq=0.87 R-Sq=0.71
DW = 2.47 DW=1.34 DW=1.23 DW=2.15 DW=2.10
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
179
Parameter Morocco Mexico Ethiopia El-Salvador Egypt
 est 0.040 0.005 0.003 -0.303 0.01
t-stat 3.068** 0.919 1.565 -7.685** 4.458**
l -0.614E-7 -1.429 -0.135 1.000 -0.326
-0.394 -2.768** -1.797* 1.000 -5.369**
k 0.045 -0.277 0.003 1.000 0.506
0.844 -2.02* 1.251 1.000 0.476
m 0.110E-7 -0.602E-7 -0.018 -0.775E-6 0.618
0.080 -0.477 -3.136** -0.775E-6 1.256
m -0.204E-6 -0.356E-6 -0.007 0.984 0.001
-2.313* -2.050* -3.343** 0.984 0.545
n 0.399E-6 -0.229 0.410 1.00 -0.402
0.112 -0.676 5.109** 1.00 -2.651**
n 0.171E-6 0.866 0.035 0.985 0.021
1.680 6.830** 10.694** 0.985 7.770**
LR1 1.000 1.000 0.921E-3 1.000 -0.003
1.000 1.000 0.811 1.000 -1.945*
N= 43 N=43 N=33 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.80 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.94 R-Sq=0.001 R-Sq=0.92
DW = 1.49 DW=1.766 DW=2.14 DW=1.77 DW=1.89
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
180
Parameter Morocco Mexico Ethiopia El-Salvador Egypt
 est 0.052 0.005 0.314 0.022 0.009
t-stat 3.380** 0.919 1.285 2.081* 3.441**
l -0.581 -1.429 -0.124 0.389E-7 -0.313
-0.547 -2.768** -1.596 0.286 -4.152**
k 0.024 -0.277 0.314 0.185 0.007
0.592 -2.02* 1.200 0.391 0.765
m -0.127E-7 -0.602E-7 -0.017 -0.139E-6 0.763E-3
-0.096 -0.477 -3.049** -0.129 0.178
m -0.135E-6 -0.356E-6 -0.722 0.966E-7 -0.001
-1.924* -2.050* -3.060** 0.982 -0.801
n 0.893E-6 -0.229 0.403 0.446E-5 -0.412
0.281 -0.676 5.278* 0.101 -2.564**
n 0.116E-6 0.866 0.036 0.213E-7 0.023
1.525 6.830** 10.604** 0.275 8.233**
LR2 -0.057 1.000 0.988 -0.152 1.000
-1.705* 1.000 1.095 -3.496** 1.000
N= 43 N=43 N=33 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.28 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.94 R=0.27 R=0.92
DW = 1.62 DW=1.76 DW=2.09 DW=2.64 DW=1.72
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
181
Parameter Morocco Mexico Ethiopia El-Salvador Egypt
 est 0.520 0.005 0.003 0.026 0.009
t-stat 3.380** 0.919 1.565 2.081* *4.458
l -0.581E-7 -1.429 -0.134 0.389 -0.326
-0.547 -2.768** -1.797* 0.285 -5.369**
k 0.238E-1 -0.277 0.003 0.185 0.005
0.591 -2.022** 1.251 0.391 0.476
m -0.127E-7 -0.602 -0.180 -0.139E-6 0.006
-0.096 -0.477 -3.136** -0.128 1.256
m -0.134E-6 -0.356 -0.007 0.966E-7 0.112
-1.924* -2.050* -3.343** 0.982 0.545
n 0.893E-6 -0.229 0.410 0.446 -0.402
0.281 -0.676 5.109** 0.102 -2.651**
n 0.445E-6 0.866 0.036 0.213E-7 0.021
1.525 6.830** 10.694* 0.275 7.770
LR3 -0.579 1.00 0.921 -0.152 -0.003
-1.705* 1.00 0.811 -3.495** -1.945
N=43 N=43 N=33 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.28 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.94 R-Sq=0.28 R-Sq=0.92
DW =1.62 DW=1.76 R-Sq=2.14 DW=2.64 DW=1.89
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
182
Parameter Morocco Mexico Ethiopia El-Salvador Egypt
 est 0.008 0.005 0.003 -0.144 0.009
t-stat 0.311 0.906 1.374 -2.946** 3.612**
l -0.120 -1.309 -0.111 0.80E-6 -0.302
-0.326 -1.464 -1.489 0.218 -4.079**
k 0.089 -0.275 0.003 -0.414 0.006
0.825 -1.996* 1.259 -0.393 0.656
m 0.501E-7 -0.571E-7 -0.017 0.146E-6 0.103
0.353 -0.431 -3.019** 0.001 0.249
m -0.594E-6 -0.355E-6 -0.007 0.499E-6 -0.002
-1.117 -2.0537* -3.034** 0.230 -0.947
n 0.480 -0.227 0.412 -0.189E-4 -0.413
0.857 -0.678 5.667** -0.400 -2.759**
n 0.463E-6 0.863 0.363 0.304 0.023
1.062 6.558** 10.391** 0.126 8.544**
LR4 0.041 -0.004 1.000 0.175 -0.307
1.356 -0.163 1.000 3.160 -0.417
N=43 N=43 N=33 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.25 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.94 R-Sq=0.25 R-Sq=0.92
DW =1.56 DW=1.75 DW=2.23 DW=2.45 DW=1.77
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
183
Parameter Morocco Mexico Ethiopia El-Salvador Egypt
 est 0.009 0.005 0.009 -0.272 0.021
t-stat 0.396 0.905 3.137** -6.975** 3.049**
l -0.160E-7 -2.236 -0.096 1.000 -1.331
-0.052 -2.472** -1.918* 1.000 -1.076
k 0.098 -0.271 0.64E-3 1.000 0.013
1.048 -1.967* 0.315 1.000 0.082
m -0.137E-7 -0.1002E-6 -0.228 -0.612E-5 0.028
-0.103 -0.747 -3.878** -0.612E-5 0.384
m -0.693E-6 -0.403E-3 -0.006 0.985 -0.016
-1.441 -2.331* -3.513** 0.985 -0.589
n 0.46E-5 -0.259 0.411 1.000 -10.084
0.933 -0.768 6.000** 1.000 -3.099**
n 0.429E-6 0.872 0.033 0.986 0.411
1.260 7.013** 10.465** 0.986 4.521**
LR5 0.044 0.029 -0.006 1.000 0.485
1.610 1.103 -2.705** 1.000 1.067
N=43 N=43 N=33 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.25 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.94 R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq=0.94
DW =1.61 DW=1.85 DW=2.21 DW=1.46 DW=1.73
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
184
Parameter Morocco Mexico Ethiopia El-Salvador Egypt
 est 0.046 0.005 0.003 -0.303 0.009
t-stat 3.303** 0.929 1.374 -7.685** 3.441**
l -0.235-6 -1.416 -0.111 1.000 -0.313
-1.0762 -2.682** -1.489 1.000 -4.152**
k 0.052 -0.276 0.312 1.000 0.773
0.998 -1.993* 1.259 1.000 0.765
m 0.101E-5 -0.640E-7 -0.178 -0.775E-6 0.763
0.577 -0.506 -3.019** -0.775E-6 0.178
m -0.174E-6 -0.366E-6 -0.007 0.984 -0.134
-1.760* -2.025* -3.034** 0.984 -0.801
n -0.825E-6 -0.229 0.412 1.000 -0.412
-0.213 -0.689 5.668** 1.000 -2.564**
n 0.119E-6 0.867 0.363 0.985 0.023
1.285 7.014 10.391** 0.985 8.233**
LR6 1.000 -0.005 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 -0.230 1.000 1.000 1000
N=43 N=43 N=33 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.24 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.94 R-Sq=0.001 R-Sq=0.92
DW =1.53 DW==1.78 DW=2.23 DW=1.77 DW=1.72
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
185
Parameter Morocco Mexico Ethiopia El-Salvador Egypt
 est 0.021 0.006 0.005 -0.303 0.011
t-stat 0.757 1.450 1.518 -7.685** 2.879**
l -0.122E-7 0.494 -0.119 1.000 2.638
-0.044 0.572 -1.773* 1.000 3.024**
k 0.802 -0.267 0.003 1.000 0.104
0.925 -2.192* 1.413 1.000 0.417
m -0.854 -0.18E-7 -0.020 -0.775E-6 0.055
-0.061 -0.153 -2.886** -0.775E-6 0.582
m -0.446E-6 -0.32E-6 -0.006 0.984 -0.263
-0.945 -2.028* -2.793** 0.984 -0.062
n 0.299E-5 -0.223 0.428 1.000 -7.449
0.761 -0.682 5.595** 1.000 -2.341*
n 0.297E-6 0.828 0.003 0.985 0.552
1.147 8.149** 8.953** 0.985 6.426**
LR7 0.028 -0.060 -0.001 1.000 -0.070
0.787 2.653** -0.676 1.000 -2.607**
N=43 N=43 N=33 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.24 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.94 R-Sq=0.001 R-Sq=0.99
W = 1.61 DW=1.88 DW=2.23 DW=1.77 DW=1.63
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
186
Parameter Morocco Mexico Ethiopia El-Salvador Egypt
 est 0.046 0.005 0.336 -0.303 0.009
t-stat 3.302** 0.929 1.374 -7.685** 3.441**
l -0.235E-6 -1.416 -0.111 1.000 -0.313
-1.076 -2.682** -1.489 1.000 -4.151**
k 0.051 -0.276 0.003 1.000 0.007
0.998 -1.993* 1.259 1.000 0.765
m 0.101E-5 -0.640E-7 -0.178 -0.775E-6 0.763
0.577 -0.506 -3.019** -0.775E-6 0.178
m -0.175E-6 -0.366 -0.688 0.985 -0.001
-1.760* -2.025* -3.034** 0.985 -0.801
n -0.825E-6 -0.229 0.412 1.000 -0.412
-0.213 -0.689 5.667** 1.000 -2.564
n 0.119E-6 0.867 0.036 0.985 0.232
1.285 7.014** 1.03391** 0.985 8.233
LR8 1.00 -0.005 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.00 -0.230 1.000 1.000 1.000
N=43 N=43 N=33 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.24 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.94 R-Sq=0.001 R-Sq=0.92
DW =1.60 DW=1.78 DW=2.23 DW=1.77 DW=1.72
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
187
Parameter Honduras Gabon Zimbabwe Zaïr Uruguay
 est 0.060 -0.083 -0.040 -0.006 0.436
t-stat 5.237** -2.443* -2.290* -0.192 0.241
l -0.196 19.076 8.157 5.603 -2.855
-2.812** 2.511* 1.551 2.134* -0.579
k 0.107E-3 -0.411 -1.627 -0.679 0.285
0.008 -1.211 -1.740* -2.932** 0.010
m -0.022 -0.801 -0.739 0.152 0.301
0.543 -3.651** -0.934 2.162* 3.53**
m -0.642 0.101 -0.125 -0.034 0.23
-0.921 0.331 -0.812 -0.388 3.445**
n -2.366 0.267 5.857 0.35 0.257
-3.325** 0.841 4.032** 1.288 1.595
n 0.096 0.296 1.633 0.158 0.755
2.374* 0.551 3.623** 1.466 12.677**
LR1 1.00 1.00 -0.903 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 -1.195 1.00 1.00
N= 37 N=22 N=31 N=26 N=41
R-Sq=0.92 R-Sq=0.82 R-s=S0.85 R-Sq=0.9 R-Sq=0.99
DW = 2.54 DW=2.05 R-Sq=2.01 DW=1.76 DW=1.91
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
188
Parameter Honduras Gabon Zimbabwe Zaïr Uruguay
 est 0.060 -0.830 -0.029 -0.007 0.043
t-stat 5.237** -2.443* -1.675 -0.259 0.241
l -0.196 19.076 6.412 5.73 -2.85
-2.812** 2.511* 1.345 2.410* -0.58
k 0.107E-3 -0.411 -1.387 -0.700 0.286
0.008 -1.211 -1.602 -3.078** 0.010
m -0.022 -0.801 -0.806 0.157 0.301
0.543 -3.651** -0.919 2.146* 3.535**
m -0.006 0.101 -0.123 -0.458 0.235
-0.921 0.331 -0.787 -0.483 3.445**
n -2.366 0.267 6.631 0.012 0.257
-3.325** 0.841 4.790** 0.317 1.595
n 0.962 0.296 1.386 0.162 0.755
2.374* 0.551 3.214** 1.599 12.677
LR2 1.00 1.00 0.204 0.012 1.00
1.00 1.00 0.423 0.317 1.00
N= 37 N=22 N=31 N=26 N=41
R-Sq=0.92 R-Sq=22 R-Sq=0.85 R-Sq=0.69 0.99
DW =2.54 DW=2.05 DW=1.94 DW=1.79 DW=1.91
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
189
Parameter Honduras Gabon Zimbabwe Zaïr Uruguay
 est 0.609 -0.083 -0.317 -0.705 0.436E-3
t-stat 5.237** -2.443* -1.701* -0.259 0.242
l -0.196 19.076 6.756 5.731 -2.854
-2.812** 2.511* 1.352 2.41* -0.579
k 0.107E-3 -0.411 -1.390 -0.700 0.003
0.872 -1.211 -1.599 -3.078** 0.010
m -0.022 -0.801 -0.090 0.157 0.030
-0.543 -3.651** -1.069 2.146* 3.535**
m -0.642 0.101 -0.082 -0.458 0.236
0.921 0.330 -0.525 -0.483 3.445
n -2.366* 0.267 6.552 0.377 0.257
-3.325** 0.841 4.539** 1.373 1.595
n 0.962 0.296 1.479 0.162 0.755
2.374* 0.551 3.120** 1.559 12.677**
LR3 1.00 1.00 -0.011 0.012 1.00
1.00 1.00 -0.257 0.317 1.00
N= 37 N=22 N=31 N=26 N=41
R-Sq=0.92 R-Sq=0.82 R-Sq=0.85 R-Sq=0.69 R-Sq=0.99
DW =2.54 DW=2.05 DW=2.03 DW=1.80 DW=1.96
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
190
Parameter Honduras Gabon Zimbabwe Zaïr Uruguay
 est 0.055 -0.122 -0.345 -0.005 -0.11E-3
t-stat 4.374** -4.238** -2.173* -0.192 0.062
l -0.280 33.384 6.620 5.603 -6.874
-2.279** 3.146** 1.441 2.134* -1.156
k -0.001 -1.074 -1.121 -0.6790 0.014
-0.088 -1.869* -1.269 -2.932** 0.050
m -0.027 -0.624 -0.082 0.152 0.029
0.742 -3.06** -1.021 2.162* 3.652**
m -0.009 -0.424 -0.133 -0.034 0.240
-1.030 -0.811 -0.857 0.388 3.615**
n -2.359 0.534 6.784 0.347 0.220
-3.386** 2.08* 5.043** 1.289 1.375
n 0.119 0.968 1.563 0.158 0.755
2.268* 1.170 3.818** 1.466 13.179**
LR4 0.015 0.217 -0.037 1.00 0.036
1.021 1.717* -0.808 1.00 1.113
N=37 N=22 N=31 N=26 N=41
R-Sq=0.92 R=0.86 R-Sq=0.85 R-Sq=0.69 R-Sq=0.99
DW =2.60 DW=2.62 DW=2.02 DW=1.77 DW=2.04
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
191
Parameter Honduras Gabon Zimbabwe Zaïr Uruguay
 est 0.055 -547.07 -1.999 0.010 -0.473E-3
t-stat 3.547** -0.435 -20.390** 0.392 -0.247
l -0.224 135.29 50.123 4.768 -3.993
-2.146* 0.435 2.317* 2.472** -0.805
k 0.735 1017.7 3305 -0.510 -0.620
0.512 0.432 2.974** -2.444* -0.872
m -0.025 0.145E-3 0.370 0.122 0.032
-0.647 0.308 8.364** 1.732* 3.971
m -0.856 3.2.52 2116 -0.041 0.261
-0.965 0.433 3.208** -0.553 3.748**
n -2.341 0.001 0.432 0.366 0.175
-3.077** 0.409 0.201 1.316 1.015
n 0.114 748.770 -5254.1 0.136 0.737
1.87 0.433 -2.924** 1.580 12.510
LR5 0.090 547.15 2.050 -0.044 0.087
0.541 0.435 21.232** -1.065 0.978
N= 37 N=22 N=31 N=26 N=41
R-Sq=0.92 R-Sq=0.51 R-Sq=0.864 R-Sq=0.70 R-Sq=0.99
DW = 2.60 DW=1.70 DW=1.95 DW=1.78 DW=2.03
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
192
Parameter Honduras Gabon Zimbabwe Zaïr Uruguay
 est 0.065 -0.083 -0.026 -0.006 -0.11E-3
t-stat 4.197** -2.443* -1.588 -0.197 -0.062
l -0.441 19.076 2.384 5.603 -6.874
-0.302 2.511** 0.567 2.134* -1.156
k 0.9E-3 -0.411 -1.013 -0.679 0.014
0.067 -1.211 -1.422 -2.932** 0.050
m -0.023 -0.801 -0.072 0.152 0.029
-0.636 -3.651** -0.858 2.162* 3.652**
m -0.009 0.101 -0.110 -0.345 0.240
-1.214 0.330 -0.765 -0.388 3.615
n -2.316 0.267 7.185 0.347 0.220
-3.317** 0.841 5.834** 1.288 1.375
n 0.111 0.296 1.329 0.158 0.755
2.210* 0.551 3.224** 1.466 13.179
LR6 -0.343 1.00 0.734 1.00 0.362
-1.512 1.00 1.398 1.00 1.113
N=37 N=22 N=31 N=26 N=41
R-Sq=0.92 R-Sq=0.82 R-Sq=0.86 R-Sq R-Sq=0.99
DW = 2.67 DW=2.05 DW=1.95 DW=1.76 DW=2.04
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
193
Parameter Honduras Gabon Zimbabwe Zaïr Uruguay
 est 0.568 -0.061 0.033 0.009 0.056
t-stat 3.993** -2.143* -1.936* 0.403 3.993**
l -0.253 17.281 6.977 4.920 -0.253
-1.623 3.147** 1.435 2.687** -1.623
k -0.680 -0.158 -1.303 -0.537 -0.680
-0.492 -0.452 -1.507 -2.823** -0.049
m -0.024 -0.774 -0.980 0.137 -0.024
-0.673 -3.861** -1.207 2.054* -0.673
m -0.007 0.089 -0.092 -0.058 -0.007
0.945 0.367 -0.629 0.759 -0.945
n -2.346 0.285 6.485 0.432 -2.346
-3.351** 0.94 4.691** 1.518 -3.351
n 0.108 0.206 1.487 0.136 0.108
2.093* 0.519 3.686** 1.686* 2.093
LR7 0.009 -0.963 -0.022 -0.045 0.008
0.462 -1.029 -0.543 -1.180 0.462
N= 37 N=22 N=31 N=26 N=41
R-Sq=0.92 R-Sq=0.82 R-Sq=0.85 R-Sq=0.71 R-Sq=0.92
DW = 2.57 DW=1.96 DW=1.99 DW=1.80 DW=2.57
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
194
Parameter Honduras Gabon Zimbabwe Zaïr Uruguay
 est 0.058 -0.083 0.026 0.011 -0.11E-3
t-stat 4.572** -2.44* -1.588 0.392 -0.062
l -0.880 19.076 2.384 4.768 -6.874
0.757 2.511* 0.567 2.47* -1.156
k 0.7E-6 -0.411 -1.013 -0.510 0.013
0.5E-4 -1.211 -1.422 -2.444* 0.050
m -0.015 -0.801 -0.727 0.122 0.029
-0.419 -3.651** -0.852 1.732 3.652**
m -0.0070 0.101 -0.110 -0.412 0.240
-1.035 0.331 -0.765 -0.553 3.615**
n -2.397 0.267 7.185 0.366 0.220
-3.348** 0.841* 5.834** 1.316 1.375
n 0.101 0.296 1.329 0.136 0.755
2.273* 0.551 3.224** 1.580 13.179**
LR8 -0.025 1.00 0.734 -0.044 0.036
-1.236 1.00 1.398 -1.065 1.11
N= 37 N=22 N=31 N=26 N=41
R-Sq=0.92 R-Sq=0.82 R-Sq=0.86 R-Sq=0.70 R-Sq=0.99
DW = 2.60 DW=2.05 DW=1.96 DW=1.77 DW=2.04
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
195
Parameter Ecuador Dominican Cost Rica India Haiti
 est -0.022 -0.004 0.001 -0.855E-3 -0.499
t-stat -6.658** -2.572** 0.382 -0.539 -50.181**
l 0.995 -0.873 0.017 0.044 10.675
4.813** -0.815 0.308 0.543 6.765**
k 0.022 0.968 -0.118 0.009 6.925
1.333 0.827 -1.425 2.112* 5.256**
m 0.672E-8 -50.471 0.517 -0.007 0.423E-10
0.039 -52.383** 2.194* -0.572 1.912*
m -0.172E-8 -0.004 0.228E-7 0.002 -0.311E-4
-0.528 -31.327** 2.472** 0.616 -0.866
n 0.254E-5 7.948 0.256 -0.911 -0.742E-7
2.841** 1.900* 4.003** -1.228 -30.221**
n 0.080 0.641 0.030 0.206 0.403
14.696** 6.132** 12.580** 4.362** 21.317**
LR1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
N=39 N=43 N=43 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.90 R-Sq=0.62 R-Sq=0.96 R-Sq=0.80 R-Sq=0.01
DW =1.39 DW=1.90 DW=1.71 DW=2.10 DW=0.28
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
196
Parameter Ecuador Dominican Cost Rica India Haiti
 est 0.022 -0.004 0.001 0.020 -0.499
t-stat -6.658** -2.572** 0.382 2.852** -50.181**
l 0.995 -0.873 0.017 -0.166 10.675
4.813** -0.814 0.308 -0.547 6.765**
k 0.022 0.968 -0.012 0.108 6.925
1.333 0.827 -1.425 1.267 5.256**
m 0.675E-8 -50.471 0.517 0.598 0.423E-10
0.039 -52.383** 2.194* 1.644 1.912*
m -0.172 -0.004 0.228E-7 -0.433 -0.311E-4
-0.528 -31.327** 2.472** -0.006 -0.866
n 0.254E-5 7.948 0.256 -77.519 -0.742E-7
2.841** 1.900* 4.003** -3.471** -30.221**
n 0.80 0.641 0.305 0.509 0.403
14.696** 6.132** 12.580** 4.626** 21.317**
LR2 1.000 1.000 1.000 -0.013 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000 -1.026 1000
N=39 N=43 N=43 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.90 R-Sq=0.62 R-Sq=0.96 R-Sq=0.83 R-Sq=0.01
DW = 1.38 DW=1.90 DW=1.71 DW=2.09 DW=0.28
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
197
Parameter Ecuador Dominican Cost Rica India Haiti
 est -0.022 -0.004 0.001 0.020 -0.499
t-stat -6.658** -2.572** 0.382 2.849** -50.181**
l 0.995 -0.873 0.018 -0.220 10.675
4.813** -0.814 0.308 -0.711 6.765**
k 0.022 0.968 -0.012 0.107 6.925
1.333 0.827 -1.425 1.221 5.256**
m 0.675E-8 -50.471 0.517 0.635 0.423E-10
0.039 -52.383** 2.194* 1.664 1.912*
m -0.172E-8 -0.004 0.228E-7 -0.295 -0.311E-4
-0.053 -31.327** 2.472** -0.363 -0.866
n 0.254E-5 7.948 0.256 -75.69 -0.742E-7
2.841** 1.900* 4.003** -3.190** -30.221**
n 0.080 0.641 0.030 0.537 0.403
14.696** 6.131** 12.580** 4.328** 21.317**
LR3 1.000 1.000 1.000 -0.015 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000 -1.097 1.000
N=39 N=43 N=43 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.90 R-Sq=0.62 R-Sq=0.96 R-Sq=0.83 R-Sq=0.01
DW =1.38 DW=1.90 DW=1.71 DW=1.99 DW=0.28
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
198
Parameter Ecuador Dominican Cost Rica India Haiti
 est -0.45E-3 0.162E-7 -1.049 0.020 -0.499
t-stat -0.695 0.517 -6.057** 2.849** -50.181**
l -0.247 0.073 -0.641 -0.436 10.675
-0.164 2.845** -0.650 -1.654 6.765**
k 0.163 0.057 -0.016 0.102 6.953
1.105 2.91** -0.035 1.162 5.265**
m 0.129E-5 473.59 0.166 0.633 0.423E-10
0.452 10.285** 0.242 1.693* 1.912*
m 0.321E-6 0.030 0.233 -0.003 -0.311E-4
0.898 10.285** 0.150 -0.036 -0.866
n 0.193 -0.051 -0.230 -80.600 -0.742
0.800 -0.456 -7.745** -3.377** -30.221**
n 0.891 0.203E-3 0.101 0.519 0.403
18.700** 0.067 0.066 4.459** 21.317**
LR4 -0.002 -0.61E-3 1.047 0.546 1.000
-0.499 0.679 6.050** 0.460 1.000
N=39 N=43 N=43 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.94 R-Sq=0.90 R-Sq=0.42 R-Sq=0.82 R-Sq=0.01
DW =1.71 DW=2.26 DW=1.31 DW=2.11 DW=0.28
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
199
Parameter Ecuador Dominican Cost Rica India Haiti
 est -0.506 -0.004 -1.049 0.020 -0.499
t-stat -7.956** -2.572** -6.057** 2.875** -50.181**
l -12.026 -0.873 -0.641 -0.372 10.675
-0.223 -0.814 -0.650 -1.662 6.765**
k -4.022 0.968 -0.016 0.107 6.952
-0.113 0.827 -0.035 1.232 5.256**
m -0.550E-6 -50.471 0.166 0.615 0.423
-0.317 -52.383** 0.242 1.657 1.912*
m 0.537E-5 -0.004 0.233 0.248 -0.311E-4
0.187 -31.33** 0.150 0.035 -0.866
n -0.732E-6 7.948 -0.230 -77.826 -0.742E-7
-0.440 1.900* -7.745** -3.387** -30.221**
n -2.185 0.641 0.101 0.512 0.403
-0.089 6.132** 0.066 4.446** 21.317**
LR5 0.540 1.000 1.047 1.000 1.000
5.137** 1.000 6.050** 1.000 1.000
N=39 N=43 N=43 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.46 R-Sq=0.62 R-Sq=0.42 R-Sq=0.822 R-Sq=0.01
DW =1.07 DW=1.90 DW=1.31 DW=2.05 DW=2.22
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
200
Parameter Ecuador Dominican Cost Rica India Haiti
 est 0.004 -0.492E-3 -1.049 0.018 -0.013
t-stat 0.489 -0.186 -6.057** 2.955** -2.178*
l 0.007 1.215 -0.641 -1.824 1.188
0.086 1.013 -0.650 -0.980 2.839**
k 0.164 0.918 -0.016 0.119 -0.077
1.235 1.114 -0.035 1.381 -2.498**
m 0.114E-5 -28.949 0.166 0.580 -0.135E-6
0.453 -29.798** 0.242 1.608 -1.402
m 0.380E-6 -0.002 0.233 0.014 0.160E-7
1.413 -18.452** 0.150 0.206 1.226
n -0.192E-3 7.776 -0.230 -81.992 0.037
-0.465 1.918* -7.745** -3.595** 2.417*
n 0.753 0.584 0.101 0.525 0.018
4.93** 7.789** 0.066 -3.595** 3.925**
LR6 -0.075 -0.098 1.047 0.048 -0.017
-1.889* -2.882** 6.050** 0.856 -4.203**
N=39 N=43 N=43 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.95 R-Sq=0.71 R-Sq=0.42 R-Sq=0.83 R-Sq=0.84
DW =1.87 DW=2.20 DW=1.31 DW=2.12 DW=2.22
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant a t 0.01 level
201
Parameter Ecuador Dominican Cost Rica India Haiti
 est -0.623E-3 -0.008 -1.049 -0.676E-4 -0.027
t-stat -0.752 -1.789* -6.057** 0.058 -6.61**
l 0.195 0.294 -0.641 6.435 2.51
0.202 2.118* -0.650 1.611 6.44**
k 0.165 0.007 -0.016 0.312 -0.099
1.010 2.814** -0.035 2.121* -0.784
m 0.209E-5 0.999 0.166 -0.075 -0.123
0.751 0.999 0.242 -0.178 -1.140
m 0.337E-6 0.034 0.233 0.019 0.262
0.887 7.402** 0.150 0.139 1.444
n 0.001 0.013 -0.230 -40.226 0.042
0.842 0.094 -7.745** -1.524 2.368*
n 0.893 0.002 0.101 0.735 0.246
17.564** 0.349 0.066 3.976** 3.468**
LR7 -0.037 0.281 1.047 -0.133 -0.007
-1.197 1.366 6.050** -1.634 -2.909**
N=39 N=43 N=43 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.94 R-Sq=0.91 R-Sq=0.42 R-Sq=0.80 R-Sq=0.78
DW =1.82 DW=2.20 DW=1.31 DW=2.09 DW=1.96
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
202
Parameter Ecuador Dominican Cost Rica India Haiti
 est -0.507E-3 -0.342E-3 -1.049 0.186 -0.772
t-stat -0.690 -0.124 -6.057** 2.955** -50.757**
l 0.696 0.996 -0.641 -1.824 3.399
0.745 0.866 -0.650 -0.980 3.101**
k 0.143 0.821 -0.016 0.119 1.561
1.047 0.946 -0.035 1.380 1.547
m -0.175E-6 -20.799 0.166 0.580 0.439E-10
0.066 -3.797** 0.242 1.608 0.955
m 0.279 -0.001 0.233 0.144E-3 -0.149E-3
0.779 -3.424** 0.150 0.206 -0.668
n 0.001 8.119 -0.230 -81.992 -0.477E-7
0.800 1.891* -7.745** -3.595** -21.543**
n 0.839 0.581 0.101 0.525 2.045
18.097** 7.448** 0.066 4.757** 13.036**
LR8 -0.090 -0.009 1.047 0.048 0.646
-2.523** -2.961** 6.050** 0.857 1.742*
N=39 N=43 N=43 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.95 R-Sq=0.71 R-Sq=0.42 R-Sq=0.82 R-Sq=0.02
DW =1.81 DW=2.20 DW=1.31 DW=2.12 DW=1.31
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
203
Parameter Nigeria Niger Nepal Mauritius Malaysia
 est 0.114 0.046 0.055 0.035 0.004
t-stat 7.125** 27.685** 3.238** 2.689** 0.380
l 0.253 0.123E-4 -0.839 3.858 0.115
2.513* 0.318 -3.962** 2.549** 0.104
k -0.113 -1.007 -0.060 -0.196 0.078
-2.676* -0.743 -1.118 -3.045** 0.620
m -0.107 -0.065 -2.109 -0.196 0.063
-1.226 -0.221 -2.651** -3.045** 2.590**
m 0.002 -0.225E-5 0.155 -.009 -0.022
1.012 -0.169* 3.397** 0.024 -1.015
n -0.744 -0.904E-4 -1.020 -2.680 -3.468
-3.890** -260.410** -1.590 -2.308* -5.012**
n 0.011 8.3462 0.070 0.372 0.582
1.614 310.880** 1.656 3.576** 3.064**
LR1 1.000 1.000 1.00 1.00 1.00
1.000 1.000 1.00 1.00 1.00
N= 43 N=28 N=28 N=33 N=43
R-Sq=0.72 R-Sq=1.000 R-Sq=0.57 R-Sq=0.81 R-Sq=0.725
DW =1.48 DW=1.46 DW=1.96 DW=1.80 DW=2.11
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
204
Parameter Nigeria Niger Nepal Mauritius Malaysia
 est 0.112 0.0461 0.055 0.035 0.004
t-stat 6.771** 27.685** 3.238** 2.689** 0.380
l 0.288 0.123E-4 -0.839 3.858 0.115
2.466** 0.318 -3.962** 2.549** 0.104
k -0.129 -1.007 -0.060 -0.196 0.077
-2.578** -0.747 -1.118 -3.045** 0.620
m -0.161 -0.654 -2.109 -0.354 0.063
-1.797* -0.221 -2.651** -3.932** 2.590*
m 0.003 -0.225E-5 0.155 -0.009 -0.022
1.095 -0.169 3.397** -0.350 -1.015
n -0.685 -0.904 -1.020 -2.680 -3.468
-3.120** -260.410** -1.590 -2.308** -5.012**
n 0.012 8.346 0.070 0.372 0.582
1.570 310.880** 1.656 3.576** 3.064**
LR2 0.101 1.000 1.000 1.00 1.00
1.413 1.000 1.000 1.00 1.00
N= 43 N=28 N=28 N=33 N=43
R-Sq=0.73 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.81 R-Sq=0.72
DW = 1.50 DW=1.46 DW=1.96 DW=1.81 DW=2.11
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
205
Parameter Nigeria Niger Nepal Mauritius Malaysia
 est 0.112 0.046 0.055 0.035 0.004
t-stat 6.771** 27.685** 3.238** 2.689** 0.380
l 0.288 0.123E-4 -0.839 3.858 0.115
2.466** 0.319 -3.962** 2.549** 0.104
k -0.129 -1.006 -0.060 -0.196 0.077
-2.578** -0.743 -1.118 -3.045** 0.620
m -0.161 -0.654E-10 -2.109 -0.354 0.063
-1.797** -0.221 -2.651** -3.932** 2.590**
m 0.003 -0.224 0.155 -0.009 -0.022
1.095 -0.169 3.975** -0.350 -1.015
n -0.685 -0.904E-4 -1.020 -2.680 -3.468
-3.120** -260.41** -1.590 -2.308* -5.012**
n 0.012 8.346 0.070 0.372 0.582
1.570 310.880** 1.656 3.576** 3.064**
LR3 0.101 1.000 1.000 1.00 1.00
1.413 1.000 1.000 1.00 1.00
N= 43 N=28 N=28 N=33 N=43
R-Sq=0.73 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.81 R-Sq=0.72
DW = 1.50 DW=1.46 DW=1.96 DW=1.81 DW=2.11
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
206
Parameter Nigeria Niger Nepal Mauritius Malaysia
 est 0.117 0.053 0.086 3.59 -1.230
t-stat 5.972** 9.211** 5.538** 2.543** -1.012
l 0.241 -0.366E-6 -0.449 3.599 6710.6
2.089* -0.178 -3.623** 2.265* 0.170
k -0.107 0.009 -0.035 -0.211 -1552.9
-2.071* 0.159 -1.212 -2.582** 0.170
m -0.111 -0.598E-11 -2.968 -0.366 0.042
-1.188 -0.335 -4.134** -3.856** 0.962
m 0.248 -0.237E-6 0.109 -0.001 -37.22
0.908 -0.325 3.665** -0.383 -0.164
n -0.752 0.121E-4 -1.343 -2.888 0.220 -
3.213** 468.86** -2.623** -2.345* 0.887
n 0.010 -0.171 0.060 0.382 490.40
1.434 -90.139** 2.394* 3.476** 0.173
LR4 -0.016 1.000 -0.045 0.016 1.276
-0.256 1.000 -2.433* 0.343 1.045
N= 43 N=28 N=28 N=33 N=43
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.66 R-Sq=0.81 R-Sq=0.14 R-Sq=0.14
DW = 1.48 DW=1.20 DW=2.34 DW=1.87 DW=0.92
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
207
Parameter Nigeria Niger Nepal Mauritius Malaysia
 est 0.108 0.357 0.085 0.030 -1.230
t-stat 4.464** 906.950** 5.157** 2.435* -1.012
l 0.305 -0.283E-3 -0.508 4.809 6710.6
1.558 -0.581 -3.717** 2.841** 0.170
k -0.139 -0.169E-3 -0.038 -0.285 -1552.9
-1.509 -3.847** -1.295 -2.660** -0.170
m -0.112 -0.539E-11 -2.682 -0.340 0.042
-1.159 -0.603 -3.780** -3.686** 0.962
m 0.003 -0.343E-8 0.107 0.002 -37.228
0.832 -0.551 3.104** 0.066 -0.164
n -0.753 0.999E-5 -1.036 -2.252 0.220
-3.518** 10490** -1.915* -1.944* 0.173
n 0.141 0.129E-3 0.058 0.402 490.400
1.077 5.684** 2.381* 3.715** 0173
LR5 0.021 -0.024 -0.036 0.309 1.276
0.394 -12.195** -2.094* 1.183 1.045
N= 43 N=28 N=28 N=33 N=43
R-Sq=0.72 R-Sq=1.000 R-Sq=0.62 R-Sq=0.81 R-Sq=0.72
DW = 1.52 DW=1.88 DW=2.13 DW=1.86 DW=2.11
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
208
Parameter Nigeria Niger Nepal Mauritius Malaysia
 est 0.113 -0.897 0.060 0.034 -1.230
t-stat 6.580** -30.889** 3.044** 2.543** -1.012
l 0.260 -0.104E-3 -0.874 3.56 6710
2.39* -1.368 -2.633** 2.265* 0.170
k -0.118 15.887 -0.050 -0.211 -1552.9
-2.425* 3.526** -0.909 -2.582** -0.170
m -0.106 0.952E-10 -2.433 -0.366 0.042
-1.150 1.964* -2.582** -3.856** 0.962
m 0.002 0.436E-5 0.516 -0.007 -37.228
0.999 0.077 3.524** -0.383 -0.164
n -0.734 0.986E-5 -1.079 -2.888 0.220
-3.162** 1594.500** -1.573 -2.345* 0.887
n 0.011 0.447 0.068 0.382 490.400
1.511 0.771 1.542 3.476** 0.173
LR6 0.012 0.945 0.010 0.164 1.276
1.251 0.950 0.361 0.434 1.0455
N= 43 N=28 N=28 N=33 N=43
R-Sq=0.72 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.57 R-Sq=0.80 R-Sq=0.14
DW = 1.47 DW=0.49 DW=1.78 DW=1.87 DW=2.02
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
209
Parameter Nigeria Niger Nepal Mauritius Malaysia
 est 0.098 0.345 0.076 0.034 0.004
t-stat 4.535** 509.560** 4.762** 2.543** 0.475
l 0.369 0.161E-6 -0.35 3.599 0.955
2.225* 0.247 -2.018* 2.265* 0.607
k -0.185 -0.475E-4 -0.025 -0.211 0.090
-1.990* -0.951 -0.756 -2.583** 0.702
m -0.132 -0.365E-11 -2.735 -0.366 0.067
-1.492 0.306 -3.846** -3.856** 2.664**
m 0.005 -0.716E-8 0.103 -0.001 -0.023
0.889 -0.445 2.662** -0.383 -1.145
n -0.742 0.999E-5 -0.908 -2.888 -3.373
-3.164** 5374.400** -1.593* -2.345* -5.149**
n 0.019 0.713E-4 0.062 0.382 0.583
1.241 1.355 2.16* 3.476** 3.640**
LR7 0.069 -0.324 -0.041 0.016 -0.305
1.310 -5.065** -2.070* 0.434 -0.713
N= 43 N=28 N=28 N=33 N=43
R-Sq=0.73 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.61 R-Sq=0.80 R-Sq=0.73
DW =1.57 DW=1.40 DW=2.00 DW=1.87 DW=2.14
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
210
Parameter Nigeria Niger Nepal Mauritius Malaysia
 est 0.113 0.366 0.092 0.034 -1.230
t-stat 6.580** 146.610** 6.885** 2.543** -1.012
l 0.260 -0.182E-5 -0.045 -0.211 6710.60
2.393* -1.186 -0.406 2.265* 0.1706
k -0.118 -0.779E-4 -0.012 -0.211 -1552.9
-2.425* -1.973* -0.63 -2.582** -0.170
m -0.106 -0.310E-10 -3.506 -0.366 0.043
-1.150 0.876 -6.123** -3.856** 0.962
m 0.002 -0.938E-8 0.073 -0.001 -37.229
0.999 -0.388 3.184** -0.383 -0.162
n -0.734 0.998E-5 -0.97 -2.888 0.220
-3.162** 6546** -2.21* -2.345* 0.173
n 0.011 0.498E-4 0.044 0.382 490.40
1.511 1.435 2.348* 3.476** 0.173
LR8 0.012 -0.373 -0.863 0.016 1.276
1.251 -1.863* -4.409** 0.434 1.045
N= 43 N=28 N=28 N=33 N=43
R-Sq=0.72 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.74 R-Sq=0.80 R-Sq=0.14
DW =1.49 DW=0.72 DW=1.99 DW=1.87 DW=0.92
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
211
Parameter Jordan Chile Cameron Burundi Pakistan
 est -63E-4 -0.096 -1.832 -0.115 -0.001
t-stat -8.34** -7.344** -29.887** -6.897** -0.073
l 0.166 11.763 1.010 16.648 -0.698
80.19** 1.717* 1.010 2.678** -1.484
k 0.065 -20.684 1.004 -0.098 1.881
2.889** -1.487 1.004 -0.252 1.492
m 22EE-4 0.116 0.998 -0.57E-3 1.00
0.601 9.409** 0.998 -0.103 1.00
m 0.999 3.371 0.966 0.332E-5 0.259
79E+3** 4.884** 0.967 1.505 1.978*
n 218.65 -0.141 1.179 -1.598 13.890
0.592 -2.235* 1.269 -0.802 1.693*
n -3.656 0.894E-5 0.469 0.039 0.275
-71.43** 2.254* 1.212 -0.108 1.783*
LR1 -82E-4 2.254 1.00 1.00 -0.031
-2.30** 1.499 1.00 1.00 -0.424
N= 43 N=43 N=30 N=30 N=43
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.48 R-Sq=0.31 R-Sq=0.68
DW =1.97 DW=1.38 DW=2.08 DW=1.76 DW=2.02
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
212
Parameter Jordan Chile Cameron Burundi Pakistan
 est -63E-4 -0.082 -1.832 -0.099 -0.715E-3
t-stat -8.34** -6.575** -29.887** -4.938** -0.063
l 0.166 -0.476 1.010 1.3.007 -0.944
80.19** -0.406 1.010 2.130* -2.145*
k 0.065 -2.666 1.004 -0.090 1.458
2.889** -0.217 1.004 -0.281 1.328
m 22EE-4 0.094 0.998 -0.88E-3 1.00
0.601 6.535** 0.998 -0.166 1.00
m 0.999 2.272 0.966 0.255E-51 0.256
79E+3** 4.525** 0.967 1.293 2.207*
n 218.65 -0.123E-3 1.179 -1.301 10.558
0.592 -1.927* 1.269 -0.743 1.343
n -82E-4 0.519E-5 0.469 0.042 0.326
-71.43** 1.572 1.212 0.171 2.300*
LR2 -82E-4 -0.572 1.001 -0.079 0.041
-2.30** -1.763* 1.001 -1.790* 1.508
N= 43 N=43 N=30 N=30 N=43
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.47 R-Sq=0.36 R-Sq=0.70
DW = 1.97 DW=1.50 DW=2.08 DW=1.89 DW=1.80
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
213
Parameter Jordan Chile Cameron Burundi Pakistan
 est -62E-4 -0.080 -1.832 0.099 -0.002
t-stat -7.955** -6.446** -29.887** -4.938** -0.186
l 0.167 -0.472 1.007 13.007 -0.950
76.54** -0.407 1.010 2.130* -1.912*
k 0.063 -2.662 1.004 -0.090 1.671
2.73** -0.221 1.004 0.281 1.391
m 0.98E-3 0.941 0.998 -0.88E-3 1.00
0.256 6.544** 0.998 -0.166 1.00
m 0.999 2.273 0.966 0.255E-5 0.232
0.76E+5** 4.420** 0.967 1.294 1.916*
n 94.489 -0.124E-3 1.179 -1.301 12.818
0.247 -1.921* 1.269 -0.743 1.648
n -3.66 0.519E-5 0.469 0.042 0.331
-70.01** 1.544 1.212 0.171 2.151
LR3 -55E-4 -0.575 1.00 -0.079 0.305
-2.04* -1.782* 1.00 -1.790* 1.177
N=43 N=43 N=30 N=30 N=43
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.47 R-Sq=0.37 R-Sq=0.70
DW =1.96 DW=1.50 DW=2.08 DW=1.90 DW=1.78
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
214
Parameter Jordan Chile Cameron Burundi Pakistan
 est -55E-4 -0.021 -1.832 -0.087 -0.002
t-stat -3.24** -5.193** -29.685** -4.215** -0.116
l 0.165 1.007 1.010 9.991 -0.686
77.98 3.134** 1.010 1.703* -1.298
k 0.07 -0.147 1.004 -0.159 1.942
2.78** -1.309 1.004 -0.626 1.479
m 25E-4 0.002 0.998 -0.002 1.00
0.658 4.522** 0.998 -0.478 1.00
m 0.999 0.018 0.966 0.252E-5 0.241
74E+3 6.319** 0.967 1.663 2.052*
n 255.40 -0.948 1.179 -2.653 15.086
-66.22** -0.367 1.270 -1.796* 1.975*
n -3.653 -0.47E-7 0.469 0.172 0.287
-66.22** -1.028 1.217 0.771 1.977*
LR4 14E-4 0.118 1.001 -0.174 -0.005
-0.72 3.282** 1.001 -3.467** -0.207
N=43 N=43 N=30 N=30 N=43
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.68 R-Sq=0.07 R-Sq=0.49 R-Sq=0.68
DW =1.97 DW=1.51 DW=2.01 DW=2.02 DW=1.95
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
215
Parameter Jordan Chile Cameron Burundi Pakistan
 est -55E-4 -0.084 -0.636 -0.235 -0.055
t-stat -3.24** -7.634** -1.842* -3.265** -2.180*
l 0.165 0.958 -20.952 -46.721 -2.195
77.98 3.765** -0.325 -0.945 -1.117
k 0.07 -11.840 65.576 -3.341 4.797
2.78** -1.143 0.451 -0.789 2.715**
m 25E-4 0.103 1.129 1.001 1.00
0.658 9.353** 1.632 0.972 1.00
m 0.999 2.473 7.168 0.419 -0.854
74E+3 0.512 1.446 -0.292 -0.292
n 255.40 -0.121 -11.561 4.648 31.668
-66.22** -2.087* -3.636** 0.947 4.080**
n -3.653 0.603E-5 -1.381 7.003 0.567
-66.22** 1.895* -0.131 0.732 1.750*
LR5 14E-4 -0.184 0.663 0.225 0.071
-0.72 -3.223** 1.909* 2.801* 2.721**
N=43 N=43 N=30 N=38 N=43
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.71 R-Sq=0.65 R-Sq=0.71
DW =1.97 DW=1.50 DW=1.40 DW=2.23 DW=2.13
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
216
Parameter Jordan Chile Cameron Burundi Pakistan
 est -55E-4 -0.012 -0.002 -0.115 -0.047
t-stat -3.24** -3.099** -0.119 -6.897** -3.581**
l 0.165 0.144 0.866 16.648 3.252
77.98 0.476 0.941 2.678* 1.605
k 0.07 -0.017 0.949 -0.098 4.329
2.78** -0.186 1.794* -0.252 2.707**
m 25E-4 0.02 -1.050 -0.57E-3 1.00
0.658 4.334** -1.125 -0.104 1.00
m 0.999 0.015 0.262 0.332E-5 -0.157
74E+3 5.593** 1.543 1.505 -0.582
n 255.40 0.263E-3 1.978 -1.598 37.814
-66.22** 0.102 0.641 -0.802 4.054**
n -3.653 -0.434E-7 0.474 -0.295 0.630
-66.22** 0.982 2.083 -0.108 2.389*
LR6 14E-4 0.088 1.00 1.00 -0.506
-0.72 2.698** 1.00 1.00 -2.178*
N=43 N=43 N=30 N=30 N=43
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.65 R-Sq=0.91 R-Sq=0.31 R-Sq=0.70
DW =1.97 DW=1.73 DW=1.56 DW=1.76 DW=2.04
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
217
Parameter Jordan Chile Cameron Burundi Pakistan
 est 31E-4 -0.001 -0.010 -0.171 -0.259E-3
t-stat 0.482 -0.243 -1.291 -4.318** -0.018
l 0.16 0649 5.231 13.94 -1.050
71.39** 2.002* 2.071* 1.824* -1.195
k 0.069 -0.083 1.591 -0.163 1.753
2.75** -1.078 2.582** -0.281 1.363
m 39E-4 0.001 -1.048 -0.001 1.00
0.89 2.408* -1.140 -0.273 1.00
m 0.99 0.013 0.276 0.548E-5 0.235
69E+7** 4.592** 1.470 1.448 2.129*
n 391.54 -0.917E-7 1.132 -0.278 13.830
0.883 -0.338 0.489 -0.156 1.674
n -3.654 -0.372E-7 0.555 0.285 0.287
-66.61** -1.029 3.057** 0.095 2.199*
LR7 35E-4 -0.014 -0.096 0.104 0.011
-0.529 -1.662 -1.698* 1.88* 0.380
N=43 N=43 N=30 N=30 N=43
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.60 R-Sq=0.91 R-Sq=0.37 R-Sq=0.68
DW =1.97 DW=1.52 DW=1.60 2.04 DW=1.995
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
218
Parameter Jordan Chile Cameron Burundi Pakistan
 est 31E-4 -0.016 -0.002 -0.120 -0.035
t-stat 0.482 -5.642** -0.119 -6.650** -2.391*
l 0.482 0.104 0.865 17.434 3.092
71.39** 9.839** 0.941 2.696** 1.568
k 0.069 -0.036 0.949 -0.776 3.944
2.75** -0.392 1.795* -0.196 2.705**
m 39E-4 0.002 -1.050 -0.258E-3 1.00
0.89 4.711** -1.125 -0.046 1.00
m 0.99 0.015 0.262 0.349E-5 0.002
69E+7** 6.871** 1.543 1.519 0.011
n 391.54 -0.128E-5 1.978 -1.480 31.282
0.883 -0.577 0.641 -0.819 3.655**
n -3.654 -0.356E-7 0.474 -0.516 0.454
-66.61** 0.860 2.083* -0.184 2.246*
LR8 35E-4 0.013 1.00 0.355 -0.057
-0.529 4.243** 1.00 0.616 -2.557**
N=43 N=43 N=30 N=30 N=43
R-Sq=1.00 R=0.99 R-Sq=0.91 R-Sq=0.32 R-Sq=0.72
DW =1.97 DW=1.52 DW=1.60 DW=1.786 DW=2.09
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
219
Parameter Guyana Guatemala Kuwait Korea Colombia
 est 0.021 0.020 -0.018 0.002 -0.005
t-stat 1.255 1.31 -0.877 1.313 -3.729**
l -6.218 -0.449 0.713 -0.213 0.149
-1.356 -1.427 1.011 -0.294 2.355*
k 0.004 0.091 0.439 0.047 0.037
0.050 1.581 2.460** 0.409 1.553
m 0.327 0.131 0.076 -0.299 1.000
1.358 1.041 0.696 -1.650 1.000
m 0.154 -0.016 -0.132 0.305 0.16E-3
1.69* 0.423 -1.244 2.183* 1.003
n -0.396 0.496 -0.315 0.803 0.201
-0.301 1.276 -1.294 1.453 1.022
n 0.497 0.496 0.431 0.493 0.177
2.778** 2.328* 2.377* 2.915** 5.166**
LR1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
N= 23 N=39 N=31 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.96 R-Sq=0.81 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.77
DW = 2.00 DW=1.88 DW=1.64 DW=2.08 DW=1.88
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
220
Parameter Guyana Guatemala Kuwait Korea Colombia
 est 0.021 0.021 -0.018 0.008 0.016
t-stat 1.255 1.353 -0.877 1.313 2.201*
l -6.218 -0.338 0.713 -0.213 -1.933
-1.356 -0.990 1.011 -0.294 -4.700**
k 0.004 0.106 0.439 0.047 0.381
0.050 1.718* 2.460** 0.409 0.894
m 0.327 0.147 0.076 -0.299 1.000
1.358 1.138 0.696 -1.651 1.000
m 0.154 -0.107 -0.132 0.304 0.030
1.69* -0.284 -1.244 2.194* 1.048
n -0.396 12.865 -0.315 0.803 3.279
-0.301 1.345 -1.294 1.145 0.536
n 0.497 0.478 0.431 0.492 0.325
2.778** 2.205* 2.377* 2.915** 2.766**
LR2 1.000 -0.014 1.000 1.000 -0.325
1.000 -0.596 1.000 1.000 2.766**
N= 23 N=39 N=31 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.96 R-Sq=0.80 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.77
DW = 2.00 DW=1.91 DW=1.64 DW=2.08 DW=2.22
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
221
Parameter Guyana Guatemala Kuwait Korea Colombia
 est 0.021 0.021 -0.018 0.008 0.016
t-stat 1.255 1.353 -0.877 1.313 2.201*
l -6.218 -0.338 0.713 -0.213 -1.932
-1.356 -0.990 1.011 -0.294 -4.700**
k 0.004 0.106 0.439 0.047 0.381
0.050 1.718* 2.460** 0.409 0.894
m 0.327 0.147 0.076 -0.299 1.000
1.358 1.138 0.696 -1.651 1.000
m 0.154 -0.012 -0.132 0.304 0.030
1.69* -0.284 -1.244 2.184* 1.047
n -0.396 12.865 -0.315 0.803 3.279
-0.301 1.345 -1.294 1.145 0.536
n 0.497 0.478 0.431 0.492 0.325
2.778** 2.205* 2.377* 2.915** 2.766**
LR3 1.000 -0.014 1.000 1.000 -0.039
1.000 -0.596 1.000 1.000 -2.214*
N= 23 N=39 N=31 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.96 R-Sq=0.81 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.76
DW = 2.00 DW=1.91 DW=1.64 DW=2.08 DW=2.22
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
222
Parameter Guyana Guatemala Kuwait Korea Colombia
 est 0.076 0.021 -0.024 0.008 -0.014
t-stat 2.886** 1.416 -1.244 1.484 -1.070
l -0.792 -0.659 0.741 1.368 4.059
-0.494 -2.037* 1.176 1.076 1.829*
k 0.023 0.092 0.463 0.551 1.396
0.782 1.758* 2.786** 0.506 0.962
m 0.375 0.052 0.064 -0.143 1.000
1.915* 0.366 0.591 -0.699 1.000
m 0.029 -0.018 -0.123 0.256 0.001
0.850 -0.505 -1.056 1.843* 0.027
n -1.017 12.361 -0.275 0.702 7.971
-1.017 1.342 -1.081 1.030 0.912
n 0.192 0.472 0.431 0.550 0.653
1.949* 2.367* 2.280* 3.180** 5.305**
LR4 -0.167 0.306 0.032 -0.038 -0.128
-4.824** 1.260 0.887 -1.491 -3.355**
N=23 N=39 N=31 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.967 R-Sq=0.81 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.76
DW = 2.00 DW=1.91 DW=1.64 DW=2.10 DW=1.77
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
223
Parameter Guyana Guatemala Kuwait Korea Colombia
 est 0.076 0.016 -2.293 0.008 -0.014
t-stat 2.886** 1.159 -4.299** 1.470 -1.070
l -0.792 -0.616 -281.62 0.284 4.059
-0.494 -1.554 -0.547 0.303 1.829*
k 0.023 0.806 178.27 0.056 1.396
0.782 1.315 0.602 0.515 0.962
m 0.375 0.087 0.088 0.224 1.000
1.915* 0.598 1.934* -1.051 1.000
m 0.029 -0.029 561.62 0.282 0.001
0.850 -0.645 0.558 1.753* 0.027
n -1.017 11.487 0.010 0.673 7.971
-1.017 1.227 0.208 0.896 0.912
n 0.192 0.539 3.736 0.512 0.653
1.949* 2.524** 1.068 2.894 5.305**
LR5 -0.167 0.016 2.293 -0.163 0.323
-4.824** 0.731 4.276** -0.809 2.761**
N=23 N=39 N=31 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.967 R-Sq=0.81 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.74
DW = 2.00 DW=1.88 DW=1.82 DW=2.06 DW=2.16
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
224
Parameter Guyana Guatemala Kuwait Korea Colombia
 est 0.076 -0.006 -0.018 0.005 -0.004
t-stat 2.886** -2.829** -0.877 0.889 -0.429
l -0.792 0.274 0.713 -1.185 4.971
-0.494 2.590** 1.011 -1.365 2.407
k 0.023 0.004 0.439 0.006 0.796
0.782 1.047 2.460** 0.059 0.786
m 0.375 -0.007 0.076 1.576 1.000
1.915* 1.321 0.695 2.013* 1.000
m 0.029 -0.003 -0.315 0.246 0.007
0.850 -0.861 -1.243 1.540 0.156
n -1.017 0.362 -0.315 0.112 4.866
-1.017 0.896 -1.295 0.157 0.710
n 0.192 0.041 0.431 0.609 0.566
1.949* 8.006** 2.377* 3.086** 3.751**
LR6 -0.167 -0.565 1.000 0.142 -0.167
-4.824** -0.605 1.000 0.723 -2.799**
N=23 N=33 N=31 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.967 R-Sq=0.79 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.86 R-Sq=0.76
DW = 2.00 DW=1.96 DW=1.64 DW=1.96 DW=2.03
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
225
Parameter Guyana Guatemala Kuwait Korea Colombia
 est 0.076 0.019 -0.449 0.006 -0.004
t-stat 2.886** 1.518 -7.024** 1.109 -0.429
l -0.792 -0.897 -0.404 1.344 4.971
-0.494 -1.381 -0.134 1.024 2.407*
k 0.023 0.095 0.434 0.806 0.796
0.782 1.641 0.522 0.729 0.786
m 0.375 0.136 0.194 -0.177 1.000
1.915* 1.084 1.867* -0.870 1.000
m 0.029 -0.029 -0.137 0.277 0.008
0.850 -0.635 -0.219 1.876* 0.156
n -1.017 10.017 0.308 0.842 4.866
-1.017 1.043 1.134 1.222 0.711
n 0.192 0.495 4.376 0.581 -0.566
1.949* 2.679 2.132* 3.102** 3.754**
LR7 -0.167 0.022 0.433 -0.032 0.167
-4.824** 0.789 6.393** -1.382 -2.799**
N=23 N=39 N=31 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.967 R-Sq=0.80 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.76
DW = 2.00 DW=1.84 DW=1.88 DW=2.08 DW=2.04
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
226
Parameter Guyana Guatemala Kuwait Korea Colombia
 est 0.076 -0.006 0.018 0.005 -0.004
t-stat 2.886** -2.422* -0.877 0.889 -0.429
l -0.792 0.272 0.713 -1.185 4.971
-0.494 2.217* 1.011 -1.365 2.407*
k 0.023 0.472 0.439 0.006 0.796
0.782 1.053 2.460* 0.059 0.786
m 0.375 0.007 0.076 1.576 1.000
1.915* 1.296 0.696 2.013 1.000
m 0.029 -0.002 -0.132 0.246 0.007
0.850 -0.803 -1.243 1.540 0.156
n -1.017 0.357 -0.315 0.112 4.866
-1.017 0.892 -1.294 0.157 0.710
n 0.192 0.041 0.431 0.609 0.566
1.949* 7.132 2.377** 3.086** 3.754
LR8 -0.167 -0.240 1.000 0.014 -0.167
-4.824** 0.218 1.000 0.723 -2.799
N=23 N=39 N=31 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.967 R-Sq=0.79 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.86 R-Sq=0.76
DW = 2.00 DW=1.95 DW=1.89 DW=1.95 DW=2.05
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
227
Parameter Malawi Tunisia Trinidad Togo Thailand
 est 0.611 0.033 18E-11 -0.882 0.323
t-stat 4.332** 3.653** -1.69* -0.504 2.616**
l 0.263 0.260 31E-10 -2.128 0.142
0.835 0.347 28.55** -1.383 0.517
k -0.228 -0.430 -11E-10 0.293 0.109
-2.590** -0.865 -2.27* 1.600 1.790*
m 0.052 -0.291 1.000 0.001 -0.357
0.376 -2.991** 15E+12 0.395 -1.180
m 0.094 0.010 25E-10 0.015 0788
2.233* 0.484 4.1** 0.98 2.640**
n 2.308 -2.598 -1.000 -0.912 -1.837
1.567 -2.535** -16E+12 -2.773** -2.118*
n -0.106 0.408 -14E+10 0.744 0.175
-0.361 3.656** -29.15** 2.962** 1.594
LR1 1.00 1.00 14E+16 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 -1.69 1.00 1.00
N= 36 N=41 N=21 N=25 N=43
R-Sq=0.84 R-Sq=0.76 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.74 R-Sq=0.90
DW =1.83 DW=1.93 DW=1.60 DW=2.40 DW=1.25
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
228
Parameter Malawi Tunisia Trinidad Togo Thailand
 est 0.061 0.033 18E-11 -0.008 0.029
t-stat 4.33** 3.653** -1.69 0.504 3.067**
l 0.263 0.260 31E+10 -2.882 0.098
0.835 0.347 28.55** -1.383 0.426
k -0.228 -0.430 -11E-10 0.293 0.125
-2.590* -0.65 -2.27* 1.600 2.265*
m 0.051 0.291 1.000 0.001 -0.390
0.376 -2.991** 15E+8** 0.395 -1.408
m 0.094 0.010 25E-10 0.015 0.727
2.233* 0.484 4.106** 0.798 2.725**
n 2.308 -2.598 -1.000 -0.912 -1.81
1.567 -2.535** -16E11** -2.773** -2.27*
n -0.011 0.408 -14E-10 0.744 0.207
-0.361 3.656** -29.15** 2.962** 2.047*
LR2 1.00 1.00 14E-16 1.00 0.029
1.00 1.00 -0.596 1.00 1.845*
N= 36 N=41 N=21 N=25 N=43
R-Sq=0.83 R-Sq=0.76 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.74 R-Sq=0.83
DW =1.83 R-Sq=1.93 DW=1.60 DW=2.40 DW=1.27
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
229
Parameter Malawi Tunisia Trinidad Togo Thailand
 est 0.061 0.0339 0.18E-9 -0.008 0.029
t-stat 4.332** 3.653** -1.69 0.504 3.067**
l 0.263 0.260 31E-10 -2.128 0.098
0.835 0.347 28.55** -1.383 0.426
k -0.228 -0.043 -11E-10 0.293 0.125
-2.590** -0.865 -2.27* 1.60 2.265*
m 0.517 -0.291 1.000 0.137 -0.390
-2.991** 15E+8** 0.395 -1.408
m 0.094 0.010 25E10 0.014 0.727
2.233* 0.484 4.10** 0.798 2.725**
n 2.308 -2.598 -0.354 -0.912 -1.817
1.567 -2.535** -2.059* -2.773** -2.277*
n -0.011 0.408 -1.000 0.744 0.207
-0.361 3.656** -16EE+10 2.962** 2.047*
LR3 1.00 1.00 0.416E-16 1.00 0.298
1.00 1.00 0.596 1.00 1.845*
N= 36 N=41 N=21 N=25 N=43
R-Sq=0.84 R-Sq=0.76 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.74 R-Sq=0.83
DW = 1.82 DW=1.93 DW=1.60 DW=2.40 DW=1.27
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
230
Parameter Malawi Tunisia Trinidad Togo Thailand
 est 0.052 0.034 -17E-11 -0.163 0.033
t-stat 3.220** 3.584** -1.26 -0986 3.432**
l 0.168 -0.061 47E-10 -1.478 0.254
0.471 -0.081 4.085** -0.955 0.994
k -0.199 -0.002 -12E-10 0.273 0.957
-2.263* -0.038 -3.81** 1.473 2.114*
m -0.046 -0.257 1.000 0.120 -0.405
-0.262 -2.486** 68E+11** 0.397 -1.441*
m -0.142 0.007 68E+11** 0.127 0.068
1.861* 0.358 4.10** 0807 2.573**
n 2.286 -2.665 -0.354 -0.782 -1.887
1.576 -2.583** -2.059* -2.522* -2.253*
n -0.056 0.387 -1.000 0.713 0.189
-0.960 3.503** -16EE+10 3.313** 2.101*
LR4 -0.099 -0.026 0.416E-16 -0.162 -0.016
-1.222 -1.129 0.596 -2.324* -1.509
N= 36 N=41 N=21 N=25 N=43
R-Sq=0.84 R-Sq=0.77 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.78 R-Sq=0.90
DW = 2.01 DW=1.86 DW=1.60 DW=1.90 DW=1.31
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
231
Parameter Malawi Tunisia Trinidad Togo Thailand
 est -0.344 0.028 -17E-11 0.001 0.046
t-stat -6.465** 3.290** -1.26 0.055 4.084**
l 23.325 -0.594 47E-10 -0.626 -0.283
0.414 -0.712 4.085** -0.325 -2.426*
k -3.880 -0.802 -12E-10 0.390 0.058
-0.399 -1.050 -3.81** 2.046* 1.919*
m -0.948 -0.290 1.000 0.002 -0.411
-3.918** -3.202** -1.478 0.651 -1.632
m 11.182 0.001 0.167E-4 0.011 0.036
2.086* 0.426 0.244 0.750 1.945*
n 5.313 -2.936 0.354E-4 0.709 -1.537
4.226** -2.998** -2.059* -1.722* -2.271**
n -11.567 0.447 -0.808 0.606 0.115
-1.533 4.258** -1.446 2.367* 1.958*
LR5 0.344 0.057 0.416E-5 -0.827 0.330
5.144** 1.850* 1.372 -0.870 3.452**
N= 36 N=41 N=21 N=25 N=43
R-Sq=0.64 R-Sq=0.79 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.74 R-Sq=0.92
DW= 1.36 2.12 DW=1.46 DW=2.35 DW=1.44
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
232
Parameter Malawi Tunisia Trinidad Togo Thailand
 est 0.046 0.339 16E-11 0.008 0.034
t-stat 3.171** 3.653** 1.20 0.504 4.426**
l 0.302 0.260 33E-10 -2.128 0.545
0.761 0.347 -3.36** -1.383 1.944*
k -0.228 -0.431 0.9E-9 0.293 0.095
-2.466** -0.866 31.81** 1.600 2.839**
m -0.060 -0.291 1.000 0.001 -0.483
-0.359 -2.991** 91E+7 0.395 -1.795*
m 0.163 0.010 3E-9 0.014 0.053
2.175* 0.484 -4.68** 0.798 2.416*
n 2.571 -2.598 -1.000 -0.912 -1.754
1.806* -2.535** -9E+8** -2.773** -2.386*
n -0.057 0.408 15E-10 0.744 0.182
-1.047 3.656** 3.61** 2.962** 2.450**
LR6 -0.125 1.00 11E-16 1.00 -0.027
-1.883* 1.00 0.41 1.00 -2.446**
N= 36 N=41 N=21 N=25 N=43
R-Sq=0.82 R-Sq=0.76 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.74 R-Sq=0.91
DW =1.77 DW=1.93 DW=1.80 DW=2.40 DW=1.35
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
233
Parameter Malawi Tunisia Trinidad Togo Thailand
 est -0.390 0.032 16E-11 -0.011 0.026
t-stat -3.114** 3.637** 1.20 -0.558 4.171**
l 48.512 -0.063 -3E-10 -2.411 0.771
0.452 -0.081 -3.36** -1.399 1.816*
k -6.397 -0.063 9E-9 0.231 0.145
-0.348 -1.027 31.81** 0.943 3.052**
m -0.886 -0.290 -1.000 0.001 -0.607
-3.212** -3.095** 91E+7** 0.293 -2.093*
m 16.129 0.007 -30E-10 0.015 0.059
1.309 0.332 -4.684** 0.903 1.834*
n 3.553 -2.785 -1.000 0.977 -2.0811
2.478** -2.772** -9E8** -2.424* -2.580**
n -18.616 0.421 15E-10 0.786 0.244
-1.085 3.949** 3.61** 2.681** 2.736**
LR7 0.345 0.028 11E-16 0.026 -0.216
2.450** 1.244 0.413 0.395 -1.735*
N= 36 N=41 N=21 N=25 N=43
R-Sq=0.48 R-Sq=0.77 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.74 R-Sq=0.90
DW = 1.56 DW=2.07 DW=1.79 DW=2.38 DW1.36
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
234
Parameter Malawi Tunisia Trinidad Togo Thailand
 est 0.046 0.033 0.417 -0.015 0.034
t-stat 3.17** 3.653** 229.29** 0.6999 4.426**
l 0.302 0.260 0.005 -2.715 0.545
0.761 0.347 67.78** -1.295 1.944*
k -0.228 -0.430 -0.451E-3 0.305 0.951
-2.466** 0.865 -9.504** 1.487 2.839**
m -0.599 -0.291 -0.251 0.002 -0.483
-0.359 -2.991** -4.286** 0.591 -1.795*
m 0.163 0.010 0.475E-4 0.018 0.530
2.175* 0.484 0.770 1.021 2.416*
n 2.571 -2.598 -0.584E-4 -1.008 -1.754
1.806* -2.535** -5.171** -2.487* -2.386*
n -0.573 0.107 -0.109E-3 0.852 0.182
-1.048 3.656** -1.860* 2.348* 2.450**
LR8 -0.124 1.00 1.00 0.024 -0.274
-1.884* 1.00 1.00 0.480 -2.446**
N=36 N=41 N=21 N=25 N=43
R-Sq=0.85 R-Sq=0.76 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.74 R-Sq=0.91
DW =1.77 DW=1.93 DW=1.79 DW=1.90 DW=1.35
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
235
Parameter UAE Venezuela Uganda Benin Bangladesh
 est 0.007 0.002 -0.235 0.095 -0.035
t-stat 1.065 0.287 -3.259** 5.356** -1.728*
l 1.165 -0.226 -0.180 -0.379E-8 0.514
2.045* -0556 -2.197* -0.634 0.379
k -0.324 -0.203 0.286 0.092 0.005
-1.735* -2.652** 2.196* 0.482 0.538
m 0.167 -0.364 1.649 -4.094 -0.484
0.021 -1.854* 2.388* -0.709 -1.575
m -0.147 -0.041 -0.811 -0.972E-9 0.212
-1.535 -0.671 -2.440* -0.1002E-1 0.971
n -4.952 0.803 -0.131E-7 -0.509 0.166
-4.773** 2.598** -3.021** -3.192** 2.987**
n 0.998 0.868 0456 0.089 0.219
11.875** 5.681** 14.859** 2.321* 1.142
LR1 2.105 1.00 0.275 1.00 1.00
0.412 1.00 1.913* 1.00
N= 26 N=43 N=20 N=33 N=30
R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.93 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.69 R-Sq=0.46
DW = 1.52 DW=1.89 DW=2.37 DW=2.52 DW=1.96
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
236
Parameter UAE Venezuela Uganda Benin Bangladesh
 est 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.095 -0.035
t-stat 1.065 0.287 0.117 5.356** -1.728*
l 1.165 -0.226 -22.856** -0.379E-8 0.514
2.045* -0.556 -3.964 -0.634 0.379
k -03.24 -0.202 3.637** 0.091 0.056
-1.735* -2.652** 3.964** 0.482 0.538
m 0.167 -0.364 2.401 -4.095 -0.484
0.021 -1.854* 2.769** -0.709 -1.575*
m -0.147 -0.041 -0.093 -0.971E-9 0.166
-1.535 -0.671 -3.975 -0.010 0.971
n -4.952 0.803 -0.175E-3 -0.509 0.166
-4.773** 2.598** -3.345** -3.192** 2.987**
n 0.998 0.868 0.222E-3 0.088 0.219
11.875** 5.681** 8.674** 2.322* 1.142
LR2 2.105 1.00 -0.086 1.00 1.00
0.412 1.00 -1.116 1.00 1.00
N= 26 N=43 N=20 N=33 N=30
R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.93 R-Sq=0.98 R-Sq=0.69 R-Sq=0.46
DW =1.53 DW=1.89 DW=2.37 DW=2.52 DW=1.96
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
237
Parameter UAE Venezuela Uganda Benin Bangladesh
 est 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.095 -0.035
t-stat 1.065 0.287 0.117 5.356** -1.728*
l 1.165 -0.226 -22.856 -0.379 0.515
2.045* -0.556 -3.964** -0.633 0.379
k -0.324 -0.202 3.637 0.092 0.056
-1.735* -2.652** 3.964** 0.482 0.538
m 0.167 -0.364 -0.092 -4.094 -0.484
0.021 -1.854* -3.975** -0.709 -1.575
m -0.147 -0.041 -0.175E-7 -0.971 0.212
-1.535 -0.671 -3.345** -0.010 0.971
n -4.952 0.803 -0.175E-7 -0.509 0.166
-4.773** 2.598** -3.345** -3.192** 2.987**
n 0.998 0.868 0.222E-3 0.088 0.219
11.875** 5.681** 8.674** 2.324* 1.141
LR3 2.105 1.00 -0.085 1.00 1.00
0.412 1.00 -1.116 1.00 1.00
N= 26 N=43 N=20 N=33 N=30
R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.93 R-Sq=0.98 R-Sq=0.69 R-Sq=1.96
DW =1.53 DW=1.89 DW=1.47 DW=2.52 DW=1.96
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
238
Parameter UAE Venezuela Uganda Benin Bangladesh
 est 0.007 0.57E-3 -0.393 0.053 -0.035
t-stat 1.08 0.103 -3.876** 1.536 -1.758*
l 1.165 0.787 -0.003 -0.37E-8 0.683
2.079* 0.506 -0.004 -0.562 0.486
k -0324 -0.208 0.642E-3 0.160 0.065
-1.745* -2.671 0.005 1.14 0.600
m 0.167 -0.370 2.090 -17E-7 -0.500
0.022 -1.996* 4.032** -1.82* -1.581
m -0.147 -0.044 -0.287E-3 0.877 0.218
-1.553 -0.697 0.090 29.74** 1.012
n -4.925 0.808 -0.143E-7 0.19E+7 0.186
-4.741 2.643** -4.423** 1.894* 2.504**
n 0.998 0.891 0.186E-3 -0.87 0.233
12.113** 5.581** 11.322** -24.74** 1.207
LR4 2.379 -0.031 0.388 69E-2 `-0.016
0.425 -0.687 2.859** 0.42 -0.419
N= 26 N=43 N=20 N=33 N=30
R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.93 R-Sq=0.98 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.46
DW =1.53 DW=1.94 DW=1.41 DW=2.04 DW=2.03
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
239
Parameter UAE Venezuela Uganda Benin Bangladesh
 est -9.448 0.003 0.515 0.069 -0.455
t-stat -5.486** 0.444 4.806** 1.570 -3.013**
l -17.921 -0.844 0.022 -0.37E-8 4.649
-5.319** -0.642 0.702 0.714 1.482
k 5.310 -0.196 -0.003 -0.162 0.033
3.641** -2.571** -0.700 -1.169 0.305
m 6.145 -0.264 0.290 -18E-7 -0.354
14.030** -0.927 0.279 -1.95 -1.188
m 8.210 -0.032 0.773E-4 0.876 0.055
2.846* -0.535 0.609 30.28** 0.229
n -1.547 0.709 -0.236E-8 0.20E+7 0.197
-1.664 1.912* -0.382 -2.037** 3.648**
n 0.192 0.824 -0.312E-5 0.877 0.375
0.112 4.532** -0.708 -24.76** 1.731*
LR5 9.504 0.203 -0.759 0.007 -0.074
5.477** 0.482 -5.705** -0.584 1.825*
N= 26 N=43 N=20 N=33 N=30
R-Sq=0.90 R-Sq=0.93 R-Sq=0.96 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.5
DW =2.27 DW=1.87 DW=1.33 DW=2.05 DW=2.36
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
240
Parameter UAE Venezuela Uganda Benin Bangladesh
 est 0.704 0.003 -0.048 0.053 -0.106
t-stat 1.100 0.714 -0.603 1.531 -6.573**
l 1.165 7.097 -0.159 -0.37E-8 4.907
2.040* 2.922** -0.965 -0.562 2.016*
k -0.324 -0.196 0.025 0.16 0.054
-1.776* -3.102** 0.954 -1.14 0.485
m 0.167 0.011 -2.512 -0.17E-5 0.182
0.021 0.059 -1.082 -1.87 0.642
m -0.147 0.045 -0.489E-3 0.877 -0.582
-1.514 -0.916 -0.720 29.74** -1.918*
n -4.952 0.330 0.133E-7 0.19E+7 0.123
-4.735** 1.125 0.949 1.894 2.879**
n 0.998 0.764 0.134E-3 0.905 1.077
11.646** 7.005** 5.307** 2.391* 3.609**
LR6 2.062 -0.241 -1.635 0.69E-2 0.100
0.408 -2.696** -2.492* 0.422 4.682**
N=26 N=43 N=20 N=33 N=30
R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.94 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.67
DW =1.53 DW=2.17 DW=1.57 DW=2.04 DW=1.97
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
241
Parameter UAE Venezuela Uganda Benin Bangladesh
 est -10.172 0.557E-3 0.353 0.043 -0.110
t-stat -5.3664** 0.125 -1.929* 1.55 -3.764**
l -30.293 2.686 1.046 -12E-10 -0.198
-4.652** 2.416* 3.173** -0.369 -0.093
k 6.097 -0.226 -0.166 0.141 0.318
3.796** -3.215** -3.165** -0.938 1.964*
m 5.709 -0.181 1.363 -16E-7 0.279
14.655** -0.991 2.049* -1.657 0.750
m 3.359 -0.035 0.006 0.875 -0.373
1.939* -0.607 3.145** 29.77** -1.040
n -1.440 0.578 -0.925E-8 18E+5 0.342
-1.701* 1.944* -2.264* -24.23** 0.542
n -10.378 0.850 0.176E-4 25E-4 0.733
-6.308** 6.748** 6.127** -0.165 2.297*
LR7 10.226 -0.097 0.223 -0.439 0.094
5.350** -2.724** 1.116 1.555 3.193**
N=26 N=43 N=20 N=33 N=30
R-Sq=0.90 R-Sq=0.94 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.60
DW =2.27 DW=2.02 DW=1.36 DW=2.02 DW=1.97
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
242
Parameter UAE Venezuela Uganda Benin Bangladesh
 est 0.070 0.557E-3 0.245 0.043 0.117
t-stat 1.087 0.125 -2.975** 1.566 -5.387**
l 1.165 2.68 1.340 -069E-11 1.501
2.070* 2.417* 3.267** -0.148 0.711
k -0.324 -0.226 -0.214 -0.155 -0.073
-1.793* -3.216** -3.263** -1.080 -0.578
m 0.167 -0.182 2.000 -17E-7 0.111
0.022 -0.991 2.795** -1.812 0.397
m -0.147 -0.035 0.007 0.875 -0.333
-1.540 -0.607 3.183** 29.47** -1.189
n -4.952 0.578 -0.141E-3 -0.442 0.314
-4.785** 1.943* -3.189** -2.789** 0.700
n 0.998 0.851 0.227E-3 0.876 0.75
12.027** 6.748** 11.737** 23.82 2.894**
LR8 2.30 -0.097 0.192 -20E-4 0.107
0.421 -2.724** 1.276 -0.165 4.791**
N= 26 N=43 N=20 N=33 N=30
R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.94 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.71
DW =1.53 DW=2.02 DW=1.45 DW=2.02 DW=1.97
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
243
Parameter Bahrain Argentina Algeria Brazil Bolivia
 est -0.729 -0.686 0.34E-13 -0.174 -1.30
t-stat -16.189** -12.595** 3.41** -4.726** -22.207**
l 0.997 1.000 -0.21E-20 0.999 1.001
0.997 1.000 -4.417** 0.999 1.001
k 0.990 1.000 0.14E-13 0.990 1.010
0.990 1.000 1.499 0.990 1.010
m 1.000 1.000 -0.15E-12 0.999 0.998
1.000 1.000 -7.478** 0.999 1.150
m 0.988 0.999 1.00 1.000 0.969
0.988 0.999 0.29E+15 1.000 0.969
n 0.404E-5 -0.604E-5 0.2E-18 -0.235E-3 -0.923E-3
0.404E-5 -0.605E-5 2.99 -0.235E-3 -0.177E-3
n 0.984 0.950 -1.000 0.983 0.928
0.984 0.950 -0.15E+14 0.983 0.929
LR1 1.000 1.000 0.25 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 3.357 1.000 1.000
N=32 N=41 N=41 N=43 N=37
R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.05 R-Sq=0.30
DW = 1.88 DW=1.73 DW=1.89 DW=2.04 DW= 1.36
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
244
Parameter Bahrain Argentina Algeria Brazil Bolivia
 est -0.729 -0.686 0.34E-13 -0.174 -1.30
t-stat -16.189** -12.595** 3.471** -4.726** -22.207**
l 0.997 1.000 -0.21E-20 0.999 1.001
0.997 1.000 -4.417** 0.999 1.001
k 0.990 1.000 0.14E-13 0.990 1.010
0.990 1.000 1.499 0.990 1.010
m 1.000 1.000 -0.15E-12 0.999 1.001
1.000 1.000 -0.17E-6 0.999 1.001
m 0.988 0.999 1.00 1.001 0.998
0.988 0.999 0.29E15 1.001 1.150
n 0.404E-5 -0.604E-5 2E-17 -0.235E-3 -0.923E-3
0.404E-5 -0.605E-5 2.99** -0.232E-3 -0.002
n 0.984 0.950 -1.000 0.982 0.928
0.984 0.950 1.000 0.982 0.928
LR2 1.000 1.000 0.25E-13 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 3.471** 1.000 1.000
N=32 N=41 N=41 N=2.42 N=37
R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.05 R-Sq=0.02
DW = 1.44 DW=1.73 DW=1.89 DW=2.04 DW= 1.36
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
245
Parameter Bahrain Argentina Algeria Brazil Bolivia
 est -0.729 -0.686 -0.485E-4 -0.174 -1.30
t-stat -16.189** -12.595** -0.838 -5.726** -22.207**
l 0.997 1.000 0.821E-11 0.999 1.001
0.997 1.000 0.352 1.019 1.001
k 0.990 1.000 0.003 0.990 1.001
0.990 1.000 1.087 0.990 1.001
m 1.000 1.000 0.317 0.999 0.998
1.000 1.000 0.955 1.008 1.150
m 0.988 0.999 0.002 1.000 0.969
0.988 0.999 2.575** 1.032 0.969
n 0.404E-5 -0.604E-5 0.029 -0.32E-3 0.923
0.404E-5 -0.605E-5 1.610 -0.629E-3 -0.002
n 0.984 0.950 0.017 0.982 -0.928
0.984 0.950 4.447** 0.984 -0.928
LR3 1.000 1.000 -0.003 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 -2.293* 1.000 1.000
N=32 N=41 N=41 N=43 N=37
R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq=0.82 R-Sq=0.07 R-Sq=0.30
DW = 1.44 DW=1.73 DW=1.23 DW=2.04 DW= 1.36
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
246
Parameter Bahrain Argentina Algeria Brazil Bolivia
 est -0.729 -0.686 -0.035 -0.174 -1.398
t-stat -16.189** -12.595** -28.752** -5.726** -21.841**
l 0.997 1.000 0.366 0.999 1.001
0.997 1.000 17.416** 1.019 1.001
k 0.990 1.000 0.670 0.990 1.010
0.990 1.000 1.136 0.990 1.010
m 1.000 1.000 0.329E-6 0.999 0.998
1.000 1.000 1.534 1.008 1.212
m 0.988 0.999 0.181 1.000 0.969
0.988 0.999 2.681** 1.000 0.969
n 0.404E-5 -0.604E-5 0.021 -0.232 -0.923E-3
0.404E-5 -0.605E-5 1.035 -0.629 -0.001
n 0.984 0.950 0.036 0.982 0.928
0.984 0.950 4.054** 0.984 0.928
LR4 1.000 1.000 0.413 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 3.007** 1.000 1.000
N=32 N=41 N=41 N=43 N=37
R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq=0.80 R-Sq=0.07 R-Sq=0.02
DW = 1.44 DW=1.72 DW=1.53 DW=1.39 DW=1.02
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
247
Parameter Bahrain Argentina Algeria Brazil Bolivia
 est -0.729 -0.686 -0.033 -0.174 -1.398
t-stat -16.189** -12.595** -25.767** -5.726** -21.266**
l 0.997 1.000 0.326E-8 0.999 1.001
0.997 1.000 11.723** 1.019 1.001
k 0.990 1.000 0.006 0.990 1.010
0.990 1.000 0.992 0.990 1.010
m 1.000 1.000 0.472E-6 0.999 0.998
1.000 1.000 2.014* 1.008 1.371
m 0.988 0.999 0.186 1.000 0.969
0.988 0.999 2.492** 1.031 0.969
n 0.404E-5 -0.604E-5 0.243 -0.232E-3 -0.92E-3
0.404E-5 -0.605E-5 0.972 -0.629E-3 -0.13E-2
n 0.984 0.950 0.353 0.982 0.928
0.984 0.950 4.158** 0.984 0.929
LR5 1.000 1.000 0.4E-3 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 0.230 1.000 1.002
N=32 N=41 N=41 N=43 N=37
R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq=0.75 R-Sq=0.07 R-Sq=0.02
DW = 1.44 DW=1.78 DW=1.27 DW=1.44 DW=1.94
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
248
Parameter Bahrain Argentina Algeria Brazil Bolivia
 est -0.729 -0.686 0.004 -0.174 -1.398
t-stat -16.189** -12.595** 4.286** -4.726** -22.049**
l 0.997 1.000 -0.196E-9 0.999 1.001
0.997 1.000 -5.185** 0.999 1.001
k 0.990 1.000 0.005 0.990 1.010
0.990 1.000 2.043* 0.990 1.010
m 1.000 1.000 -0.301E-5 0.999 0.998
1.000 1.000 -2.126* 0.999 1.169
m 0.988 0.999 0.483 1.000 0.962
0.988 0.999 2.153* 1.000 0.969
n 0.404E-5 -0.604E-5 0.270 -0.234E-3 -0.001
0.404E-5 -0.605E-5 1.519 -0.232E-3 -0.19
n 0.984 0.950 0.017 0.982 0.928
0.984 0.950 5.371** 0.982 0.929
LR6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.005
N=32 N=41 N=41 N=43 N=37
R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq=0.85 R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq=0.03
DW = 1.44 DW=1.73 DW=1.36 DW=2.16 DW=1.47
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
249
Parameter Bahrain Argentina Algeria Brazil Bolivia
 est -0.729 -0.686 -0.033 -0.174 -1.398
t-stat -16.189** -12.595** -24.890** -5.755** -21.423**
l 0.997 1.000 0.308E-8 0.999 1.001
0.997 1.000 11.322** 1.016 1.001
k 0.990 1.000 0.006 0.990 1.001
0.990 1.000 0.976 0.990 1.001
m 1.000 1.000 0.524E-6 0.999 0.998
1.000 1.000 2.084* 0.990 0.998
m 0.988 0.999 0.019 1.008 0.969
0.988 0.999 2.938** 1.026 0.969
n 0.404E-5 -0.604E-5 0.021 -0.23E-3 -0.001
0.404E-5 -0.605E-5 0.980 -0.67E-3 -0.155
n 0.984 0.950 0.333 0.982 0.928
0.984 0.950 3.834** 0.984 0.928
LR7 1.000 1.000 0.002 1.000 0.999
1.000 1.000 1.301 1.000 1.002
N=32 N=41 N=41 N=43 N=37
R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq=0.76 R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq=0.02
DW = 1.44 DW=1.79 DW=1.36 DW=1.48 DW=1.42
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
250
Parameter Bahrain Argentina Algeria Brazil Bolivia
 est -0.729 -0.686 -0.032 -0.174 -0.139
t-stat -16.189** -12.595** -25.216** -5.674** -21.897**
l 0.997 1.000 0.317E-8 0.999 1.001
0.997 1.000 15.571** 1.025 1.001
k 0.990 1.000 0.001 0.990 1.010
0.990 1.000 0.284 0.990 1.010
m 1.000 1.000 0.493E-6 0.999 0.998
1.000 1.000 2.126* 1.014 1.198
m 0.988 0.999 0.025 1.001 0.969
0.988 0.999 3.745** 1.040 0.969
n 0.404E-5 -0.604E-5 0.0.02 -0.23E-3 -0.104
0.404E-5 -0.605E-5 0.097 -0.55E-3 -0.002
n 0.984 0.950 0.022 0.982 0.928
0.984 0.950 2.770** 0.984 0.929
LR8 1.000 1.000 -0.006 1.000 0.999
1.000 1.000 -3.589** 1.000 1.001
N=32 N=41 N=43 N=43 N=37
R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq=0.82 R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq=0.32
DW = 1.44 DW=1.72 DW=1.68 DW=1.82 DW=1.17
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
251
Parameter Ghana Mali Nicaragua Saudi Arabia Turkey
 est -0.930 0.103 -2.561 -0.458 25E-6
t-stat -16.033** 0.933 -26.862** -9.429** 0.72
l 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 49E-5
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 -2.32
k 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 27E-5
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.366
m 0.229E-6 1.000 1.000 1.000 86E-6
0.229E-6 1.000 1.000 1.000 2.742
m 0.943 0.965 1.000 0.960 1.000
0.943 0.965 1.000 0.961 1.000
n 1.000 0.56E-5 0.502E-6 0.5E-5 -0.1E-3
1.000 0.56E-5 0.505E-6 0.5E-5 -2.47**
n 1.000 0.965 0.851 0.999 1.000
1.000 0.965 0.851 0.999 -1.23
LR1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 25E-6
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 -1.235
N=36 N=22 N=27 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.01 R-Sq=0.33 R-Sq=1.00
DW =1.91 DW=1.99 DW=2.00 DW=1.70 DW=1.67
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
252
Parameter Ghana Mali Nicaragua Saudi Arabia Turkey
 est -0.930 0.103 -2.561 -0.458 -0.269
t-stat -16.033** 0.933 -26.862** -9.429** -7.047**
l 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
k 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
m 0.229E-6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.119
0.229E-6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.119
m 0.943 0.965 1.000 0.960 0.974
0.943 0.965 1.000 0.961 0.974
n 1.000 0.56E-5 0.502E-6 0.5E-5 -0.300
1.000 0.56E-5 0.505E-6 0.5E-5 -0.300
n 1.000 0.965 0.851 0.999 0.974
1.000 0.965 0.851 0.999 0.974
LR2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
N=36 N=22 N=27 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq0.99 R-Sq=0.01 R-Sq=0.33 R-Sq=1.00
DW =2.00 DW=1.99 DW=2.00 DW=1.70 DW=1.80
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
253
Parameter Ghana Mali Nicaragua Saudi Arabia Turkey
 est -0.930 0.103 -2.561 -0.458 -0.269
t-stat -16.033** 0.933 -26.862** -9.429** -7.047**
l 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
k 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.008
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.008
m 0.229E-6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.119
0.229E-6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.119
m 0.943 0.965 1.000 0.960 0.974
0.943 0.965 1.000 0.961 0.974
n 1.000 0.56E-5 0.502E-6 0.5E-5 -0.3000
1.000 0.56E-5 0.505E-6 0.5E-5 -0.3000
n 1.000 0.965 0.851 0.999 0.974
1.000 0.965 0.851 0.999 0.974
LR3 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
N=36 N=22 N=27 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq0.99 R-Sq=0.01 R-Sq=0.33 R-Sq=1.00
DW =1.85 DW=1.99 DW=2.23 DW=1.70 DW=1.69
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
254
Parameter Ghana Mali Nicaragua Saudi Arabia Turkey
 est -0.930 0.103 -2.561 -0.458 -0.269
t-stat -16.033** 0.933 -26.862** -9.429** -7.047**
l 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
k 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
m 0.229E-6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.119
0.229E-6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.119
m 0.943 0.965 1.000 0.960 0.974
0.943 0.965 1.000 0.961 0.974
n 1.000 0.56E-5 0.502E-6 0.5E-5 -0.300
1.000 0.56E-5 0.505E-6 0.5E-5 -0.300
n 1.000 0.965 0.851 0.999 0.974
1.000 0.965 0.851 0.999 0.974
LR4 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
N=36 N=22 N=27 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq0.99 R-Sq=0.01 R-Sq=0.33 R-Sq=1.00
DW =2.00 DW=1.2 DW=1.72 DW=1.70 DW=1.80
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
255
Parameter Ghana Mali Nicaragua Saudi Arabia Turkey
 est -0.930 0.103 -2.561 -0.458 -0.269
t-stat -16.033** 0.933 -26.862** -9.429** -7.047**
l 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
k 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.008
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.008
m 0.229E-6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.119
0.229E-6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.119
m 0.943 0.965 1.000 0.960 0.974
0.943 0.965 1.000 0.961 0.974
n 1.000 0.56E-5 0.502E-6 0.5E-5 -0.300
1.000 0.56E-5 0.505E-6 0.5E-5 -0.300
n 1.000 0.965 0.851 0.999 0.974
1.000 0.965 0.851 0.999 0.974
LR5 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
N=36 N=22 N=27 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq0.99 R-Sq=0.01 R-Sq=0.33 R-Sq=1.00
DW =2.15 DW=1.95 DW=1.72 DW=1.70 DW=1.80
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
256
Parameter Ghana Mali Nicaragua Saudi Arabia Turkey
 est -0.930 0.103 -2.561 -0.458 -0.269
stat -16.033** 0.933 -26.862** -9.429** -7.047**
l 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
k 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.008
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.008
m 0.229E-6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.119
0.229E-6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.119
m 0.943 0.965 1.000 0.960 0.974
0.943 0.965 1.000 0.961 0.974
n 1.000 0.56E-5 0.502E-6 0.5E-5 -0.300
1.000 0.56E-5 0.505E-6 0.5E-5 -0.300
n 1.000 0.965 0.851 0.999 0.974
1.000 0.965 0.851 0.999 0.974
LR6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
N=36 N=22 N=27 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq0.99 R-Sq=0.01 R-Sq=0.33 R-Sq=1.00
DW =1.97 DW=1.33 DW=2.00 DW=1.70 DW=1.80
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
257
Parameter Ghana Mali Nicaragua Saudi Arabia Turkey
 est -0.930 0.103 -2.561 -0.458 -0.269
t-stat -16.033** 0.933 -26.862** -9.429** -7.047**
l 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
k 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.008
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.008
m 0.229E-6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.119
0.229E-6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.119
m 0.943 0.965 1.000 0.960 0.974
0.943 0.965 1.000 0.961 .0974
n 1.000 0.56E-5 0.502E-6 0.5E-5 -0.300
1.000 0.56E-5 0.505E-6 0.5E-5 -0.300
n 1.000 0.965 0.851 0.999 0.974
1.000 0.965 0.851 0.999 0.974
LR7 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
N=36 N=22 N=27 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq0.99 R-Sq=0.01 R-Sq=0.33 R-Sq=1.00
DW =2.05 DW=2.14 DW=1.72 DW=1.70 DW=1.85
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
258
Parameter Ghana Mali Nicaragua Saudi Arabia Turkey
 est -0.930 0.103 -2.561 -0.458 -0.269
t-stat -16.033** 0.933 -26.862** -9.429** -7.047**
l 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001
k 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.008
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.008
m 0.229E-6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.119
0.229E-6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.119
m 0.943 0.965 1.000 0.960 0.974
0.943 0.965 1.000 0.961 0.974
n 1.000 0.56E-5 0.502E-6 0.5E-5 -0.300
1.000 0.56E-5 0.505E-6 0.5E-5 -0.300
n 1.000 0.965 0.851 0.999 0.974
1.000 0.965 0.851 0.999 0.974
LR8 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
N=36 N=22 N=27 N=43 N=43
R-Sq=0.00 R-Sq0.99 R-Sq=0.01 R-Sq=0.33 R-Sq=1.00
DW =2.13 DW=2.12 DW=1.85 DW=1.70 DW=1.85
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
259
APPENDIX B
CROSS NATIONAL TIME SERIES RESULTS WITH A SINGLE POLITICAL
VARIABLE
Parameter All States MENA-N/OI MENA-OI Arab World MENA
l est 0.403 1.875 0.209 1.278 1.427
t-stat 28.08** 25.15** 7.646** 26.42** 24.55**
k 0.7E-10 -0.327 -0.365 -1.144 -0.677
0.217 -0.360 -2.251** -2.045* -0.989
m 0.596 -0.759 -0.774 0.370 0.004
41.48** -7.873** -3.334** 5.849** 0.077
m 0.93E-4 0.167 0.958 0.529 0.14E-3
18.90** 27.17** 93.60** 6.721** 20.28**
n -0.689 -1.764 -3.946 4.677 0.390
-2.547** -0.397 -2.744** 1.518 0.096
n -0.2E-9 -0.580 -0.653 -0.577 -1.078
-0.283 -0.357 -3.215** -0.757 -1.122
LR1 -0.38E-6 -0.295E-5 0.015 0.572 -0.409
-0.122 -1.68* 0.280 0.378 -2.091*
N=2349 N=251 N=200 N=350 N=451
R-Sq=1.00 R-SQ=0.88 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.79 R-Sq=0.72
DW=1.23 DW=-1.679 DW=1.78 DW=1.13 DW=1.12
Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
260
Parameter All States MEAN-N/O MENA-OI Arab World MENA
l est 0.403 1.864 0.210 1.278 1.425
t-stat 28.100** 25.09** 7.748** 26.48** 24.55**
k 0.78E-10 -0.300 -0.369 -1.165 -0.778
0.217 -0.332 -2.263** -2.082* -1.137
m 0.597 -0.739 -0.784 0.366 0.269
41.59** -7.692** -3.409** 5.790** 0.056
m 0.935 0.16E-3 0.958 0.54E-4 0.135
19.08** 27.48** 94.04** 7.156** 20.24**
n -0.685 1.624 -3.945 4.310 3.812
-2.544** 0.398 -2.743** 1.512 1.010
n -0.192 -0.305 -0.648 -0.487 -0.834
-0.283 -0.018 -3.176** -0.636 -0.861
LR2 -0.312 -0.426 0.002 -0.156 -0.396
-2.462** -2.216* 0.037 -0.921 -2.337**
N=2349 N=251 N=200 N=350 N=451
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.88 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.79 R-Sq=0.72
DW =1.24 DW=1.33 DW=1.78 DW=1.13 DW=1.14
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
261
Parameter All States MEAN-N/O MENA-OI Arab World MENA
l est 0.402 1.882 0.210 1.281 1.439
t-stat 28.08** 25.16** 7.730 26.33** 24.69**
k 0.78E-10 -0.578 -0.368 -1.168 -0.940
0.217 -0.632 -2.241** -2.064* -1.358
m 0.597 -0.747 -0.078 0.004 0.037
41.63** -7.745** -3.410** 5.836** 0.077
m 0.94E-4 0.17E-3 0.958 0.54E-4 0.136
19.12** 27.41** 93.82** 7.142** 20.34**
n -0.69E-5 1.853 -3.946 4.271 3.836
-2.568** 0.450 -2.743** 1.496 1.015
n -0.19E-9 0.633 -0.649 -0.522 -0.760
-0.283 0.039 -3.179** -0.676 -0.779
LR3 -0.345 -0.263 0.003 -0.048 -0.313
-2.869** -1.628* 0.079 -0.353 -2.219*
N=2349 N=251 N=200 N=350 N=451
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.88 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.79 R-Sq=0.72
DW =1.24 DW=1.32 DW=1.78 DW=1.13 DW=1.14
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
262
Parameter All States MEAN-N/O MENA-OI Arab World MENA
l est 0.404 1.871 0.209 1.279 1.426
t-stat 28.11** 25.000** 7.720** 26.44** 24.45**
k 0.84E-10 -0.509 -0.355 -1.139 -0.876
0.232 -0.555 -2.113* -2.016* -1.255
m 0.596 -0.755 -0.078 0.368 -0.166
41.45** -7.803** -3.424** 5.827** -0.035
m 0.930 0.165 0.958 0.538 0.136
18.96** 27.26** 93.65** 7.124** 20.22**
n -0.675 0.440 -3.955 4.237 3.506
-2.496** 0.106 -2.749** 1.485 0.925
n -0.205 -1.357 -0.658` -0.567 -1.279
-0.302 -0.161 -3.209** -0.743 -1.322
LR4 0.533 -0.129 0.011 -0.002 -0.149
0.619 -1.013 0.311 -0.020 1.35
N=2349 N=251 N=200 N=350 N=451
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.88 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.79 R-Sq=0.72
DW =1.23 DW=1.30 DW=1.78 DW=1.13 DW=1.12
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
263
Parameter All States MEAN-N/O MENA-OI Arab World MENA
l est 0.404 1.871 0.210 1.278 1.427
t-stat 28.20** 24.94** 7.757** 26.42** 24.42**
k 0.78E-10 -0.370 -0.368 -1.13 -0.693
0.217 -0.403 -2.277* -2.019* -1.010
m 0.595 -0.753 -0.078 0.368 0.003
41.52** -7.772** -3.412** 5.834** 0.062
m 0.93E-4 0.16E-3 0.958 0.537 0.13E-3
19.07** 27.05** 94.15** 7.107** 20.03**
n -0.767 0.971 -3.946 4.188 3.397
-2.835** 0.234 -2.743** 1.453 0.891
n -0.192E-9 -0.644 -0.647 -0.573 -1.160
-0.283 -0.394 -3.203** -0.750 -1.202
LR5 0.274 0.589 -0.016 0.024 0.070
2.808** 0.326 -0.165 0.125 0.369
N=2349 N=251 N=200 N=350 N=451
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.88 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.79 R-Sq=0.86
DW =1.23 DW=1.30 DW=1.78 DW=1.13 DW=1.12
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
264
Parameter All States MEAN-N/O MENA-OI Arab World MENA
l est 0.403 1.872 0.210 1.277 1.426
t-stat 28.11** 24.99** 7.773** 26.44** 24.47**
k 0.78E-10 -0.464 -0.370 -1.203 -0.766
0.217 -0.507 -2.292** -2.137* -1.114
m 0.596 -0.755 -0.078 0.370 0.433
41.55** -7.797** -3.408** 5.868** 0.906
m 0.93 0.16E-3 0.958 0.55E-4 0.135
19.01** 27.12** 94.19** 4.210** 20.10**
n -0.752 1.886 -3.943 5.572 4.541
-2.771** 0.445 -2.740** 1.745* 1.179
n -0.19E-9 -0.570 -0.649 -0.594 -1.199
-0.283 -0.349 -3.197** -0.779 -1.245
LR6 -0.201 -0.160 -0.007 -0.413 -0.323
-1.971* -0.704 0.094 -0.927 -1.452
N=2349 N=251 N=200 N=350 N=451
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.88 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.79 R-Sq=0.72
DW =1.23 DW=1.30 DW=1.78 DW=1.36 DW=1.28
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
265
Parameter All States MEAN-N/O MENA-OI Arab World MENA
l est 0.403 1.873 0.209 1.277 1.426
t-stat 28.11** 25.00** 7.744** 26.42** 24.40**
k 0.814E-10 -0.388 -0.367 -1.124 -0.72
0.225 -0.425 -2.273** -2.011* -1.043
m 0.596 -0.755 -0.769 0.363 0.38E-3
41.49** -7.797** -3.330** 5.723** 0.008
m 0.929 0.165 0.958 0.53E-4 0.13E-3
18.95** 27.01** 94.20** 7.071** 20.08**
n -0.687 0.767 -3.936 3.963 3.344
-2.551** 0.185 -2.737** 1.383 0.879
n -0.19E-9 -0.678 -0.668 -0.492 -1.082
-0.293 -0.415 -3.237* -0.643 -1.116
LR7 -0.331 0.147 -0.026 0.180 0.143
-0.286 0.704 -0.488 0.926 0.766
N=2349 N=251 N=200 N=350 N=451
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.88 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.79 R-Sq=0.72
DW =1.23 DW=1.30 DW=1.79 DW=1.13 DW=1.12
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
266
Parameter All States MEAN-N/O MENA-OI Arab World MENA
l est 0.403 1.872 0.210 1.278 1.425
t-stat 28.10** 25.03** 7.767** 26.45** 24.49**
k 0.949 -0.542 -0.375 -1.186 -0.830
0.262 -0.588 -2.321* -2.103* -1.205
m 0.596 -0.758 -0.772 0.369 0.464
41.53** -7.829** -3.366** 5.847** 0.097
m 0.930 0.16E-3 0.958 0.543 0.13E-3
18.98** 27.07** 94.26** 7.174** 20.09**
n -0.709 1.912 -3.929 4.588 4.265
-2.627** 0.458 -2.733** 1.581 1.122
n -0.194 -0.495 -0.654 -0.564 -1.158
-0.286 0.303 -3.233** -0.740 -1.205
LR8 -0.122 -0.242 -0.345 -0.179 -0.386
-1.276 -1.054 0.566 -0.655 -1.862**
N= 2349 N=251 N=200 N=350 N=451
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.88 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.79 R-Sq=0.72
DW =1.23 DW=1.30 DW=1.78 DW=1.13 DW=1.13
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
267
Parameter L. America Africa Asia Caribbean
l 0.339 0.157
17.45** 2.934**
k 0.57E-6 0.194
0.134 0.178
m 0.661 0.842
33.99** 15.65**
m 0.95E-4 0.10E-3
13.18** 6.980**
n 0.007 -1.732
0.034 -2.793**
n 0.756 0.119
0.034 1.253
LR1 -1.085 -0.14E-5
-0.594 -0.334
N=649 N=718
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00
DW = 1.45 DW=1.22
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
268
Parameter L. America Africa Asia Caribbean
l 0.340 0.162 0.183 0.277
17.52** 3.00** 13.94** 6.263**
k 0.50E-6 0.961 -0.173 -0.266
0.118 0.187 -2.028** -3.481**
m 0.659 0.837 0.002 0.096
33.93** 15.53** 0.325 2.748**
m 0.95E-4 0.10E-3 0.974 0.875
1.3.25** 6.985** 118.8** 24.18**
n 0.050 -1.769 -91415 2258.7
0.228 -2.846** -0.330 0.3140
n 0.050 0.2E-8 -1.401 0.129
0.229 1.248 -4.399** 1.670
LR2 -0.363 0.218 0.001 -0.746
-1.346 0.657 0.077 -0.634
N=649 N=718 N=346 N=178
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.97
DW = 1.45 DW=1.22 DW=1.63 DW=1.93
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
269
Parameter L. America Africa Asia Caribbean
l 0.340 0.162 0.183 0.277
17.53** 2.99** 13.94** 6.263**
k 0.49E-6 0.96E-10 -0.174 -0.266
0.117 0.187 -2.028* -3.481**
m 0.659 0.838 0.003 0.096
33.94** 15.52** 0.325 2.748**
m 0.95E-4 0.10E-3 0.975 0.874
13.25** 6.95** 118.8** 24.18**
n 0.052 -1.765 -91415 2258.7
0.235 -2.837** -0.330 0.314
n 0.523 0.12E-8 -1.401 0.129
0.235 1.248 -4.399** 1.670
LR3 -0.378 0.158 0.001 -0.074
-1.418 0.505 0.077 -0.634
N=649 N=718 N=346 N=178
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.97
DW =1.45 DW=1.22 DW=1.62 DW=1.93
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
270
Parameter L. America Africa Asia Caribbean
l 0.339 0.159 0.183 0.27596
17.47** 2.959** 14.02** 6.224**
k 0.14E-6 0.88E-10 -0.155 -0.267
0.032 0.175 -1.857* -3.481**
m 0.660 0.841 0.003 0.962
33.95** 15.65** 0.385 2.744**
m 0.95E-4 0.10E-3 0.975 0.876
13.18** 7.022 119.5** 24.21**
n 0.009 -1.736 -25726 2350.2
0.043 -2.798** -0.930 0.3253
n 0.967 0.12E-8 -1.449 0.12895
0.044 1.255 -4.559** 1.672
LR4 0.092 -0.021 -0.023 -0.865
0.548 -0.090 -1.907* -0.097
N=679 N=718 N=346 N=178
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.000 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.97
DW =1.11 DW=1.21 DW=1.63 DW=1.92
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
271
Parameter L. America Africa Asia Caribbean
l 0.340 0.158 0.182 0.257
17.53** 2.953** 13.93** 6.215**
k 0.17E-5 0.920 -0.169 -0.267
0.403 0.179 -2.019* -3.789**
m 0.659 0.841 0.003 0.098
33.89** 15.67** 0.328 2.783**
m 0.953 0.10E-3 0.975 0.876
13.25** 7.042** 119.1** 24.23**
n 0.680 -1.737 -15175 1580
0.031 -2.803** 0.054 0.2136
n 0.007 0.20E-8 -1.551 0.12919
0.030 1.252 -4.620** 1.676
LR5 0.235 0.132 -0.019 -0.036
1.377 0.526 -1.378 -0.420
N=649 N=718 N=346 N=178
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.97
DW =1.45 DW=1.21 DW=1.62 DW=1.92
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
272
Parameter L. America Africa Asia Caribbean
l 0.339 0.158 0.183 0.275
17.46** 2.954** 13.97** 6.236**
k 0.64E-6 0.81E-10 -0.166 -0.265
0.147 0.157 -1.976* -3.468**
m 0.660 0.841 0.317 0.094
33.98** 15.68** 0.344 2.665**
m 0.95E-4 0.10E-3 0.975 0.876
13.17** 7.032** 118.9 24.24**
n 0.863 -1.638 -94265 3325.1
0.039 -2.612** -0.3419 0.457
n 0.008 0.12E-8 -1.374 0.127
0.039 1.260 -4.282** 1.658
LR6 -0.146 -0.289 -0.010 -0.064
0.039 -1.038 -0.682 -0.886
N=649 N=718 N=346 N=178
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.97
DW =1.44 DW=1.22 DW=1.64 DW=1.92
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
273
Parameter L. America Africa Asia Caribbean
l 0.339 0.158 0.183 0.275
17.48** 2.952** 13.91** 6.217**
k 0.87E-6 0.87E-10 -0.170 -0.266
0.206 0.171 -2.095* -3.481**
m 0.660 0.841 0.312 0.096
34.01** 15.66** 0.339 2.747**
m 0.94E-4 0.10E-3 0.974 0.876
13.20** 7.027** 118.90** 24.22**
n 0.014 -1.740 -71887 2398.1
0.063 -2.807** -0.258 0.331
n 0.014 0.12E-8 -1.422 0.129
0.063 1.262 -4.423** 1.671
LR7 -0.276 0.052 0.008 -0.157
-1.166 0.205 0.469 -0.158
N=649 N=718 N=346 N=178
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.97
DW =1.43 DW=1.21 DW=1.63 DW=1.92
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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Parameter L. America Africa Asia Caribbean
l 0.339 0.161 0.184 0.276
17.45** 2.994** 14.04** 6.236**
k 0.60E-6 0.12E-9 -0.163 -0.266
0.141 0.228 -1.952* -3.468**
m 0.660 0.839 0.003 0.095
33.98** 15.62** 0.357 2.719**
m 0.949 0.10E-3 0.974 0.875
13.17** 7.010** 119.20** 24.18**
n 0.008 -1.688 -99704 2777.6
0.038 -2.717** 0.363 0.382
n 0.008 0.12E-8 -1.337 0.128
0.038 1.251 -4.177** 1.66
LR8 -0.009 -0.223 -0.002 -0.035
-0.052 -1.009 -1.517 -0.490
N=649 N=718 N=346 N=178
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.97
DW =1.44 DW=1.22 DW=1.64 DW=1.92
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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APPENDIX C
CROSS NATIONAL TIME SERIES ANALYSIS RESULTS WITH EXTERNAL AND
INTERNAL CONFLICTS AS CONTROL VARIABLES – ALL STATES
Parameter LR4 LR5 LR6 LR7 LR8
l est. 0.403 0.403 0.402 0.402 0.403
t-stat 28.07** 28.16** 28.07** 28.03** 28.06**
k 0.08E-10 0.78E-10 0.78E-10 0.842 0.95E-10
0.230 0.218 0.217 0.233 0.262
m 0.597 0.597 0.598 0.597 0.597
41.49** 41.56** 41.60** 41.54** 41.57**
m 0.94E-4 0.94E-4 0.94E-4 0.94E-4 -0.94E-10
19.01** 19.12** 19.07** 19.00** 19.04**
n -0.67E-5 -0.77E-5 -0.75E-5 -0.69E-5 -0.71E-5
-2.497** -2.831** -2.765** -2.542** -2.620**
n -0.20E-9 -0.19E-9 -0.19E-9 -0.21E-9 -0.19E-9
-0.299 -0.284 -0.284 -0.304 -0.287
LR1 -0.33E-6 -0.92E-7 -0.68E-6 -0.487E-6 -0.563E-5
-0.108 -0.289 -0.219 -0.157 -0.181
LR2 -0.310 -0.313 -0.311 0.319 -0.310
-2.442** -2.746** -2.454** -2.505** -2.448**
LR4-8 0.050 0.276 -0.201 -0.064 -0.119
0.533 2.817** -1.968* -0.548 -1.254
N=2349 N=2349 N=2349 N=2349 N=2349
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00
DW=1.24 DW=1.24 DW=1.24 DW=1.24 DW=1.24
 Significant at 0.05 level
 ** Significant at 0.01 level
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CROSS NATIONAL TIME SERIES ANALYSIS RESULTS WITH EXTERNAL
AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS AS CONTROL VARIABLES – AFRICA
Parameter LR4 LR5 LR6 LR7 LR8
l est. 0.161 0.160 0.160 0.161 0.163
t-stat 2.983** 2.981 2.976** 2.977** 3.018**
k 0.91E-10 0.95E-10 0.832E-10 0.894 0.12E-9
0.177 0.186 0.162 0.174 0.237
m 0.839 0.839 0.11E-3 0.839 0.837
15.49** 15.50** 6.950** 15.50** 15.47**
m 0.10E-3 0.10E-3 1.656 0.10E-3 0.103
6.929** 6.944** -2.631** 6.935** 6.925**
n -1.759 -1.764 0.12E-8 -1.766 -1.711
-2.822** -2.833** 1.256 -2.837** -2.742**
n 0.12E-8 0.119E-8 -0.18E-5 0.12E-8 0.12E-8
1.254 1.248 -0.415 1.261 1.246
LR1 -0.15E-5 -0.129E-5 0.236 -0.13E-5 -0.12E-5
-0.379 -0.292 0.709 -0.350 -0.424
LR2 0.220 0.230 0.359 0.228 0.172
0.660 0.689 0.535 0.262 -0.388
LR4-8 -0.034 0.139 -0.308 0.067 -0.234
-0.149 0.552 -1.101 0.262 -1.052
N=718 N=718 N=718 N=718 N=718
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00
DW =1.22 DW =1.22 DW =1.22 DW =1.22 DW =1.22
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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CROSS NATIONAL TIME SERIES ANALYSIS RESULTS WITH EXTERNAL
AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS AS CONTROL VARIABLES – ASIA
Parameter LR4 LR5 LR6 LR7 LR8
l est. 0.183 0.183 0.184 0.183 0.184
t-stat 13.98** 13.92** 13.94** 13.89** 14.01**
k -0.153 -0.178 -0.164 -0.179 -0.151
-1.774* -2.079* -1.89* -2.071** -1.747*
m 0.036 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
0.391 0.308 0.349 0.335 0.387
m 0.975 0.975 0.974 0.975 0.975
119.3** 118.9** 118.7* 118.7** 119.00**
n -20629 -19812 -91519 -74542 -91919
-0.074 -0.070 -0.330 -0.267 -0.3327
n -1.449 -1.568 -1.372 -1.423 -1.325
-4.553** -4.644** -4.268** -4.418** -4.121**
LR1 -0.003 0.008 -0.002 0.002 -0.006
-0.173 0.515 -0.115 0.125 -0.377
LR2 -0.003 0.008 -0.002 0.002 -0.006
-0.173 0.515 0.535 0.125 -0.377
LR4-8 -0.238 0.008 -0.010 0.008 -0.025
-1.910* 0.515 -0.687 0.479 -1.601
N= 347 N= 347 N= 347 N= 347 N= 347
R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.99 R-Sq=0.99
DW =1.63 DW =1.63 DW =1.63 DW =1.63 DW =1.63
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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CROSS NATIONAL TIME SERIES ANALYSIS RESULTS WITH EXTERNAL
AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS AS CONTROL VARIABLES – MENA
Parameter LR4 LR5 LR6 LR7 LR8
l est. 1.422 1.437 1.422 1.424 1.422
t-stat 24.61** 24.58** 24.62** 24.57** 24.64**
k -1.924 -0.748 -0.797 -0.748 -0.857
-1.335 -1.093 -1.168 -1.096 -1.254
m -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.225 0.004
-0.050 0.064 0.086 0.047 0.093
m 0.14E-3 0.14E-3 0.14E-3 0.13E-3 0.14E-3
20.38** 20.14** 20.27** 20.19** 20.28**
n 0.394 0.675 1.471 0.655 1.081
0.097 0.166 0.361 0.162 0.268
n -0.899 -0.757 -0.816 -0.743 -0.785
-0.927 -0.783 -0.845 -0.776 -0.815
LR1 -0.44E-5 -0.41E-5 -0.433E-5 -0.40E-5 -0.45E-5
-2.251* -2.083* -2.219* -2.058* -2.289*
LR2 -0.382 -0.396 -0.373 -0.391
-2.625** -2.341* -2.206* -2.293* -2.111*
LR4-8 -0.163 0.410 -0.319 0.038 -0.383
-1.474 0.022 -1.440 0.0204 -1.839*
N=451 N=451 N=451 N=451 N=451
R-Sq=0.72 R-Sq=0.72 R-Sq=0.72 R-Sq=0.72 R-Sq=0.72
DW =1.16 DW =1.15 DW =1.16 DW =1.14 DW =1.16
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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CROSS NATIONAL TIME SERIES ANALYSIS RESULTS WITH EXTERNAL
AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS AS CONTROL VARIABLES – LATIN
AMERICA
Parameter LR4 LR5 LR6 LR7 LR8
l est. 0.341 0.342 0.340 0.341 0.340
t-stat 17.50** 17.560** 17.49** 17.52** 17.49**
k 0.18E-6 0.16E-5 0.54E-6 0.83E-6 0.67E-6
0.042 0.383 0.124 0.196 0.157
m 0.659 0.658 0.659 0.659 0.659
33.87** 33.81** 33.89** 33.92** 33.88**
m 0.95E-4 0.96E-4 0.95E-4 0.95E-4 0.95E-4
13.21** 13.28** 13.20** 13.24** 13.21**
n 0.49E-9 0.045 0.049 0.058 0.055
0.219 0.202 0.223 0.262 0.246
n 0.049 0.045 0.050 0.058 0.055
0.220 0.202 0.223 0.262 0.246
LR1 -1.105 -1.261 -1.083 -1.054 -1.114
-0.605 -0.690 -0.592 -0.578 -0.609
LR2 -0.349 -0.338 -0.362 -0.388 -0.360
-1.284 -1.252 -1.336 -1.433 -1.330
LR4-8 0.070 0.223 -0.007 -0.300 -0.046
0.414 1.339 0.172 -1.263 -0.567
N=694 N=694 N=694 N=694 N=694
R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00 R-Sq=1.00
DW =1.45 DW =1.45 DW =1.45 DW =1.44 DW =1.45
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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CROSS NATIONAL TIME SERIES ANALYSIS RESULTS WITH EXTERNAL
AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS AS CONTROL VARIABLES – CARIBBEAN
Parameter LR4 LR5 LR6 LR7 LR8
l est. 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.277 0.278
t-stat 6.240** 6.227** 6.225** 6.235** 6.261**
k -0.267 -0.267 -0.265 -0.267 -0.565
-3.471** -3.477** -3.459** -3.471** -3.456**
m 0.096 0.098 0.093 0.096 0.095
2.736** 2.754** 2.656** 2.737** 2.703**
m 0.875 0.875 0.874 0.875 0.873
24.09** 24.11** 24.12** 24.09** 24.04**
n 2293.5 1719.80 3278 2358.1 2841.5
0.3168 0.2319 0.449 0.325 0.3905
n 0.128 0.129 0.127 0.128 0.127
1.666* 1.670* 1.653* 1.666* 1.652*
LR1 -0.074 -0.068 -0.072 -0.074 -0.085
-0.627 -0.568 -0.618 -0.631 -0.712
LR2 -0.074 -0.068 -0.072 -0.074 -0.085
-0.627 -0.568 -0.618 -0.631 -0.712
LR4-8 -0.005 -0.027 -0.063 -0.015 -0.043
-0.059 -0.314 -0.873 -0.149 -0.587
N=178 N=178 N=178 N=178 N=178
R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.97 R-Sq=0.97
DW =1.93 DW =1.93 DW =1.93 DW =1.93 DW =1.93
* Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.01 level
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